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                                          Abstract


This research aims to examine the lived experiences of Money Boys (MBs), male-to-male prostitutes, in the People’s Republic of China, by asking, as a result of their experience, if issues of class and sexuality should be critically inspected in today’s Chinese culture, and whether new gendered/classed subjects are being generated. Based on the fieldwork that I researched in Shanghai, this thesis uses the analytical lens of “value/s” by interrogating how specific values are produced through new political economic apparatus—namely neo-liberalism and its relationship to traditional and socialist values. The thesis asks why some values have become significant to the forms of cultural and economic exchange performed by Money Boys. Using participant observation and in-depth interviews obtained in a brothel, bars and cruising parks, the data makes visible the ways in which different values are put into effect by the Money Boys by accessing resources from their working class backgrounds and bodies. Specifically the thesis shows how Money Boys problematise emergent Chinese homosexual identity which is currently normalised by urban citizens and the State. It also shows how Money Boys redefine the concept of cosmopolitanism to describe how they imagine and shape their future. 

Taken as a whole, this research proposes that there is an urgent need to reconsider how Chinese society is configured through the contemporary formation of material struggles, including the rural and urban polarisation and class relations of the newly rich and migrant poor. It demonstrates that materiality organises the ways in which values are redistributed and performed differently by different classed/gendered subjects. Money Boys, and their lived experiences, offer a critical way to illuminate how performing value in today’s China is a dynamic, contested process and how sex work complicates value formation through the sexualised body.
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The Value Turn of the People's Republic of China

“Money Can’t Buy Your Love, but the Rest Is Negotiable!” (Rentboy.com)

Went to Chen Ma’s brothel again today. When we had dinner together (they have a cooking rota!), I heard a different accent of Mandarin, which suggested that people in the house were from different provinces of Mainland China. Also, they told different stories to me but they have similar hopes, that is, to earn some money in the city and get a better life. With some glasses of not-cold-enough Chinese beer and sex jokes told in front of the pimp’s 10-year old daughter, I suddenly felt in this moment that what is happening in today’s China can in fact be seen to be deeply ‘embodied’ by my informants’ lives... (Fieldwork notes from June 6th 2011)

When I first visited China, in Beijing and Shanghai I soon noticed that expressions of “intimacy” were everywhere. Sex shops and therapeutic drugstores were on the streets (see photo 1), in the guest books of cafés girls wrote down in English their personal information and desire to find potential foreign boyfriends. An elite college student jotted down her break-up with her boyfriend, describing herself as a cold-hearted girl who did not know how to perform the “correct, authentic emotions” – crying for the end of intimacy (see photos 2 and 3). By night, however, the cities belonged to the sex workers. When I walked through the urban streets I was surprised by how often I would see houses adorned with tinsel and pink neon lights. If one looks in the door of these buildings they would be full of young women, who sitting were chatting to each other or just sat on the chair woodenly. It is obvious to me at the time that these houses are, in fact, brothels. For, they are not actually novel to me because in my hometown in Taiwan, and in other Asian cities that I have been to such as Hong Kong and Bangkok, the brothels always looked like this. In terms of the same-sex (male-male) trade, I remember the day I went to visit a friend who had just moved into a new building, and while we were in the lift we unexpectedly saw a small flyer on the wall saying “Ass Fucker Specialists” (操屁專家;cao pi zhuan jia ). We could not help but burst into laughter. At that time I realised that Money Boys seemed to really “live everywhere”, as documented by the immeasurable online advertisements in Chinese virtual space, websites for their brothels (under the name “massage salons”), or from sex tourists’ travel diaries online – all informed me that now, in China, Money Boys are “everywhere.” One interviewee of mine from Taiwan, a “senior” with ten years of experience as a sex tourist in Mainland China, once told me in an electrifying tone, that even in a far-west Chinese satellite city, near the Silk Road, he could still meet Money Boys in a public bath. 
      Nevertheless, for me, it is this “everywhere” that becomes a research puzzle. By emphasising that this exists “everywhere”, this prevents more urgent questions being asked, such as: Who are Money Boys? What are they doing? And more importantly, what stories and issues in today’s China can be questioned and engaged with from their lived experiences? Indeed, for researchers on sex work, no matter which position they take, namely, in support of or against the legalisation of prostitution, one can tease out a common concern in sex work research, that of the “intersections” that pattern prostitution. That said, research cannot avoid noticing the way in which sex workers’ bodies are etched in (the struggle for) money, namely, capital (Sanders 2005; Bernstein 2007; Zheng 2009; Kong 2011; Mai 2012). This thesis seeks to engage with the lens of “intersectionality” by examining the case of Money Boys in today’s China. It attempts to rediscover how the intersection between body (sexuality) and materiality (capital) can be reflected through my informants’ experiences. At the same time, through this relationship, I intend to capture how the institutionalised inequities and exclusions are emerging in new Chinese society. 


Intersectionality: Class and Sexuality

“While Institutions and cultural domains of meaning have a profound impact on shaping ideas and practices, people do not necessarily organize their everyday actions according to these divisions. Rather people think and act at the intersections of discourses.”  (Yanagisako and Delaney, 1995: 18)
“To value diversity is to value those who can “be heard and act” under its name.  (Ahmed 2012:29)

My employment of intersectionality is inspired by feminist theory since the 1980s, where the race, class and gender matrix is considered important in interpreting the ways in which various inequalities are formatted through different spaces, institutions and times (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995). Through an intersectional approach, feminists have been able to create different strategies in order to critique and figure out the depth and style of inequalities in society. Intersectionality also highlights the ways in which differences (race, class or sexuality) are inscribed onto different bodies, unequally governed through power (Yuval-Davis 1997; Berger et al. 2009; Grabham 2009). However, I am aware of Sara Ahmed’s (2012) cautionary reminder of the way in which intersectionality can be flipped into the trap of “diversity” discourse, with the latter remade by neo-liberalism as a conservative narrative. For Ahmed, those who use of intersectionality must be careful not to be deployed to appease then disregard the politics and struggles among different subjects with different class and colour backgrounds:

“Diversity is often used as shorthand for inclusion, as the “happy point” of intersectionality, a point where lines meet. When intersectionality becomes a happy point, the feminist of color critique is obscured. All differences matter under this view.” (Ahmed 2012:14)  
Given this caution, my research attempts to prove that intersectionality, in my case regarding class and sexuality, is still imperative. For it reveals how exclusion, rather than inclusion, is experienced through Money Boys’ class and bodily experiences. I explore this intersection but with to the intention of presenting how my informants are able to reshape it into a dynamic and non-linear formulation. Borrowing from Knowles and Harper (2009), the research will scrutinise how my respondents are able to “translate” intricate meanings from different cultural and social milieus, through their rural-to-urban migrant bodies. I will also delineate the ways in which they deploy or struggle to accumulate capital (symbolic and economic) in order to negotiate exclusions from society and personal struggles for a better future. Henceforward let me introduce this intersection between class and sexuality.
      Specifically, in terms of class, the thesis focuses on the new material environment, such as how neo-liberalism has produced a new middle-class self, the figure of which has been understood by theorists as a means of deciphering the new Chinese social fabric, where desires, consumerism and individualism are the main ingredients in the making of the middle-class self (Kleinman 2011; Zhang et. al 2011; Yan 2010). However, my research will interrogate the way that this middle-class self has been understood as the new backbone of today’s Chinese society, by unveiling how the “new self narrative” runs the danger of being middle class-centric and exclusive. It will explain how the “new self narrative” fails to notice that class inequity is growing through the polarisation between the urban rich and immigrant poor, compounded by the differentiating of citizenship benefits (Pun 2005; Bray 2005; Yan 2008; Solinger 2009).
      As a result, the research begins its journey by rethinking the ideas of the middle-class “self” in China. That said, applying self as a problematic idea generated through the unequal class system instead of as a self-evident concept needs a critical review. Through this understanding of how self is a classed term, I then bring sexuality into the reconsideration of the idea of “self” now applied by Queer theorists to illustrate an emerging “queer self” in the new China, and demonstrating the ways in which this is conditioned as a self-centric idea. The research also claims that the ways in which theorists have attempted to promote the “queer self” through cosmopolitanism (Rofel 2007; Eng 2010) might also run the risk of classed exclusion. I note that the proposal of the “queer self” also disregards how cosmopolitanism is initiated by filtering. That is, cosmopolitanism is a technique that must be generated through materiality, or capital accumulation, and therefore only those resourceful and privileged enough are able to harness cosmopolitanism in order to legitimate “them/selves.”




 “Class as a performative classification brings the perspective of the classifier into effect in two ways: first, to confirm the perspective of the classifier; and second, to capture the classified within discourse. As Bourdieu notes, ‘nothing classifies somebody more than the way he or she classifies  (1989: 19).” (Skeggs 2010:345)

Framing Class: Debates and Redefinition 





       As a research of “value”, this thesis will assess how different capitals are produced or processed through different classed subjects.  In other words, through the politics of capital, one can see how class politics is facilitated. This theoretical account in my research is applied from Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984;1986) well-known theory of capitals, where he employs the metaphors of capitals in order to see where we stand in social space, and why. Thus, Bourdieu details four types of capitals that are actively processing or being processed in different fields. Through the deployment and movement of different forms of capital, Bourdieu exposes the ways in which the misrecognition of class formulate then strengthen certain selves. The four types of capital in Bourdieu's account are as follows. First is Economic capital, which means monetary assets such as income or property. It is the basic form of capital. Secondly, he proposes that Cultural capital exists in three forms: firstly in the form of the embodied state of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body. Secondly, in the objectified state, which means in the form of cultural goods such as books, pictures, machines, etc.; and thirdly, in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which is from educational qualifications (Bourdieu 1984: 243).The third is Social capital which is generated through social processes and is made up of social networks such as membership in groups and connections with individuals. Last, Symbolic capital is inspired from Max Weber's notion of charisma. Bourdieu illustrates it as being about authority and personal qualities. It is particularly important to note that symbolic capital is the one type of capital that the other types capital combine to legitimate. As Skeggs notes, legitimacy is vital to convert capital to power, thus, for instance, before having symbolic power, cultural capital has to be legitimated (2004:17). 

Amid these forms of capital, Bourdieu particularly stresses the “convertibility” amongst capital. One form of capital can be transformed into another. Craig Calhoun (2002) claims the importance of convertibility for the movement of capital in Bourdieu’s theory, as it sheds light on how different subjects in different social fields, such as lawyers or authors, are all caught up in the game of capital, with an aim of converting capital in order to ensure his or her own security or success. Bourdieu emphasises that this game of class is not a peaceful process, but instead a game of competition where the privileged must exclude the others in order to secure their security. Yvette Taylor (2010) for example, declares that the capitals here is not moving naturally and separately but intimately interrelated: 

“And classed capitals are not simply held and carried automatically bur rather they can regenerative, accumulated across time and holding subjects ‘in place’ even in insecure instances. Both ‘working-class’ and ‘middle-class’ are moveable, inter-related categories rather than self-evident and clear-cut: that said, how they materialise and (mis) position people in everyday life can be quick, automatic and prohibitive of individual choice and movement beyond classification. (Taylor 2010:6)
                                                                                                     
In this account, one can thus understand that the individual is a not a pre-given and neutral idea, but formatted through their ability or inability to win capitals and through this contested competition of capitals, different subjects are forced to stay in different class space. In short, the self is therefore a classed one. Or more radically, the self is a misrecognised social being through the processing of class politics.  Carrying different quantities of capitals, people are at pains to convert capitals into value, and this becomes inscribed into bodies in order to “move” or secure one’s class positions. However, for Bourdieu, the game of modern capitalism system itself is designed for those with more resources to accumulate more capitals, thus, it is not easy for the less privileged to go upwards. To reiterate, it is through this contested and struggling politics of capitals that this thesis challenges the recent theoretical works of the new Chinese self, which stages the middle-class self in the centre of the social. These subjects seem unwilling to acknowledge the ability of the middle-classed self to become visible and powerful, at least in today’s China, is actually based in this competitive game of capitals. Or in Bourdieu’s terms, this visibility and power comes from being misrecognized. In fact, as Skeggs (2004) states, even middle-class has to come across daily and many symbolic and material “struggles,” and thus “class (as a concept, classification and positioning) must always be the site of continual struggle and re-figuring precisely because it represents the interests of particular groups (2004:5).” 
       
       In this lens of struggle, the thesis thus refuses to read middle-class lives as a ready-made reality in China. I instead intend to view class as a dynamic moving politics that is being practised by Chinese citizens. In fact, class in modern Chinese history is significantly formatted through highly political and thus vigorous conditions. That is to mean, to become the working class or middle-class self in modern Chinese history is such a political project.  A great deal of research has claimed that the working class self becomes politically mobilised during the time of the Maoist Revolution time (Pun 2005; Yan 2008; Anagnost 2004; Solinger 2012). Precisely, class is not a clear and political discourse before Mao’s revolution. It was Mao who politically schemed working class as the main player and then millions of peasants were influenced by the revolution discourse to become the working class self, which was anointed as a national scared figure (Anagnost 1997). Nevertheless since the late 1970s, Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping once again took class as a main political project; in this instance to facilitate his post-socialist experiment (Zhang and Ong 2009) by re-opening China’s market to the global capital market, where the middle class self is recalled by and emerging within the new Chinese society as many theorists above are investigating. In this new middle class self account, as I will specify through this thesis, one can barely overlook that the urban middle class subject is actually, mirrored by the emerging of the new younger rural-to-urban migrants. The sons and daughters of peasants or working class selves are following the fast step of urbanisation and the boost of the economy by moving to cities and becoming the main supply to China’s labour market. In this new divide of rural and urban subject, the new working class in China is formed, emerging in the various service industries and factories. Here Dagong (part-timing) represents the new flexible type of labouring that characterises the subject formation of rural immigrant (Yan 2008; Solinger 2005). Money Boys, most are also as the second generation in China (Kong 2012) can ask how the new class formation is facilitated through institutional contingencies, such as the house registration system (Hukou) and how material supports, that is, capitals from the state, are unevenly and unfairly given through the division of rural poor and urban rich (Harvey 2005; Whyte 2009). On the other hand, as I have declared, this thesis requires an intersectional approach as well, and Money Boys’ lived experiences can demonstrate how class intersects with other social forces, such as race or sexuality. Yvette Taylor  (2010) indicates, class is always formatted through the intersections, as it cannot exist solely, but rather is interplayed by others forces. The use of class in this thesis, as mentioned above, is therefore aimed at examining how class is intersected with sexuality. 
        Overall, it is within this understanding of class, rooted in the intersection of class and sexuality, that I examine Money Boys’ experiences and take value as a way to seize the interplaying of class and sexuality and emphasising how they perform or struggle, are able or unable to face the contingencies and challenges that arise in their daily life. Skeggs (2010) tersely frames how class thus shall be read as performative politics, as it keeps moving and embeds with others social forces, which can be traced (though usually is difficult to capture) through discourse or polices and so on:

“Class as a performative classification brings the perspective of the classifier into effect in two ways: first, to confirm the perspective of the classifier; and second, to capture the classified within discourse. As Bourdieu notes,‘nothing classifies somebody more than the way he or she classifies’ (1989: 19).” (Skeggs 2010:345)







It is widely believed that China’s radical transformation over the last two decades is significant for its encountering of neo-liberalism, from the application of market logics after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and Maoism (Anderson 2010). Deng Xiaoping – the Chinese Communist Party’s leader in the 1980s to the early 1990s, gradually initiated China’s stepping into global capitalism (Zang 2011)​[1]​. For example, as soon as possible after Deng announced his economic reform project, numerous Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in China’s coastal belt were set up. SEZs are functioned as the sites where transnational enterprises set up their factories, which in turn contributed to the speedy establishment of complex infrastructures in cities and ultimately, to urbanisation (Bray 2005; Harvey 2005). To facilitate all of these processes a massive labour force was required. Hence, the ban on rural residents temporarily immigrating to – and their employment in – cities was abolished by the government (Jacka 1997; Zhang 2001; Lee 2007; Murphy 2009). According to Mainland China’s National Bureau of Statistics (2012), Mainland China’s urban population has, for the first time, overtaken the rural population in its modern history, we thus could therefore argue that “urbanisation” might be recognised as the most outstanding project for the Chinese State in terms of social transformation.
      This is a basic political economic sketch of what has happened in China when neo-liberalism has been referred by Chinese government (Pun 2005; Lee 2008), which as a result has interested researchers, particularly ethnographers who have tried to capture the ways in which individuals have adjusted to change or settled themselves, especially those rural-to-urban immigrants who move to cities to ensure a decent future (Pun 2002; Anagnost 2004; Yan 2005; Hanser 2008; Jacka 2009). 
      Additionally, a further group of scholars has been interested in the rising urban middle class, or the newly rich who have benefited from the opening-up of China to global markets, in order to substantiate how neo-liberalism has affected China (Ong 1999; Rofel 2007; Hoffman 2010; Zang 2011). In this regard, researchers informed by Michel Foucault, for example, tend to propose that a new “self” is generated through specific socioeconomic forces in post-Maoist China. And that there is an interest in discovering what is happening in the new civil society when the strict enforcement of the socialism of the past has been challenged by the new neo-liberal ethos (Zhang and Ong 2008; Rose 2011). For instance, the pioneering anthropologist in the field of the Chinese moral self and social suffering, Arthur Kleinman, and his research team (2011), have announced that “a new Chinese self” is coming. In their account, China is undoubtedly at a critical moment when people’s moral world is under “reformulation”, when they are now straddling the line between the communist past and capitalist present. They have notified how the neo-liberal ethos, aligned with new value of “individualism” has provided a new ground for the younger generation and middle-class to begin to self-reflect on their lives, choices and futures, focusing on the possibility of getting pleasure for themselves rather than sacrificing their life to the State or their parents. Through this moral legitimation, the new self is happening, as claimed by Kleinman et. al (2011), and this self exemplifies the new China:
“Hence, the chaining subjectivity of Chinese, with a deepening of the sense of self and an emphasis on the individual and his or her quality, especially in the context of a rising middle class, can be understood not just as a remaking of the moral world, but perhaps also a new political reality –a reality that encourages the development of individuals and that itself involves the reshaping of governance by this new emphasis on individuals”. (Kleinman et. al, 2011: 30)
Kleinman et. al (2011) call that new Chinese self – which straddles the old communist and new market systems – the “divided self.” In their account, it is a selfhood that is on the cusp of the past and future, but also one who is also able to evaluate costs and gains while applying new value. As the authors declare: “the real challenge to the Chinese individual lies precisely here: how to define and remake the self amid these competing and often conflicting ethical values and actual moral practices” (2011: 10). In this vein, the authors focus on the ways in which through moral practices, the “better self” is now being imagined and performed by the Chinese middle-class. However, I will point out in this research that there are certain conditions here which facilitate the practice of being the proper self, including the desiring self proposed by Lisa Rofel (2007), that I will be reviewing critically below. Kleinman (2011) furthermore indicates that consumerism and individuality are the mechanisms that operate to allow the new Chinese self to pursue a “quality” life. Yet, the authors fail to enquire how this middle-class self is legitimated. That is to say, who has given resources to this “self” in order for it to come into existence?  In this regard, I argue that the self is never a neutral or pre-given idea and instead, one has to clarify how the self is generated through material struggles or power, which thus conditions some selves as being desired or privileged, while others are not.  
       For instance, in the Western context, Carolyn Steedman (2000) has informed us that the self is always an idea that is characterised through (unequal) material imaginations and power. She argues that the working-class self in the British tradition is a self that has been forced to speak out in specific styles (autobiographic self-telling), by the demands of power (the juridical system). Steedman terms the working-class self in this tradition as the “enforced self”, exploring the ways in which workers’ stories and personal experiences are chosen and represented by the privileged and then taken to legitimate the latter’s superiority. Overall, for Steedman, the “enforced self” is the one that – through such an enforcement – is a valueless or inferior self (in the eyes of the state-legal system) and this provides a contrast to, and a justification of, the “good and proper” upper-middle-class self. 
      In a similar vein, Beverley Skeggs (2004) specifies how the self is an idea of struggle. Through Steedman’s critique of the “enforced self”, Skeggs views “the self” as a conditioned ideal, often given to and applied by those who are more resourceful and powerful, as she asserts “only some people can accumulate the required cultural capital to become a self “(2004: 20). In Skeggs’ analysis, therefore, the “self” is not a self-evident concept but is generated through intricate social relationships such as struggle, exchange, entitlement or value-attribution. She asserts that the exchange of capital or the accrual of value (in order to legitimate the self), are often decided by material resources (economic capital for instance). For Skeggs, the self is therefore always about ownership and possessiveness, namely, a way of struggling for economic and cultural resources that unavoidably becomes an exclusive idea, no matter in what ways it sustains its legitimacy. As she claims:
“All the new debates that take a perspective on self-production, -monitoring, -responsibility, -reflexivity, etc., are premised upon the availability of, and access to, discourse and cultural resources, and the techniques and practices necessary for producing but also knowing, a self.” (2004: 20)
 
Following these interrogations of the self, my aim is to question the idea of the “self” but also to unveil how the new Chinese self, proposed above, is class-centric. In my view, Rofel and Kleinmen’s research team, they actually avoid fathoming how the “self” is embodied through material struggle, and how it might become an exclusive idea.​[2]​ They simply justified the new middle-class self as being characterised through consumerism and individualism, but without clarifying if it is an equal game in which each person is able to participate. In other words, the existing theories of the new Chinese self have not recognised how the new market has produced this self, but they seem to make no efforts to notice the conditionality of this new self generation: Who might be swept away by this new self-characterisation? 
       I have raised this question by following a great deal of research which illuminates how the polarisation between the urban rich and immigrant poor is enlarging, as this is one of the most heated social problems for contemporary China in this moment. Citizenship and benefits between urban and rural citizens are unequally given as the latter cannot apply for basic benefits (including educational support and medical insurance) from local urban councils as most of them are not allowed to register as urban residents (Solinger 1999; Dutton 2008). It also means that the daily experiences of (unequal) material distribution have really come to matter to individuals. Therefore, in my account, it seems problematic to suggest that the self-making of the new middle-class self – the newly privileged class – can be generalised to new China as a whole. I am not implying that middle-class experiences are unimportant or negative, but through the lens of class, as this thesis will reveal, I insist that a better, more critical angle is needed to explore how material struggle is actually illuminating the configuration of today’s China. 





“It is noteworthy that Chinese gays and lesbians have begun to publicly engage in identity politics, demanding not sympathy but full social recognition of their rights. At the centre of raised consciousness, real claims, and altered practices there is a new moral person who is both more autonomous and unstintingly affirmative of her or his personal happiness. Mao would be horrified!” (Kleinman et. al, 2011: 11; my emphasis)

“While the party and the state (China) apparatus still had very significant powers at national and at local level, this was combined with moves to devolve powers to intermediate organisations, quasi-autonomous regulatory bodies, professional groups and others, to be ‘governed at a distance’ through laws, regulations and guidelines promulgated by national, regional and local state bodies. This was a conscious attempt to shape a new relationship between government (zhiengfu) —the tasks of the apparatus of the party and the state — and ‘governance’ (zhili) — the zone of transaction between a multitude of quasi-autonomous bodies. (Rose 2011:250)

In her ethnographic account of Beijing in the late 1990s, Rofel, the pioneering anthropologist on sexuality in modern China, declares a “new kind of human being” has come to exist in Mainland China –the young. After an encounter with a young gay man in a gay club, who earnestly explained the ways to self-identify and understand his homosexuality as nothing but “human nature”, Rofel inaugurates her statement about a new Queer self in neo-liberal China. In general, she demonstrates the ways that young Chinese queer men had started to express their “desire” to be recognised. In Rofel’s account, Chinese citizens regard the same-sex identity as “human nature”, when they noticed homosexual identity is now recognised by the global human right activism. This idea to connect personal sexual desire with cosmopolitanism human rights discourse is credited by Rofel, who names it as the “birth of a new human being” (queer Chinese). Here, the key to becoming a “new human” is to become the one who owns a cosmopolitan identity. Rofel asserts that neo-liberalism has opened the door for China to join the global capitalist market. It has also reopened the door for global value to gradually integrate into Chinese society. 
      Cosmopolitanism as a value that registers in the ability to be “transnational, to connect with other cultures or value from abroad”, is now widely desired and deployed by Chinese homosexuals to legitimate their sexual identity (Liu and Rofel 2010; Liu 2010). In other words, the psychological desire to become a global cosmopolitan citizen, and the ways of converting this desire into action, or progress, is how the “desiring queer self” comes into existence. Nevertheless, Rofel (2007) is aware that the “desiring self” is not a possibility for everyone, but is instead conditional. For, she observes in this game of being a cosmopolitan queer self, the logic of self-legitimisation is usually achieved through the exclusion of others. However, she still insists that cosmopolitanism is the core value for understanding the queer Chinese self, reasoning that it is key to understanding neo-liberal developments in China through people’s desire to cross nation-states’ boundaries. Conversely, my research suggests looking into neo-liberalism through a different lens, by asking: who is excluded in this new regime? 
      As the following chapters state, the cosmopolitan self is not sufficient for understanding the multi-sexual experiences or “desires” that come from Chinese people. I will declare, cosmopolitanism can easily become a value-classed solipsism. I agree that cosmopolitanism is both desired by homosexual individuals to create the transnational self, and promoted by the Chinese State to identify the People’s Republic of China as now standing in the global political centre, as Rofel discovers. However, once again, I disagree with the application of cosmopolitanism as generating or subtending each individual’s bodily experiences, at least for Money Boys, where I will discuss in following chapters. Instead of being self-fulfilling or, cosmopolitanism is also a skill which demands different forms of capital in order to invest in selfhood. From this perspective, therefore, it is necessary to ask who will be qualified and who will not. In so doing, this research seeks to ask how and why other desiring practices, through the examination of Money Boys’ experiences, can be more critically and precisely evaluated. Bearing this critique in mind, I shift my questions now to those of method, asking in what ways is it possible to capture the inequality through the intersection of class and sexuality. 
      Hereafter, I introduce how value can be an appropriate analytical tool to deploy here. Also, I will clarify why value can be a critical way of framing sexual and class experiences as it shows how and what people desire and expect, but also exposes critical contingencies there. This is particularly relevant to present-day China, when new market logics are now altering the conditions and qualifications of desire or the meaning of being a “proper” gendered subject (Evans 2008; Jackson et al 2008; Kong 2011). I stress that the ways in which value theory is a practical and critical analytical tool to engage with Money Boys’ lived experiences, to understand what they are expecting from their lives, and how they act to achieve these along with struggling under specific material and symbolic conditions and pressure in their pursuit of value.


Methods: Value as Practice 

“Considerable attention has been given to what is distinctive about the queer movement’s engagement with diversity. In contrast, I show that in the context of diversity culture, queer diversity strategies look remarkably non-distinctive, subject to the inevitable strengths and weaknesses of mainstream multi-identity projects, and dare I say, unqueer”. (Ward 2008: 5; original empahsis)

In order to realise how Money Boys understand and then react to what they have experienced, the research also summarises value theory, demonstrating how it is a useful analytical tool to understand how different people measure and evaluate things, ideas and feelings which they are convinced are important or worthy, and how through these values they are willing to react, invest and act on (Graeber 2001). This research thus understands value theory as a yardstick used to measure and to evaluate the ways in which different practices and imaginations are processed to become “value” (Haiven 2011). By investigating different people through their various ways of accumulating and legitimating capital (symbolic and cultural capital) (Skeggs 2011), theorists view value as not simply about quantification, that is economic capital accumulation, but also as being about moral evaluation, as in value. This understanding of value conversion leads this research to employ Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) noted metaphors of capital in order to understand how value is able or unable, to be converted by my informants in performance or practice. Generally, Bourdieu applies economic metaphors to illustrate how capital –including economic, cultural and social forms, as well as symbolic ones (if legitimated) could be accrued by bodies. Nevertheless one can observe in particular that for Bourdieu, capital is always about struggle, for access and resources always establish the framework by which people are able or not to accumulate capitals. In this manner, the key point is to clarify how different bodies are firstly evaluated or imagined, as this conditions their potential to acquire capital (Lawler 2005; Skeggs 2011), whereas different bodies are positioned in different classed positions in their struggle for value. Thus, different orientations to different bodies may determine who has access to – and who struggles for – resources. Given this understanding of the conflicting faces of the world of value, hereafter I deploy value theory as a mainly analytical tool in order to situate my research question as I associate class and sexuality together in capturing Money Boys’ experiences in an active way. That is to say, value theory is used in the research to determine how Money Boys’ convert their desires into actions. However, more importantly, I also insist on the need to probe into the conditions under which Money Boys practice and perform their value. 





The research is an case study based in Shanghai with additional pioneering research conducted in Beijing, where I began setting up my research network by volunteering in an NGO (Aibai) collecting some research texts from NGOs about Money Boys. Those texts and research data also informed my fieldwork in Shanghai. This dissertation also seeks to broaden the terrain of discussion on male-male sex and prostitution, which I claim was shrouded in the historic past, silenced during the Cultural Revolution and thus I emphasise should be revisited in relation to public concerns. Important historical and literary documents will thus be applied in order to excavate the terrain of same-sex eroticism and sexual commerce in Chinese history. This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part will pivot around my research questions and methods. Chapter One to Chapter Three will depict the terrain of same-sex sexual behaviours in Chinese history, questioning the discourses that produced from history, which inspire me to comprehend how the new subject of this kind of sexual eroticism, the Money Boys, are differently imagined under a neo-liberalism ethos. Chapter Two deals with the history of Chinese same-sex experiences and Chapter Three will present my methods and methodology in my research practice. 





The following sections will outline the content of the chapters, in order to situate the key themes of this research and exhibit the ways in which these chapters can respond to my research questions.

Chapter Two:  Actions or identity? Same-sex sex in Chinese history 
      What is same-sex sex? How has it been imagined and practiced in the Chinese context? To what extent can we claim that China has entered into the terrain of the politics of homosexual identity? This historical chapter aims at answering these questions via modern Chinese history. In order to tackle the question of same-sex identity it will begin from the 1900s, when Western imperialism penetrated Chinese society and at the same time rooted modernity to the local social ground. Through a careful inspection of historical documents, literature and a legal case, I will illustrate how, in parallel with the localising of Chinese modernity, same-sex sexual experience has been gradually re-imagined from a set of “behaviours” or “actions” to the formation of an “identity”. I will also argue that “homosexual identity” ironically emerged from these experiences, which cannot be accounted for as the truth or social facts but should be critically reconsidered. In this vein, Chapter Two will pose a question considered in following chapters: why is identity still so important for Chinese society and the State now?  

Chapter Three: Methodology: Questions and Methods 
      This chapter will discuss which research methods can engage with this new wave of homo/sexual identity politics while at the same time critically evaluating what reflections are made visible by the research method I deployed. Specifically, my research scrutinises what specific social forces initiate the transformation of same-sex desires into identity. I will also ask who will benefit from identity politics and who will be excluded? In other words, what makes homosexual identity politics possible or impossible? In this regard, Chapter Three will demonstrate that class is an essential tool to engage with these questions, as Chinese society today is undoubtedly experiencing a dramatic class transformation where the sacred working and rural peasant class has been condemned and replaced by the middle class, via State policy. 
      In terms of research methods, this chapter will argue that the interviews are best at reflecting the new form of class politics in today’s China, for it provides a platform for the subaltern to express themselves; but interviews also challenge my research setting, as they show how the interviewee can resist the interviewer’s questioning by giving an answer which is ambiguous.

Chapter Four: Classed and Sexed Value: Neo-liberalism and Cosmopolitanism
      Having set up my research questions for looking into value production from the interplay between class and sexuality, this chapter will unpack this argument by showing how Money Boys experience this interplay, and how they reshape and negotiate the dominant value such as cosmopolitanism. This chapter will begin to answer these questions by engaging with neo-liberalism and cosmopolitanism. It looks at the ways in which neo-liberalism is viewed through the economic lens of ‘value’ by engaging in a critical examination of neo-liberal theories, allowing for a more productive view of how the disposition of value, such as cosmopolitanism, is unevenly inscribed onto different bodies through class. The chapter will also show that the ways in which value, formulated through neo-liberalism, is ultimately embodied through (classed) bodies. In this vein, this chapter further suggests that in present-day China, the processing of cosmopolitan value has been intensified by class. But I will also detail how the classed Others (and their value) is not being wiped out by neo-liberalism or cosmopolitanism, but is being drawn into the neo-liberal regime in different ways to be exchanged or exploited. 

Chapter Five: Qualifying and Qualifications of Human Value: Suzhi Imaginations
      After investigating cosmopolitan value from the neo-liberal apparatus, in order to engage with the different forms of value commensuration, this chapter seeks to continue and complicate the discussion of value and its intricate relationship with class and sexuality in neo-liberal China, through specific discourses. By examining the widely applied suzhi (Quality) discourse, I will argue the ways in which suzhi has become a discourse that has fed into the politics of the self-calibration of value, as a way to add value to the self. I will also explore that, in China, differently classed gendered self, such as the Money Boys, who in my project, are experiencing/ performing suzhi in various ways. This chapter will present how my informants are able to remake value through suzhi but in a different way. That is, instead of making social distinctions, Money Boys' practice of suzhi and capital exchange is aimed at sketching a blueprint for their future. It is a means for creating a better future while their current life conditions are more about struggle.

Chapter Six: Filial Values and Self-expressing
Following the previous chapter where it was argued that Money Boys were able to challenge the discourse of suzhi by looking into how they were able to accrue, perform, or exchange capital in order to carve a space in the mainstream, middle-class centric society, this chapter will expand this argument, with a more critical point. It will bring issues of filial value (Xiao 孝) to the centre of the discussion in order to explore the ways in which Money Boys not only take filial value to perform their moral defence, but also to reshape the meaning of filial piety at the same time. The central argument in this chapter is the performance of value is a contesting social practice, as it is not only unevenly but unequally performed by different classed subjects. 
     Filial value, as a traditional dominant Chinese value, reveals how my respondents struggle in accumulating filial piety as capital but, in the end, utilise it as a moral defence. In other words, through filial value and an examination of its discourse, this chapter argues how for some, filial piety is easy to express as a personal resource/value and as an affective and material exchange, particularly for those of the urban middle class; but for Money Boys, to translate and shape the discourse of filial value is however a moral defence, reused for appeasing the moral struggle of being outside the heterosexual kinship system and to adjust to the struggle for material needs.

Chapter Seven: Reflections on Queer Theory in China:  Toward A Subject of Materiality
      Thus far, previous chapters of this thesis are designed to exemplify the intricacy of value-making, emphasising the vital need to explore the ways in which certain gendered and classed selves, such as Money Boys, are able to perform and reshape value with their limited resources and capital. This chapter will prize out this argument through a review of theories that are concerned with queer selves in Chinese-speaking areas. My chief aim is to interrogate the politics of queer value that is evaluated and promoted in literature about cosmopolitan identity or transnational exchange which, I will assert, risk identifying Chinese Queer selves as pre-given, anarchistic subjects that ignore that gendered and class selves, after all generated from unequal material struggling. This chapter interrogate theories that use ideas of transnationalism or cosmopolitanism to place new Chinese queerness for its inferior consideration of how capital significantly decide who can become the cosmopolitan queer and who cannot. 

Chapter Eight: Conclusion: Value/s on the move:


























This does not mean that when people in a given time and place talk about sex they are “really” talking about something else -that a conversation about pornography, for instance, is a cover for a conversation about modernity. It means, rather, that sex is one realm in which meanings of modernity (as well as personhood, pleasure, gender, and the nation) are negotiated. Given the historical role of the West in forcing some of these questions onto the agenda of Chinese writers and readers, it is not surprising that we find Freud, Havelock Ellis, and Madonna, among others featured in these conversations. (Hershatter 1996: 81)

Continuity must be premised on considerations of historical rupture, and thought of from the perspective of seizing historical initiative; from the standpoint of politics continuity must be understood as part of endless process of refashioning legitimacy (Wang Hui 2011; 77)

     
One humid day, after a casual drink with my informant in a famed gay bar in Shanghai, I noticed a couplet written on the entrance door (Photo 4): on one side, the famous Maoism slogan “Serve The People” (Wei Zen Min Fu Wuh 為人民服務); on the other, “But We do Charge Money here! Thank you!” I could not stop laughing but, one thought suddenly popped into my head, that is: in today’s China, these two systems, socialism and capitalist logic are so intensely, wrestle with each other, but in what is far from a zero-sum game but with more “frictions” emerging inside. Anna Tsing (2005) employs the term “friction” to stress the process of cultural change under the demands of global capitalism as a complex one in which the local and the global unavoidably reshape each other’s value. For Tsing, an ethnographer who has worked in the tropical forest of Indonesia for a quarter of a century, “friction” also identifies the interruptions and engagements of capitalism’s dream of global connections, which produce “cultural fragments on the one hand and new connections on the other, too” (2005: 72). This chapter therefore attempts to uncover the many intricate frictions within sexual politics in modern Chinese history. It will explore debates on homosexuality from the early 1900s to the neo-liberal present, examining the way in which same-sex experiences are reformulated as homosexual identity. In other words, I am concerned with questioning Chinese homosexual identity not as self-evident but formed and reformulated by a set of social and political forces.  
       The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section deals with Chinese homosexual politics, which can be found in the binary between homosexuality as a type of “action” or “identity” and related debates. The second section sets out the theoretical questions by asking why and in what ways modernity is the most crucial social force for dealing with sexual politics in the Chinese context. It will as a result engage with modernity itself, by suggesting a more flexible and place-based analytical lens to rethink modernity in China. The third section investigates the historical context looking into the three different periods since the early 1900s – they are The May Fourth Movement, The Maoist Period and Post-Maoist Years – in order to explore confrontations between modernity and sexual politics. Given the examination of same-sex experiences represented through different historic periods, I then point out the difficulties in generalising about Chinese homosexuality. The final section concludes by describing critically the way in which sexual identity starts to weave into the private and public social space in the new neo-liberalism regime. 

(Photo 4, “A Gay Bar in Shanghai”; shot by the author)
Imagining Chinese Homosexuality: Action without Identity?
In his noted work on the modern formation of homosexuals’ identity in the West, Michel Foucault (1990) developed the argument regarding the construction of “the homosexual” – along with other abnormal sexual types – as a species. Foucault declared: 
“As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes,
 sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them[…]The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology […] Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.”(Foucault 1990: 43)

Applying this account to Chinese history however is problematic, however, since in ancient China same-sex experiences were often defined not in terms of identity but rather as a set of behaviours, preferences and actions (Zhou 2000; Sang 2003; Chiang 2010). The Chinese understanding of the homosexuals has to do with “What he or she does, not what he or she is” (Lim 2006: 8). This difference invites us to ask why the homosexual has not emerged as a “species” in recent Chinese history, and why it remains difficult to “be” a homosexual or to possess a homosexual identity. Is it because homosexuals’ eroticism has been relatively open and tolerated (Hinsch 1990)? More critically, we might also ask, along with Tze-Lang D. Sang's questions (2003), if same-sex sexual experience is doomed to express itself in terms of identity, then “Does homosexuality designate behaviour, relationship, identity, or fantasy? Also, if it designates identity, is sexual identity a matter of physiology, psychology, orientation, preference, performative repetition, or choice? (2003: 125). 
      One can see that Sang's strategy is to postpone the embrace of identity, which she feels leads to many marginal sexual behaviours and practices being ignored, along with much of the dark side of historical progress; her position is in some respects close to queer historian David Halperin's reading of Foucault. Halperin argues against the reduction of Foucault’s work to a politics of identity, insisting that one of his most important contributions was to recognise the limitations of identity as a social construct; and with this regard, he thus asserts we need to “Supplement our notion of sexual identity with a more refined concept of, say, partial identity, emergent identity, transient identity, semi-identity, incomplete identity, proto-identity, or sub-identity”(1998:109). Therefore, Halperin and Sang both attempt to challenge the binary opposition between sexual act and sexual identity, offering a useful analytical strategy for interrogating the usual idea of Chinese homosexual culture as a sexual utopia without identity. It is also important to bear in mind that the question of homosexuality in Chinese culture invokes the question of Chinese-ness itself. As Song hwee Lim (2006) states:
 “It is certainly not my intention to propose a Chinese expression of homosexuality or a homosexual expression of Chineseness. Rather, I wish to highlight the opposite- that is, whether it is Chinese”homosexual”ity”, or Chinese “homosexual”ity”, these are not essential qualities but expressions and constructs determined by social, economic, political, cultural, historical, ideological, and discursive force. It is not what they are but how they have been constructed, spoken of, mobilized, by whom, for what purposes, to what audiences, and what that are the crucial questions.” (2006: 13; my emphasis)

Bearing Lim’s insight in mind, an analysis of the construction of Chinese or homosexual identities involves tracing the “fissures” (Evans 2008a) that run through the mainstream, male-centred narrative of modern China – an analytical task that requires, first of all, an inquiry into the significance of that mainstream narrative. The question of modernity is thus important here. Hershatter (1996) claims:

“In asking a single question “is it repressive or is it liberating” we install a particular set of criteria derived from sexology and popularizations of Freud as the universal standard of value, and miss the chance to ask a broader and more illuminating set of questions. Conversations about sex are always part of a larger current of conversation and arguments. Desire’s objects, expressions, control, suppression, transgression, relative importance and the venues in which all of these are expressed, are not natural occurrences, but social ones.” (1996: 78)

Breaking down the distinction between the liberation and oppression of desires, Hershatter implies issues around sex in China are always about the “social” rather than “nature”, which in turn is helpful for us to understand how sexual desires are imagined by society. In my contention, desire, with the accentuation of social also means we can see how modernity, as the vital social force significantly negotiates with desire. Modernity has been the most important social force to drive modern China since the beginning of the twentieth century, into the heated fight with the imperialism incursions, facilitating the Communist Revolution, and finally anchoring itself in the frenetic capitalism of the present. In terms of methodology, inspired by Rofel (2007), I consider modernity as a “desire”, or an emotional impulsiveness, to be experienced by the subject through different periods of history. Experience, in my contention shall therefore be situated in the place-based, historical context. It has an essentially lucid and knowledge-dependent face, as Diana Fuss (1989) indicates:
“If experience is itself a product of ideological practices, as Althusser insists, then perhaps it might function as a window onto the complicated workings of ideology. Experience would itself then become “evidence” of a sort for the productions of ideology, but evidence which is obviously constructed and clearly knowledge-dependent.” (1989: 11)
 
Given this regard, taking “experience” to understand modernity and sexuality is useful and necessary for not seeing modernity as a singular or Western-centric knowledge system, but as an open space for us to engage in. It is also through the lens of experience that we can start our critical re-examinations of intimacy between sexuality and modernity, to investigate how they are embedded with each other and mutually constructed.
 
Re-situating Modernity: Colonialism and Sexuality in China
As mentioned above, when Foucault deciphered the new politics of “sexual identity”, he directly highlighted that the homosexual identity was born following the birth of “modern” disciplinary power More critically, however, in his later analysis of modern disciplinary apparatus Foucault (1990) stated that modernity produces a modern technology to more specifically govern our lives, by offering a space for us to enjoy the value of freedom on the one hand, but also governs the citizen through different institutes and discourses on the other. However, Rofel (1999) argues that Foucault’s critique of modernity as a modern discipline has been welcomed by critical anthropologists since the 1980s, when they have sought to see how cultural differences can be examined through modern power disciplinary apparatuses such as kinship, language or gender system. Yet, Rofel also criticises these ethnographic reflections to some extent, repeating Foucault’s European-centric assumption that seeing modernity as a novel knowledge or cultural resource which originally came from the West, adheres to the enlightenment movement. Thus Rofel claims that this western – centric modernity imagination cannot inspire us more to rethink the “multi-translation and confrontation between different cultures” (Rofel 1999: 12); she tends to reframe modernity as a set of imaginary forces, practicing in different cultural systems and places as “narrative” discourses, performed by different ordinary people:
 “If modernity is that imagined nexus linking a series of projects of science and   management, then one must trace the translation process of these projects as they travel through history and across the East-West divide. Modernity enfolds and explodes by means of global capital forms of domination in conjunction with state techniques for normalizing its citizens. Along with these special practices, modernity exists as narrated imaginary: it is a story people tell themselves about themselves in relation to others.”(Rofel 1999: 13)

This is a useful analytical strategy to open the analysis of Chinese modernity, as it offers a more open space to reframe modernity as a more dynamic and uneven process that is produced from different local places (Feuchtwang 2004), and which then confronts other modernity imaginations (Wei 2007a; 2007b). Arjun Appadurai (1996) sketches out how, under the long history of colonialism modernity has emerged as a set of different and incomplete imaginations in different cultural spaces, rather than a West-exported concept. This noted critique of modernity “scapes” has been central to, and constitutive of post-colonialism and other theories of thinking about modernity and its interrelationship with locality. In light of this, my task is to shift this understanding to Chinese history. I aim to illustrate the ways in which local modernity in China is unevenly imagined and narrated all the way through the sex and gender “scapes”, through different mediums such as literature, law and so on. Nevertheless, before we look into the sex and gender field, it is necessary and vital to comprehend the way in which modernity performs in Chinese history. Through this, we therefore can more precisely understand how modernity performs locally to affect gender and sex in China. After a review of the historical and theoretical debates, I found that in order to answer this question, it is still necessary to go back to the knotted issues between the West and East, that is, China’s anxiety about “being modern” but also about being colonised by Western modernity.


Chinese modernity: A Fight for the “belatedness”
 
 As a great deal of research has clarified, having suffered from serious colonialist invasions since the second part of the nineteenth century, Chinese intellectuals are often haunted with questions of “being late” to modernity (Chow 1995; Rofel 1999; Feuchtwang 2004; Wang 2006; Eng et al. 2012). The convinced example to illuminate the question of  “late” of modernity is from Lu Xun (1881-1936), the most important writer and left-wing activist of the early 1900s (Chow 1995; Shih 2001; Chiu 2011), whose personal traumatic experience initiated his launching a culture and social revolution to establish a new China. Lu was a foreign student studying medical science in Japan in the early 1900s. Whilst attending a lantern slide show, Lu explained that he was traumatised by accidentally seeing a slide photo of a Chinese spy, who was arrested by the Japanese army and cruelly beheaded in public, but the spy’s Chinese colleague, just stood by while he was killed, witnessing this brutal scene without showing any empathy on his face. Witnessing this photo, the young Lu suddenly realised China’s semi-colonialised situation, and he soon gave up becoming a doctor to become a writer, launching a movement to try and change China from “backyard China” into a modern country. Lu (1960) indicated his ambition to change the collective Chinese soul:
“Before the term was over I had left for Tokyo, because after this film I felt the medical science was not so important after all. The people of a weak and backward country, however strong and healthy they may be, can only serve to be made materials or onlookers of such meaningless public exposures; and it doesn’t really matter how many of them die of illness. The most important things, therefore, was to change their spirit, and since at that time I felt that literature was the best means to this end, I determined to promote a literary movement.” (Cited by Chow 1995: 4-5; my emphasis) 

After this shock encounter, Lu’s eyes were opened, and he began to think about the problem of China and its weak global status at that time as Chiu (2011) delineates. More importantly, as Chow (1995) asserts, Lu's fretful feelings about China as a weak state, that it was staying in a “backyard of modernity”, exemplified the basic attitude of other fellow Chinese intellectuals and reformers. Chow emphasises: 
“For the young Lu Xun what are shocking and disorienting are the destructions that descend upon the victim, the apathy and powerlessness of the onlookers, and the meaning of these for China as a modern nation – this, indeed, is the rational explanation Lu himself offers it is also the explanation that most readers and critics of modern Chinese literature have accepted.” (1995: 6) 

Although Chow mainly focuses on the “visuality”, and its role in mediating the power between the “watcher” and “the watched” in the colonial situation, my interest takes another route; I want to pull out the core psychological force of Chinese modernity from Lu’s case, as that anxious feeling of the “late” that aims to be “modern” has become one of the important social forces to dialogue with modernity. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to enquire how gender, namely, through same-sex sex, has also been imagined and represented as an emotional struggle in Chinese history. To respond this likely question, it is thus necessary to plunge into the history past. In the next section I divide my discussion into three periods of modern Chinese history. Firstly, below it will discuss the New Republican years, namely from 1911, when the Republic of China was founded, up until the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. In this period I will particularly focus on the May Fourth Movement (1917-1929), the most important cultural movement that was launched by Lu Xun and other social elites (Shih 2001).  
     To explain why the launch of the May Fourth Movement was an important historical event, it is crucial to underline the ways in which May Fourth profoundly changed Chinese people’s schematic knowledge of gender and same-sex eroticism, in the name of the “modern”. Secondly, after the May Fourth period, I shift my focus to the Maoist years (1949-1976), from the communist revolution to the end of the Cultural Revolution turmoil. I will explore the ways in which “sex” or same-sex sex were discussed in socialist China, considering how the country formed a heterosexual centric gender order and where a homosexual preference was condemned as belonging to an old-fashioned, dark concubine culture or as an immoral “hooliganism.” Lastly, I turn my attention to the post-Maoism years (1976 -), where same-sex behaviour has gradually figured as an “identity”, coterminous with the introduction of market logic. By reviewing the legal case of “homosexual” in the 1995, this chapter explores the ways in which multiple and complex same-sex experiences are gradually becoming accepted within Chinese society, whilst also exploring the possibility that some are marginalised for not fitting into the identity category. This identity politics, ultimately, also raises more complicated issues, as it relates to the dramatic transformation of the class structure in post-Maoist China. To initiate the historical discussion, let me for a moment return to the May Fourth Movement.  


Republican China (1911-1949): Sexual Imaginations in the May Fourth Years
 
In 1919, after Hong Kong and Macau had been colonised by the United Kingdom and Portuga, and with the semi-colonised conditions of Shanghai and other cities, the WWI's Versailles treaty finally legitimised China's fragmentation (Culp and Wang 2001). This finally aroused workers, students, intellectuals and entrepreneurs to mobilise numerous political demonstrations in Beijing. The influential movement ultimately became the nation-wide May Fourth Movement. During the May Fourth years, science and democracy, the two leading Western-export ideas, were largely translated and introduced by the native urban intellectuals, encouraged by the government officials of Chinese civil society. At the same time, Confucianism was for the first time (a second time happened in The Cultural Revolution under Maoism) targeted as a non-scientific, democratic and old-fashioned value that needed to be condemned. 
      As Chow (1991) notes, the figurehead of the May Fourth and the New Literature movement, Hu Shi (1919) proclaimed that Chinese literary methods were “incomplete”, while Western ones were “much more complete, much more brilliant, and hence, exemplary”(cited by Chow 1991: 89). Apart from the new “language revolution”, more social reformations followed, such as the popularity of wearing Western-style clothes, the promotion of Western sexology and medical science, and the wide translation of modern Western literature works such as Virginia Woolf and Oscar Wilde (Shih 2001). 
      Put another way, May Fourth was the first important social movement in modern Chinese history, which inaugurated a series of debates about the coming of the “West Wave” (Wang 2004). By digesting Western culture and knowledge, Chinese society thus produced its own “other modernity”, as termed by Rofel (1999), which was also reshaped by its citizens. But I do not seek to detail the “hybridity” problem in this chapter.  My main concern is to inspect the way in which same-sex eroticism was imagined in the encounter between west and east – when the West’s knowledge of modernity on the one hand was treated as the negative expression of imperialism but, on the other, was applied by the social reformers to remodel a new Chinese state. In this respect, I will contend the ways in which this ambiguous attitude towards the modernity is also embodied in the account of sexuality. Also, if, as Ann McClintock (1995) asserts, the first task of colonialism is always about targeting the colonials’ body and sex, then, one could ask, how does same-sex eroticism animate the new Chinese society’s various and ambiguous imaginations to the Western modernity?  
      In a similar vein, Sang (2003) notes that inside the ambiguous colonised space that academics and social elites who had returned from abroad with new scientific understandings introduced Western sexology into China to improve the Chinese people's racial strength (eugenics) (Chiang 2010). This was because of their passion for establishing China as a new, stronger and masculine world power. One of the most well-known characters was Jingshen Zhang, a sexologist returning from France who was called “Dr. Sex” by the public, and frequently published his ideas (mixed with some Daoism) in the leading mass culture magazine Xin wenhua （新文化 New Culture). Zhang submitted numerous sexual techniques/strategies for Chinese men to improve their sexual life, including educating young men to derive pleasure from foreplay (Chiang 2010). He also provocatively advocated that men should have sex with sexually experienced women who could bring men more sexual pleasures than a virgin could (Sang 2003). Moreover, Hershatter (1996) stresses that Zhang's argument can be read not as emphasising women’s virginity but instead focusing mainly on teaching Chinese men to “absorb” female sexuality to nurture their own sexual health. Socially, Hershatter addresses, this outward attention on the female’s body and sexuality is also embodied in the male reformers’ serious attacks on and severe anxiety regarding prostitution and the concubine culture, which they deemed a national weakness. Hershatter notes this attitude towards the prostitution from a leading reformer Zhan Kai, condemning that the courtesan houses in Shanghai has become:
 “The money rich men spend in opium dens and brothels in a year. Oh! We are in a hard time. All the people, whether they are officials or commoners, should sleep on the woodpile and taste gall” [endure hardships to achieve an ambition]. It's a shame to enjoy ourselves without worrying about the future of our country...I write down what I have seen and heard, and finish this book, not only in order to record these women in Shanghai, but also to show the fact that China is strong in appearance but weak in reality. It's a very worrisome situation.” (Zhan 1917; Cited by Hershatter 1996: 83; my emphasis)
 
The prostitution issue during this period reflected how, Chinese intellectual's “love and hate” attitude towards the West has always subtly emerged in their problems with sex. From a feminist position, Hershatter (1997) therefore demonstrates that, on the one hand, the May Fourth commentators truly sympathised with prostitutes, seeing them as victims of poverty and the traditional, dark concubine culture; but on the other hand, the social reformers remained hostile towards these women because their sexual practices related to money, were the embodiment of immorality and decayed the state. Hershatter adopts a comment from an elite magazine Crystal, which published articles to discuss China’s future, to show this hostility:

1.	      [They] get out of bed late in the morning.
2.	      Women do not work.
3.	      Men care only about finding sex partners.
4.	      Women pay too much attention to makeup.
5.	      People spend too much time...at play.
6.	      They are afraid of strangers.
7.	      Young boys are frivolous.
8.	      Girls are arrogant.
9.	      Men are not ashamed to be the slaves of foreigners.
10.	      Women are not ashamed to be prostitutes. 
                                      (Jingpao 1919; cited by Hershatter 1997: 257)
 
From this social critique, we can see that for the reformers, their ostensible concerns with women being prostitutes, in fact, referred to the worries about the ailing nation-body. In other words, when those public commentaries and social reformers announces that women are not ashamed of being prostitutes and men are not ashamed of being bullied by foreigner aggressors, it actually indicated a crisis of masculinity and statehood, signified by the condemnation of immoral sex such as prostitution that Hershatter (1996) implies. Also, the ambiguous attitude towards the West and sex can also be found in the anti-foot binding movement. Foot binding, was a social custom, practiced by young Chinese women since the tenth century. There were many complicated reasons for this, but one was the fetishism of small feet and their relationship to femininity (Ko 2007). Nonetheless, foot binding was seen as brutal, and was also considered to be the mark of non-civilised Chinese culture by a May Fourth commentator. As the main figurehead of the May Fourth movement, Hu Shi (1891-1926) showed his appreciation towards the Christian missionary movement from the United States for the latter launched campaigns of Youth Care Movement (慈幼運動Tzi You Yung Dong) to go against the “foot-binding” and prostitution in Chinese society. The imperialism, in Hu’s account (1928), revitalised the humanism in Chinese society:
 “China is a barbaric country, as we treat women and children in terrible ways … But now, we probably have to appreciate those imperialists wholeheartedly, by awakening us from the dark nightmare. We then kneel down for those missionaries who bring the new western civilisation and humanism to our country, and let us know how cruel and against human nature it is, to treat our children in this way (foot binding).” (1994[1928]: 235; my translation and emphasis)

Hu was one of the first elite pupils chosen by the Ching Dynasty who funded him to study in the USA. He then obtained his Doctoral degree in Philosophy at Columbia University after the Republic of China was established in 1912. Hu’s views exemplified most May Fourth commentators’ opinions, regarding the building of a new China with the help of Western knowledge. In this respect, therefore, one can clearly see that the reformers’ embrace of modernity was oscillated between the imperialism and native patriotism. But I also want to stress that this ambiguous attitude towards the West should be recounted and understood as coloured by issues of gender. Feminist historian Dorothy Ko (2007) rereads the history of the anti-foot binding movement and notices that the rhetoric of “letting the feet out”, has turned to finding a “lost part of the body” for women, particularly for the young girls, who began to obtain a public education. A famous song, Ko found, which celebrated the freedom of women's feet, illustrated the joy of this movement:
    “The joy of letting feet out, what joy!
     Please listen to my letting-feet-out.
     Stuff cotton wool between toes, all steadily on flat ground.
    Wash feet with vinegar and water, 
    Stop using a long binding cloth...
    Go to sleep without the binders, 
    So that blood can circulate. Once you let your feet out, 
    Don't be afraid of troubles that others make.”  (2007: 47)
 
Ko's feminist position makes her aware her of the gender paradox of the female body in the anti foot-binding discourse. She argues that anti foot- binding involves a sense of the recovery of a lost body-part or object, and this can also be applied to male reformers to imply their “loss of national dignity.” She thus states: 
 “Moreover, in framing the problem of unbinding as that of “gloriously recovering,” the male reformers used a nationalistic term that equates female bodies with lost territories or sovereignty. In this way, female bodies were made central to the project of national salvation, but only as a metaphor outside the realm of a woman's embodied experience.” (2007: 46)  

In doing so, combining the male reformers’ opinions and feminist critiques on foot binding, we thus can assume that, if the lost part of female body was seen as the lost part of the nation, then this also means that the female body and sex are symbolically owned by the state, a new modern nation-state. Therefore, one can see again, this ambiguity is found in the emergence of a gap between the love of Western modernity, and the hatred of imperialism in the May Fourth fashion, through the female body and sex. McClintock asserts that “All nationalisms are gendered as all nations depend on powerful constructions of gender” (1995:352), hence, regarding this feminist perspective on modernity within the Chinese context we can witness the ways in which modernity is gendered and sexualised (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995). Furthermore, the feminist engagement with modernity can be seen as not only a fight with the male-dominated ontology of modernity but also as a matter of taking responsibility for history then creating a new understanding of the past and the future, from the “many temporalities” of this moment. Inspired by Nietzsche’s pains on history, Rita Felski provides a method for feminists to welcome the challenges of “His”tory:
 “One of the reasons for the renewed interest in the idea of the modern in contemporary theory is the dethroning of the white bourgeois male as privileged subject of history, which re-opens and leaves unresolved the questions of what modernity might mean for women and other subaltern groups.” (1995: 208)

Felski places a linkage between history and modernity, but also views this linkage as a dynamic, confrontational connection rather than a harmonious relationship​[3]​. Situating Felski’s ideas to rethink the Chinese past and neo-liberal present, the task of rethinking Chinese modernity history will be more interesting. In a similar fashion, Michael Dutton (2008) critiques that “time” in China is not linear – when the dream for a future in today, paradoxically recalls the ghost of socialism from the past, an eternal return, which borrowed from Nietzsche to mark out the paradox of time in today’s China. In this loop of time, for me, it is thus worth clarifying where gender and sexuality are situated but also interrupted in time when the narrative history was controlled by a masculine, colonised trauma​[4]​. Out of the worry for the national future, the May Fourth commentators have carried a sympathetic attitude toward the prostitute and such a mentality also mirrors that masculinity is embedded in nationalism. For this reason, sex was a mediator that emerged through the nationalist struggle and uncertainties of the national future within sexuality, especially those sexual practices which are seen as an abnormal or immoral such as prostitution. But returning to the issues of same-sex sex, as I have glimpsed above, where same sex eroticism has been also discussed and represented by new Chinese the social reformers, but in a more intricate way. Same-sex sex has been imagined as a new bodily experience that needs to be defaced but also treated as the scapegoat of colonialism. To be more precisely and critically engaging with the question of same sex imagination, once again, I claim that it necessitates the situation of same-sex sex in a historical context.

Same-Sex Sex Representations
 Alongside the targeting of women's bodies and sexuality through practices foot-binding or prostitution, during the May Fourth period, same-sex sex was also targeted and discussed. From the leading urban reformers, male-male sex was recognised as an old and immoral concubine culture practiced in the upper class family. But female-female sex, which contained “monstrous” desires, was represented as the devil from literature texts. To add to the complexity, these discourses also converged with Western-centric sexology, which viewed homosexual behaviour as biological and psychological diseases. For instance, in terms of male-male sex, Wu and Stevenson (2006) highlight the moral transformation within the urban elites of the May Fourth reformers, arguing that the new generation fought for free-choice marriage and intimacy outside traditional boundaries. Their parents’ or grandparents’ sexual relationships, to some extent, were deemed old-fashioned and they believed these should be condemned and thrown into the ashes of history. 
      For example, this was the case for the May Fourth leader Hu, a philosopher who had studied at Columbia University under John Dewey in the early twentieth century. Fellow of Dewey, Hu’s faiths on Pragmatic philosophy, not only effectively promoted important educational reforms in China and later in Taiwan, but also tried to sweep out certain “abnormal” moralities and “bad behaviours” in Chinese culture, for instance male-male sex. In commenting on Chinese classic fiction, which related to male homosexual sex preferences, Hu (1918) condemned male-male sex behaviour as an evil, “animalistic lust”, which was without any shame in the face of modern Western morality, that is, “love”:
 “On the one hand, we must apply ourselves to the translation of cultivated stories of love [from the western tradition]. In fifty years, it may be that we can succeed in changing current [sexual] attitude.” (Hu 1918; cited by Wu and Stevenson 2006:53)
This morality of love also embodies the struggle between two generations. By rereading Ba Jin (1904-2005) who was a leading Chinese writer in the May Fourth era, and his influential semi-autobiographic novel Jai (家; The Family, completed in 1931), particularly regarding the predominant narrative of the young hero in the novel (Juehui's fervency on joining the May Fourth Movement), Wu and Stevenson (2006) demonstrate that Juehui's critique of his Chinese feudal family values is revealing, especially in his hostility towards the same-sex eroticism that was practiced by his beloved grandfather, who was the leader of the family but was intimate with some male courtesans. The authors maintain that this Oedipal knot between grandfather and grandson can be seen as a moral transformation for the May Fourth generation:
“Changes such as shifting from polygamy to monogamy, abandoning the imperial examination system in favor of European and British university degrees, opening up of education and public life to young women, and the gradual rejection of foot-binding are all inextricably linked with ideas of progress introduced from the west. […] What kind of relationship did Grandfather have with dan actors? There seems to have been no doubt in Ba jin’s mind that dan were to be lumped together with courtesan and concubines, that is to say, with relationships that did not meet the standards of the new generation’s sexual morality​[5]​.” (Wu and Stevenson 2006: 43-44: my emphasis)
I nonetheless consider that this Oedipal knot between the grandson and grandfather is much more complex. For, as noted it was entangled with the grandfather's homosexual habits and the young generation's efforts in getting rid of Chinese traditional values and behaviours such as foot binding. Hence, for me it raises the point as to why the young hero's hostility was interpreted as his grandfather's “homosexual habit” but not on questioning the unequal social status between the concubine and his grandfather – as the concubine culture in China usually embodied the social hierarchy wherein the dominant one is always the rich and educated upper class individual and the concubine is always seen as the fragile and powerless one from a lower social status (Hinsch 1990). Also, it seems that male-male sex became disturbing even for the young hero – when he was at the same time crying for modernity and “love.” 
      This psychological mechanism also implies that a new gender order was formulating in the May Fourth years which nurtured a new heterosexual gender value, hence the casting of non-heterosexual relationship as “abject.” Ba Jin, as the leading writer and translator at that time, translated and introduced numerous important Soviet Republic and European socialist writers’ and thinkers’ works into China. Ba was crowned as the national writer by Communist leader Mao, for his endeavours in bridging Western socialism and Chinese communism, and most importantly, his lifelong enthusiasm for establishing a modern China (Shih 2001). In this manner, being a national leading intellectual, I view Ba’s autobiographical writing as representing his subjective experience of modernity, where we can reconsider the ways in which his experiences were respected so much by the state, from the Republic period to the socialism period. 
       What concerns me most here is that one can witness Ba’s male-modernity subject formulation, which was not an even process, as it was facilitated through sex, and this facilitation was completed through condemning something or someone that was not allowed in his blueprint of new China. Same-sex sex is therefore one that which should be considered “abject”. This helps me in tracing the establishment of Chinese modernity subjectivity during this period and thereafter, which can be critically reviewed from same-sex sex. More than Ba ’s hostility towards male-male sex, from another famous writer of Ba’s generation, Yu Dafu’s writing on same-sex sex, we can see more about how same-sex sex is not just viewed as a practice belonging to an old, concubine culture, but is seen as a new “species” that should be violently wiped out.  Through Yu (1896-1945), the leading writer and political activist in the Chinese modernism writer camp, who was also infamous for his obtrusive Dionysian lifestyle (Shih 2001), I attempt to set out a new discussion and writing about sex, which has been deployed as a weapon to attack traditional Chinese value such as family-arranged marriage, and to decipher a more liberal society by new Chinese modernism writers. But the problem was under its men-centric writing, same-sex sex has been imagined as the new “other”, which threatens the heterosexuality which should be effaced from male writers’ writing.


 Modernism Sex Experiences: Monstrous Female-Female Eroticism

From the May Fourth movement, more and more Chinese writers, especially those returning from abroad, promoted the West’s modernism literature. Broadly speaking, the most adopted aesthetic of modernist writers is the bold writing on sex, which was significantly influenced by Freud (Sang 2003). Sex, moreover, for Chinese modernists, was employed as a tool to break Confucianism dominance and its family-arranged marriage. Within this social struggle the passion for sadism and masochism was also configured through these writers’ writings; it T was perceived by writers and reformers as an expression of men's eroticism and, once again, as a form of struggle against traditional Confucian repression and family demands (Wang 2004).
      Furthermore, the Chinese modernists’ writing on sex or sexing uncovers complicated feelings towards the West. In my view, it is through the struggle between the West and East or between the coloniser and the (male) colonised that this rejoined politics often reproduces and usually needs the “other” such as the working class, marginalised races, women and minority groups to soothe their ongoing anxiety and secure their privileged position. But, from these modernist writers’ representation why was the “radical” within this sex writing so limited? 
       Furthermore, why was this radical assertion in fact reformulating a secure heterosexual zone in order to negotiate with colonialism? These questions suggest a need to examine the ways in which same-sex sex was envisioned and represented in literature and in turn, how can we scale the limitation of modernity imaginations from the representations of sex in the literature? I will answer these questions using literary texts. As some critics have pointed out, the same-sex sex, especially female-female sex, was not imagined as radical in its questioning of the social hierarchy. Rather, it was represented as mysterious, gothic and as representing unaccepted sexual desires (Sang 2003). Take the most noted and controversial Japan-returned novelist Yu as an example. In his book She Is a Weak Woman (1932), the female-female desire becomes an uncomfortable dark tragedy. Sang gives this novel a feminist critique: 
“Yu Dafu's Ta shi yi ge ruo nuzi (She Is a Weak Woman 1932) stereotypes female homosexuality according to the medical theories of the third sex and gender inversion to create a homology between personal and national pathologies. In this novella, a tall, strong female student, Li Wenqing, who has a low voice and coarse skin and who stinks, seduces one girl after another, including the protagonist, Deng Xiuye – an angel-like beauty who loses her virginity to this monstrous masculine woman and subsequently embarks on a tempestuous erotic life with male teachers. After a few years, she gets married to a poor writer. When her husband is unable to support her, she hits on the idea of dating and getting money from one of her former lovers, but she is raped and beaten by him. At the end of the novella, she is gang-raped, killed, and mutilated, her breasts are cut off – by soldiers during the Japanese invasion of Shanghai in1932. What corrupts Deng, then, is the monstrous third-sexed woman.” (Sang 2003: 153)
Why is the lesbian imagination in Yu’s lewd writing represented by that creepy death of his lesbian character? Why is that the body of that lesbian should be violently mutilated? In my contention, it might be because the same-sex sex is still an experience that Yu cannot deal with. More importantly, however, this is not because same-sex is too new to imagine by Yu but, in fact, that set of desires and imaginations of the same-sex sex might have already existed inherently unconsciously. Henceforth Yu has to violently discard these desires to prevent them from threatening his male subjectivity and masculinity. This is a critical point: we must to place the imaginations “into” the body and sex rather than seeing it as an external reflection, as the “imagination” is already present and inherent to the real” (Rosengarten 2004: 204). In this vein, from Yu’s violent writing on lesbian sex, we can witness that certainly the same-sex imagination is not an external one but rather inhabits in Yu’s inner masculinity. It is even more intricate as Yu’s violent narrative is also connected with his anxiety regarding the colonialists’ invasions.
      The male subject’s double anxiety regarding male subject from the same-sex sex and colonialism are both applied and represented in Yu’s writing, where he refused to give any space for the same-sex sex except a cruel death. Then, the description of a “lesbian” who has a low voice, coarse skin but strong female body, and the sexually violent and creepy death Yu gave to the angel-like woman in his narrative who had sexual relation with the lesbian, deeply shows that Yu, a Japan-returned elite writer who was also well-known for his provocative sexual life in the 1930s and his strong feeling and rejection of female-female sex, are expressions of his traumas from colonialism. The victim in his novel was killed on the day of the Japanese army’s invasion of Shanghai, and this also shows the way in which Chinese society forms a gender order through colonialism. Besides, instead of letting the man-like lesbian die under his pen, Yu has the angel-like lady raped and mutilated in public, which implies repulsive punishments for those going astray (if female). Thus, the modernist elites and social reformers show that the obligation they carried was to build up not only a new nation-state but also, within civil society, to ensure that the gender order which should be a monogamous heterosexual-dominant space only. Sang as a result, reiterates the importance of pointing out the new gender regime, in legitimated through marriage:
“In this light, the emergence in the May Fourth era of psychobiological discourse propagated by men and concerning the unhealthy, abnormal, and unnatural character of love/desire between women signaled precisely an attempt to legitimate the marriage imperative at a moment when the traditional codes of decorum, or the Confucian vision of culture, no longer seemed natural and were breaking down.” (2003:23)

In this respect, we discover a gap between the modernity and imagination of same-sex sex. Additionally, within this gap, same-sex sex accidentally interrupts, as it is so difficult to be defined and identified in modernist’s narrative, therefore the female-female sex should be violently effaced as in Yu’s writing. Or, the male-male sex should be condemned as “animalist” sex practices because it is against the “love” in Hu and Ba’s social reforming discourse. This process also, to some extent, echoes the notorious McCarthyism years in 1950s America, when under the cold-war framework “the homosexuals were seen as the communists, and the communists were seen as the homosexuals” (Chu 2006). Wei-cheng R. Chu (2006) implies that, from this paradox, we can realise neither the homosexual nor the nationalism as “essential”. Hence, instead of mapping the completeness of modernity, a better way to proceed is to look to the way in which that gap forms. As an example, this could be viewed within the Socialism years when the Chinese Communist Party leader, Mao Zedong, successfully won the civil war in 1949 and the intersection between cosmopolitan modernity and sexuality became more complicated. As I will discuss, this is a twist of the modernity and gender narrative, crystallised by the socialist legal system when Chinese law legitimised one party-led state's authority and also legalised the social norms. Continuing this, the next part of this chapter will focus on how Chinese law mediated the state's authority and social value to deal with sexuality. From the embodiment of law, it will claim that it is then possible to critically fathom how sexual value becomes more complicated in the next stage where in Post-socialism value relates to the market-driven logic. 


Socialism Modernity: Remapping Sex in Maoism: 1949-1976

It would be a misjudgement to say that under the Maoist doctrine of the West’s value, that is, modernity of Republican China had vanished. In contrast, Communist China should be treated as an alternative “other modernity” as termed by Rofel (1999), which reshaped the whole facet of Chinese society. So too Harriet Evans (2008a) also declares that the CCP's historiography was highly “gendered” when it employed women's liberation as the important revolutionary motto located in some social policies such as equal factory wage, anti-prostitution and free-choice marriage. Indeed, “equal hours and equal wages” between women and men was applied by the CCP in the name of women's liberation but, nevertheless, as Evans reminds us, the revolutionary liberation in fact was very gendered. Evans demonstrates:
“However, the Mao years imposed an artificial neutralization of gender difference, which though successful in increasing women's participation in social and political life also operated as a kind of masculinist straitjacket that denied women full agency and suppressed their essential femininity.” (Evans 2008:70)

What concerns Evans is evident in an examination of the slogan of women's liberation, which was ignored from the male-centric historical views. As feminist critiques have pointed out, the nationalism struggle has always been established along the boundaries drawing of gender and sex (Yuval-Davis 1997; Puar 2007). As a result, for the fledgling PRC, instead of simply seeing it as an ”asexual” state it can be more productive to explore the social ground to see how sex was discussed. For instance, Mao's major project was to efficiently govern the millions of peasants who were key in helping him win the civil war and establish the PRC's population-control, which, related to sex, was an important governance skill in the PRC’s early years. As Hershatter (1996) remarks, the rapid population growth greatly met the need for collective labour so sex for reproduction was extremely important during the Mao years. Hershatter demonstrates, the eugenics claims of population health and labour quality (suzhi) were also propagandised in the official magazines and the public in this era were asked to endorse a model of reproductive “sex within monogamous marriage buttressed by the legal and moral principles encoded in the 1950 Marriage Law” (1996: 86).
      In 1951 when the first official Law of the PRC was published (Marriage Law), the Law clearly claimed to liberate women from the male-dominant (literally men superior, women inferior) family-arranged or forceful marriage and prostitution. The Marriage Law also legitimised monogamous marriage as the only allowable marital relationship. But monogamous marriage under the Marriage Law meant that this was promoted as the only model of sexual activity. From the historical documents and public mass printed media, Evans (1997) maintains that the public and official opinion towards sex in the 1950s still echoed sexology in the 1930s in dealing with sex issues and the Marriage Law. In this manner, the Marriage Law served to reconfirm and buttress heterosexuality and the obligation of the reproductive role of women. Evans thus argues:
“The social, moral and sexual requirements of the new Marriage Law thus established the immediate context for the 1950s discourse of sexuality. Free-choice monogamous marriage was publicized as a positive step to protect women from male abuse [...] However, the Law was premised on a naturalized and hierarchical view of gender relations that, by definition, limited the extent of the challenge that women could launch against the patriarchal system.” (1997: 6)
 
Accordingly, if we shift Evan's feminist critiques to homosexual issues the situation becomes even more intricate. That is, the Marriage Law can be seen as a mediator of the public and private. The Chinese state registered the heterosexual value in the Marriage Law and declared the respectability of monogamous intimacy. But there is no written law against homosexuals in the document, because as Chinese homosexual rights activist Wan Yanhai (2005) announces, for Chinese Law there is no such thing as a homosexual in the PRC. However this does not mean that homosexual behaviours are not policed by socialist China. In contrast, as Wan reminds us, China is not a nation- state by law, but is enforced by the military and police, for the punishments under the policing system are harsher.​[6]​ The punishment relates to homosexual behaviour, rather than homosexual”ity” itself. More complicatedly, what I intend to stress here is that China deals with same-sex sex with more complex technique. It uses, “hooliganism”, the native Chinese criminal category to govern homosexual practices. As a criminal category under Chinese Law, it is not only deployed by the State to deal with political dissenters, but also used to punish homosexuals.
      Why? I will respond this question by illuminating that the use of the term “hooliganism” in homosexual “crime” does not just punish bad behaviour, but also shows that privacy, namely, sex or sexuality issues in communist China is entangled with the public. Let me prove this from a famous legal case:

Homosexuality as “Hooliganism”
 In the PRC homosexuality was never categorised in the Criminal Law in terms of sodomy or in other legal terms (Kong 2011). Yet in many cases the High Court in China refused to deal with cases of “homosexual crimes” from the appeals of local law courts when the latter was troubled by how to find a specific name for a crime in Chinese Law that applies to homosexual behaviour (Zhou 2000). More importantly, the absence of such a name in Chinese Law does not suggest that harassment and threats to homosexuals from local police authorities were non-existent. Instead, in the many oral stories the researcher collected as data for this study numerous people had unhappy experiences with the police in cruising places – mostly in public parks, public toilets and baths (Zhou 1995; Tong 2009; Kong 2011). They were harassed, even arrested (if they could not pay the bribes to the police), and reported to their work place and community – the Communist China's specific governance technology–danwei (unit) (Bray 2005). These units are deployed by the government to offer jobs, food, water and housing so this means they are in charge of everyone’s life and, in this sense, being reported to the unit means that everyone in your world will know “what you have been doing.” As many informants express, when their homosexual behaviours are reported to their “units”, moral judgment from the family to the social network was a harsher punishment than the death sentence, and the whole neighbourhood knew (Zhou 1995).
      As well as this moral punishment, the Hooligan Law, as a provision category in Chinese Criminal Law, mainly served as a tool to tackle the homosexual issue. In the legal facet, “hooliganism” (liu mang) – a catchall criminal category in Chinese Law – has been widely served to discipline and put people into custody (if necessary). It involved such things as sending people for re-education through labour in the far north or other punitive labour, and it played a very important role for the police bureau in tackling political dissidents and others who practiced aberrant behaviours; it was also widely used by the local police to tackle homosexual behaviours. No. 160 of Chinese Criminal Law defines hooliganism as involving “Affray, insult women or other misbehaviours which sabotage public order which can be charged with a seven-year sentence or detention.”​[7]​
      However, what is of interest for me here is the precise social terrain in which hooliganism has been situated, and why it relates to homosexuals. For instance, Kristen Luker (2008) recaptures “rape” issues in American feminist movement history then suggests a focus on the process of “operationalisation” which is useful in examining the particular discourse’s development in society. Luker demonstrates that for sociologists to operate the concept and categorise a term is to make a “political action” that is always “grounded in sociality” (ibid: 113). Applying this point to hooliganism, in my view, the legal apparatus is also operationalised by widening the continuum of defining “hooligan behaviour” as a useful, flexible tool to govern millions of people, when they go against the authority's views. Furthermore, more than silencing dissidents, hooliganism as a strategy to govern homosexual sex should be reviewed as an embodiment of social order, that is, to categorise the aberrant and abnormal sexual behaviours that disrupt the gender order. As Rofel acknowledges, hooliganism in Chinese Law can be represented as “the matter out of place” (2007: 137), a point that was borrowed from Mary Douglas’s insights ([1966] 2002) regarding something that is not itself dirty becoming so when it enters the social system. Going further, a more pertinent point is how homosexual sex becomes dirt when in the public sphere. In a one-party-led state, the “collective activity in public” is always highly policed. And, as reviewed in this chapter hitherto, during the Maoist years policing people's lives is linked to the deployment of the danwei system, which is in charge of material benefits such as employment, wages and food; moreover, danwei is the place through which the population was organised, protected and policed, and deployment of danwei can be seen as a technology of socialist governmentality, in order to guarantee that every behaviour in public and private will be noticed and disciplined (Bray 2005; Dutton 2008). As in the domestic sphere, the family-centric morality and kinship system leaves no space for homosexual practices. 
     In this vein, we glimpse a paradox, that is, for those who have homosexual preferences, the place where their homosexual desires can be practiced is not in domestic but public spaces such as parks, toilets and baths. The Hooliganism Law, which is based on the one party-state's phobia of “public collectives', tackles “public turmoil” and immorality, and is utilised to punish homosexual behaviours. In this respect, I argue, the public in socialist China is privatised and the private is publicised. Furthermore, Chinese Law still does not seek to categorise homosexuality as a crime. The reason might be, as one informant told Zhou (1995), that, the family is strong enough to punish your homosexual behaviours:
“We have a federal-familiar and patriarchy system to police your sexuality; Chinese government knows this quite well. As a result, it seems the Chinese government then cannot be bothered to make a new regulation to deal with your sex." (1995: 65)
Accordingly, this “paradox” of public and privacy is therefore the internal motor of Hooligan Law. It shows that in China, the private (sex) is so public that it runs the risk of being punished by the law. Indeed the publicity is embedded with the private sphere. In light of this twist of publicity and privacy, for example, hooliganism, as acts “out of place”, reveals more symbolic power, as Douglas ([1966]2002) views: 
“But on examining pollution beliefs contacts which are thought dangerous also carry a symbolic load. This is a more interesting level at which ideas of pollution relate to social life. I believe that some aspects of pollution are used as analogies for expressing a general view of the social order. For example, there are beliefs that each sex is a danger to the other through contact with sexual fluid. According to other beliefs, only one sex is endangered by contact with the other, usually males from females, but sometimes the reverse [...] I suggest that many ideas about sexual dangers are better interpreted as symbols of the relation between parts of society, as mirroring designs of hierarchy or symmetry which apply in the larger social system.” (2002: 4)

As a result, I want to enquire, within this symbolic imagination, what is the specific ethics embodied and embedded in hooliganism and its relation with sexuality? The notion of modernity or the desire to be modern can still be possible routes to find the answer. Again, considering the nationalist struggle from the 1930s to the Mao years, modernity is always embraced as the most useful tool for sustaining the male-centric desire to be modern. The gender hierarchy is therefore established by excluding prostitution and same-sex sex (Hershatter 1997). The desire for modernity, however, has not vanished, even in post-Mao years, when collective labouring was significantly replaced by individual entrepreneurship under Deng Xiaoping's regime (1978-1992) – a very key moment when Regan and Thatcher in the West were simultaneously inserting a neo-liberalism agenda into the domestic and global order. Hooliganism and same-sex sex in the gap between socialist values and neo-liberal logic also have different connections and social meanings. In the next part, I propose to consider a legal case in order to re-evaluate the scale of hooliganism and homosexual behaviours in post-socialism China. From this famous Law case, I aim to rediscover the ways in which homosexual behaviours are transformed into the identity.


Post-Mao years: Advanced modernism as Neo-liberal Ethics

After the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, in aiming to secure his legitimacy, the new Chinese Communist leader Deng Xiaoping initiated the dramatic transformation of Chinese society by a set of economic reforms gradually opening the door to the global market .To promote his plan to install “Chinese socialist character of capitalism”, Deng proposed Sihua (四化)that is, four “-isations” including “privatization, liberation, marketisation and globalisation.” These are functioned as his leading policy to replace the dark past of poverty during the Cultural Revolution years (Yan 2008). 
      Deng also employed development as the main discourse to reform Chinese society, aimed at directing the state away from the agriculture and heavy industry based economy into becoming the “factory of the world” following the successful establishment of “economic zones” in coastal cities (Harvey 2005). To put in another way, the deployment of market-driven logic has not only helped subsequent Chinese leaders to secure their authority in the Chinese Communist Party but more significantly, the power of the market has also changed the social fabric of China reflecting a more intricate mixture of production and consumption in the economy. What I am concerned with here is the way in which we could consider sex or sexuality taking into the account the new economy. As Liu (1995) claims, with the opening of the Chinese media in 1995 to Hollywood films, the popular success in China of “Pretty Woman” a Cinderella romance about a street escort who ultimately successfully captured a billionaire’s heart has intriguingly shown the way in which capitalist value has gradually entered into civil society as well, alongside a new morality of sex. Liu announces:
  “A commercial society demands governance by transcendental rules and globally acknowledge ethical behavior[…] Pretty Woman is…revolutionary because it recognizes a business ethics with rational egoism being the cardinal principle of such ethics. It celebrates a love earned with the capital of morality as well as the morality of capital whereby money making has the virtue of subsidizing education and industrial development.” (Liu 1995; Cited by Yan 2008, p.3; my emphasis)
 
Market-logic has restructured Chinese society through the reformulation of sex and morality. In other words, sex in China is therefore not only an issue of desire, but should also be re-examined through “materiality.” Derrida (1992) has reminded us that the economy is after all about the “exchange”; a politic of exchange that added with value of “Law” and “home”, namely, a power of “procession” and “security”. He states: 
“Economy is in fact all about the Law and exchange. As soon as there is law, there is partition: as soon there is nomy, there is economy. Besides the values of law and home, of distribution and partition, economy implies the idea of exchange, of circulation, of return.”(Derrida 1992, 6)

In this vein, after the entrance of capitalist logic in China, new issues of sex and sexuality regards how the latter joined with law also mediate the circulation of value in new society. How are law and economy are connected together to animate the “exchange” of value? A legal case on homosexuals in the mid 1990s can be a dovetail to capture the way in which Law and economy have made this exchange happen.

Homosexual as Defamation 
In 1999, a Beijing citizen called Mr. Xu brought a legal complaint of defamation to the court against the journalist Fan Gun and the publisher of his noted book “Homosexuality In China” (1995). Xu sued Fan Gun because Fan's book, Xu claimed, implied that he was a homosexual, even though Xu was not named in the book. However, Xu demonstrated, from a paragraph description of a gay bar, the bar manager referred to was Xu himself. As a result, he declaimed that the implication was that he was a gay man. He added that this caused serious harm to his social reputation and dragged his life out of the “normal track”, as he termed it. A series of irreparable harms happened to him including losing his job, friends and fiancée and blames from his family (Rofel 2007). This highly discursive case therefore can be a yardstick to approach the link between sexuality and modernity in Post-Mao China. 
      First of all, Xu's main argument was “defamation” not authorship, that is to say, being referred to as a homosexual man was seriously harmful to his social reputation. Secondly, before working out the social meaning of the result of this case, an important point is that for the court the acceptance of dealing with this appeal justified the possibility for the state and the civil society to start taking “homosexuality” as a collective human identity in the Post-Maoist era. Rofel remarks that this case could be a cornerstone for the embodiment of homosexual as  “identity” in today’s China, when the legal apparatus responded to this homosexual case – rather than simply treating it as hooligan crimes as before. Rofel contends this shift was, after all, based on the changing face of the social terrain, when the market-driven logic starts to reshape sociality and the social value challenges the state's attitude toward sexuality. Rofel comments:
“This case was the first legal case to be adjudicated about homosexuality in China since the end of socialism [...] a gay identity only became widespread in the 1990s; such a legal case would not have made sense before then. China's socialist legal system would not have entertained such a libel case, for there was no such provision for civil suits of this nature under socialism.” (Rofel 2007: 136)

This case, however, also unveils that the state's shifting attitude toward homosexuals is not settled. It exposes a self-contradictory judgment from the Law, when the judge finally rejected Fan Gang's appeal, and fined him and the publisher in the name of “defamation.” But at the same time, the court deleted in its ruling the phrase of “homosexual” as abnormal sexual behaviour which is not allowed in PRC from the decree (the phrase was written in the original decree). In this respect for this judge, homosexual behaviour was not unnatural human sexuality as defined in the law but still related to a matter of “reputation.” Rofel (2007) addresses the ambivalences emerging from this case and the Chinese legal system and discusses the ways in which government is now facing the difficulties of dealing with non-“normative sexual desires”: 
“This case expresses deep ambivalence about the ways in which to weigh non-normative sexual desires in relation to the triangulated concerns with socialist repression, self-regulating interests, and excessive passions. Desire is central to adjudicate among this assemblage but is unpredictable.” (2007:149)

Rofel proposes “desire” as an analytical idea to tease out the social fabric of Chinese history and unmask the unstable faces of desires. This which also exactly explains how sexualities should not be quickly accepted as an already-completed “social norm”, namely, as identity in today’s China, when the market-driven logic is still wrestling with socialism legacies. As a result, I argue, it is from these historical moments we can trace the root and route of homosexual practices in contemporary China. Whereas homosexual behaviours were once shrouded in the private existences, they are now viewed as public concerns. One therefore teases out the gap between the wrestling of old socialist value and the new market-driven logic. In this gap, so too we witness that, on the one side, some desires in need to be identified but on the other side, some non-normative sexual desires are able to interrupt the process of identification. 





The intertwined condition between the public and private keeps spinning in history. Recently, many ethnographic works have ambitiously framed the “gap” forming between the private and public, or to see who is excluded and who is included (Ong 2006). In this sense, history should also be seen as a dynamic and non-linear process which is shaped by the public and the private. Therefore, as I have presented above, this chapter is largely concerned with situating modernity in modern Chinese history, investigating its social effects initiated by the May Fourth movement on today’s neo-liberal China that are intensely intersected with the class and sexuality. 





















Experiencing Identity: Research Questions and Methods

“Sociology is bound up both with obtaining stories and telling stories...But for me, a sociology of stories should be less concerned with analyzing the formal structures of stories (as literary theory might), and more interested in inspecting the social role of stories: the ways they order, how they change, and their role in the political process.” (Kenneth Plummer 1995: 19)

“When we listen to people, do they give us their stories or do we steal them?  At the heart of all social investigation is a dialectical tension between theft and gift, appropriation and exchange. The balance between these forces is more complex than it seems on first sight.” (Les Back 2007:97)

In the previous chapter, I outlined the history of modern Chinese same-sex eroticism and noted a shift in such representations connected with the emergence of gay and lesbian identity politics since the late 1990s when China began to be more deeply immersed in global capitalism. In this chapter I consider which research methods can productively engage with this new wave of homo/sexual identity politics while at the same time critically evaluating the reflections made visible by my own research. My research aims to scrutinise the specific social forces acting to shape same-sex desires as they transform into homosexual identity. I am also concerned with who benefits from identity politics and who is excluded or, from another perspective, with what makes it possible or impossible for an individual to engage with homosexual identity politics. In light of this, I maintain that social class may play a significant role in determining individual experience and outcomes in relation to these questions. Chinese society today is experiencing a dramatic transformation in explicit class structure. The formerly sanctified working and rural peasant class has been abandoned and replaced in state policy by the middle class as the favoured layer of society. Thus, the meaning of belonging to a particular class is being reshaped and reformulated in each social aspect (Anderson 2010). As mentioned above, this research concerns the intersection of class and sexuality, following my empirical study of Money Boys. It also intends to expand understanding of how researchers can best explore our awareness of socio-sexual change in today’s China.











The Birth of Chinese Homosexual Identity?

What is identity? To what extent can one facilitate a politics or discourse in order to claim that Chinese “homosexuality” has gone beyond the terrain of identity? More critically, one might also ask who is considered disqualified in this new linkage and who does it protect? While collecting and reading recent discussions and research data regarding sexuality in China today, these questions have often crossed my mind. This was especially so when for a period I worked as a volunteer for a Beijing-based group concerned with promoting gay and lesbian rights. Their activity strategies are often about “coming out”, “going public” (Wei 2007) or other similar actions related to “identity”. More significantly, when I first arrived in China numerous activities promoted by LGBT rights NGOs were also used to raise public awareness (Hildebrandt 2012). For example, in Beijing gay and lesbian groups facilitated “flash mob” actions of “kissing in public”. This became an important movement activity connected with the politics of “coming out”. The Internet was usually the foremost medium used to call for participants and supporters. 
       In Shanghai, the first LGBT pride athletic game was successfully held in 2010 and more notably, the first gay pageant and beauty contest in Beijing. “Mr. Gay China” became a big event of national interest, attracting international media attention despite the fact that the event was shut down abruptly by the Beijing government just after it opened​[8]​.  All these examples appear to imply a wave of homosexual identity assertion and awareness sweeping across post-Maoist China, especially in the two leading cities of Beijing and Shanghai. But what particularly interests me about this are the politics of self-recognition which can be teased out from these movements. One of the contestants in the pageant, for example, proudly expressed to the international media how he is so different:
“We are intelligent, we're professionals, we're gorgeous – and we're gay," said contestant Emilio Liu, from Inner Mongolia. "I want the audience to know there are a whole bunch of people like us living in China. It's a wonderful life and it's not hidden anymore​[9]​.”  





Identity Politics and Beyond?
   
In her ethnography of sexualities in modern China, Rofel (2007) frames her argument with the assertion that, since the 1990s, a “new human being” has emerged, following the state's shift from Maoist and Deng Xiaoping’s economic “revolution” years to increasing alignment with the dominant global capitalist ideology of neo-liberalism. Through the impassioned declaration of a young gay man, whom Rofel met in Beijing in 1998, Rofel provides an image of “what it means to be a new sexual citizen of today's China”:
 “With strong conviction in his voice, he asserted that it was absolutely human to express one's “personal feeling” (ziji xinli hua) and “personal affairs” (geren shi). He said he likes to tell people in his personal story, that this is the right way to communicate. He saw the expression of wishes, yearnings, and aspirations as a “skill.” He declared that all over the world people were quite capable of expressing what was in their hearts and that, in order to be part of the world, to be properly cosmopolitan, Chinese people needed to express themselves in that way as well.” (2007:1; my emphasis) 

But in today's China, self-expression as a skill has a complex meaning.  Rofel's informant, a gay man, continued by saying that gay men can -and should - stand at the forefront of a “new human era”. She continues to argue:    
“This was not, it seemed, a defence of homosexuality. In his calm, expectant gaze, he suggested that the scene around us was exemplary of a new humanity. Gay men and lesbians in China, he implied, are at the forefront of a new human era. Far from representing perversion, Chinese gay men and lesbians are leading China toward its proper place in a cosmopolitan globalized world.” (2007:1)
 
With this reflection, Rofel provides a very crucial but complicated opinion on the intersection between human nature, individualism and the fate of the state, which is now yoked to the ability of Chinese citizens to express their sexual desires, advocated in terms of “human nature” as basic citizenship. Yet Rofel's reflection is mainly concerned with whether and how same-sex sex in China can become a social movement able to engage with the state. Nevertheless, in my view her query should first be seen in the context of history. As I have proposed in the previous chapter, since defeat by the British in the Opium War (1840-1842) which led to the opening of Chinese treaty ports by imperialist forces, the Chinese leaders and reformers have been strongly aware of foreign threats and anxious about its delayed progress compared to the West (Duara 1998). 
      These two emotional forces have haunted China for more than a century (Dirlik 2001). Gender and sexuality both played key roles in explaining the state's weakness in the face of colonial invasions (Barlow 2006). From this perspective, one can see that Rofel's informant is not just expressing a desire to be an exemplary citizen within a newly humanised society, but that this expression actually resonates with a historically driven national desire to be seen as modern and to enjoy respect from the rest of the world. This point is now welcomed and acknowledged by David Eng (2010), who views cosmopolitanism as a critical cultural resource for Chinese gay and lesbian groups breaking the dam of the Western mainstream gay identity framework. Eng provocatively maintains that:
 “Rofel’s informant, she suggests, situates the emergence of expressive desires in China far beyond the rainbow) — far beyond, that is, the validation of homosexuality in recognizably Western liberal and identitarian terms: the affirmation of an existing but misrecognized minority population[…]. To the contrary, the social stakes of homosexuality’s expressive desires unfold upon a political horizon of becoming, a political horizon of great significance for Chinese modernity and for Chinese citizens alike. Indeed, as Rofel’s informant proposes, the appearance of expressive desire promises to mark China’s proper, though belated, place within a “cosmopolitan globalized world.” (2010:465; my emphasis)

Eng's concern is whether homosexual desires are radical enough to expand the horizons of Chinese modernity when China has become a new world power, and whether sexual desire can function as a crucial social force bringing China from a state of “belated modernity” to the front row. By contrast, I want to ask what the “political becoming” is that he gives to gay men here? Is “identity politics” a fair game for the sexually marginal? 













Identity Politics and Its Enemy

 To make a standard definition of homo/sexual identity or to see it as a static notion is to ignore how identity is unevenly reproduced and represented, as argued by Margaret Wetherell (2010) who notes the difficulty in defining identity due to its slippery, blurry and dynamic nature: 
“In the most basic sense, the study of identities is about what Avtar Brah (1996) calls ‘names and looks’, and what is done with these. But even this simple initial focus opens up a wide range of topics – orderings of “us” versus “them”, inward —outward movements of subjectivity, narrative and memory, and political acts of intense solidarity and sometimes great violence.” (2010:1; my emphasis) 

Wetherell suggests that if we view identity as ongoing, variable and socioeconomically situated, then this could enable us to better engage the “many layers of meaning, the rich sweep, the heated debates the constitutive ideologies, fantasies and fictions, the politics and the very ambiguities” (2010:24). Hence, the more practical way would be to examine how different layers of “identities” contest then reshape each other’s forms in specific social or discursive contexts.  In a similar vein, Angel Lin (2008) proposes that identity should be seen as a game of “capital”, a game of who can win enough social and cultural capital to self-actualise him or herself by way of differentiating from others:
“The history of the development and uses of the notion of “identity” has not been an innocent one if we are alert to the observation that it is usually the powerful who are entitled to and have both more and the right kinds of capital and resources for constructing for themselves advantageous identities.” (2008: 1)

Lin underlines the fact that identity is manifested within a discursive continuum controlled by the most privileged and powerful sectors of particular groups, places and times. In this perspective, identity is therefore not a neutral and natural given but a politically charged and contestable politics. It is the ground upon which minority individuals, groups and communities under specific socioeconomic conditions are able or unable to self-recognise, to make claims for public recognition and to gain the security of belonging to a socially recognised and validated category. Skeggs criticises that identity politics might be about “one modern variant of speaking personhood that relies upon assumptions about and desires for coherence and completeness” (2008: 11). 
     Hence, one can comprehend how identity politics is not just about “who I am” or “who we are”, but it is also a contested notion as self-identification can only be facilitated when “the other” is also used or exchanged. Identity politics thus can be a mirroring process of self, as when one says “who I am”, but is at the same time also used to refer to “who I am not” or “who I do not want to be.”
      All in all, identity, which is performed as a technique to mediate the subject and the object, should be more critically reviewed. In this vein, Wetherell (2009) maintains that within the mixed meaning bag of identity politics, we are seduced by the technique of self-actualisation and thus ignore this power of recognition that can become a conservative power of normalisation. She demonstrates that “Being recognised as a particular kind of ‘someone’ can entail engaging with normative expectations of identity which demean, oppress and blight, resulting in what Butler (2006) describes as literally “unliveable” situations and precarious lives” (2009:11). Similarly, David Oswell (2006) contends that identity politics is the ambiguous way in which a subject mirrors her or himself from the object. This mirroring is ambiguous because the object’s multiple performances of gender, class, race and sexuality and so on will always interrupt the subject’s desire to recognise her or himself “clearly” from the mirror. Thus, mirroring is a process bristling with uncertainties and incompleteness. 
      In short, identity poses an inescapable problem of hybridity. But I am more interested here in possible violence than the lucid performativity engendered from this “mirroring”. I aim to inquire: if recognition is the subject’s “self processing” of value, what determines who is good enough to become or “worthy” enough to belong and who is not? In other words, I will scrutinise the conditionality of mirroring. This politics has been very much elaborated on by the feminist philosopher Nancy Fraser (1989) who argues that modern western society (her case then was North America and West Europe) is gradually shifting from the politics of “distribution” to “recognition” following the mushrooming of new social movements from the 1980s onwards, such as environmental protection, gay and lesbian activism and so on. Fraser (1997) yet later admits that recognition is always about “material struggling”, as the capitalist system is after all the root of inequality.  Fraser notes that: “Struggles for recognition occur in a world of exacerbated material inequality” (1997: 11); the author considers that materiality, namely, distribution is still challenging the possibility or impossibility of recognition. However, in my view, by still holding quite positive hopes for recognition politics, Fraser does not re-examine the basic face of “identity”, that is, to ask: Who is supporting this recognition to become visible and political? What kind of “identity” can be embraced? These questions in fact call for an urgent rethinking of the essentiality of identity. 
      In a similar fashion, Fuss observes that identification is a “physical mechanism that produces self-recognition” (1995: 2); this “producing” process however immediately calls that identity into question, as recognition - namely, identification - often disguises and keeps identity at a distance, seeing it as having the status of an “ontological given” so that people tend to forget the unstable nature of identity. 
       I view Fraser’s account as appearing to ignore this complexity and this is what I find most problematic. The clue to the reason for this absence may lie in her account of “redistribution” where she sheds light on how the nation-state and capitalism are the two most important forces in dealing with “material distributions”, such as welfare benefits and so on. Taking the nation-state and capitalism into my research, in my history chapter (Chapter Two) for instance, I followed the insights of feminist historians (Barlow 2006; Evans 2008) to delineate the ways in which under Maoism “women’s liberation” was in fact embodied in its one-child-only and strict monogamy-only marriage policies (followed by the successful suppression of prostitution, concubinage and polygamy). Similarly, “equal-hour and equal–pay” in the factory are both treated as the state’s strategy to govern its population and uphold the social order (Evans 1997). Hence women’s liberation cannot be simply addressed as a call for women’s identity but is better seen as a mediator between society and the state. To continue and complicate this argument, it is necessary to move the focus of our discussion to a more macro, political-economic level in order to question whether everyone can be fitted into the agenda of recognition? 
      This way of considering identity politics is elaborated in the work of Wendy Brown's feminist critique (1995) as she claims how, in the struggle for recognition, liberal individualism in particular runs the risk of allying with global capitalism and producing increased subordination of the powerless. Brown excavates the terrain of identity politics (mainly in the West) and criticises the ways in which identity is linked to liberalism’s value of “freedom.” She also asks why it cannot thus promise a radical social transformation but instead has become a conservative political discourse controlled primarily by the state and conservative holders of power? More critically, Brown argues that identity discourse and politics, are usually produced and then remodelled by the capitalist state now. For the capitalist state seeks to establish multiple social identities and archives them as a set of “social classificatory schemes” in order to conjure and govern the subject. 
      Brown thus concludes that identity politics in the end has become a politics of “difference without difference.” In this Foucault-influenced model, social identity is a product of governmentality and is promoted widely through social movements, communities, NGOs and so on. As Brown demonstrates:
“In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching augmentation of progressive formulations of powers and persons (– all of which they also are –) but as tethered to a formulation of justice that reinscribes a bourgeois (masculinist) ideal as its measure.” (1995: 59; my emphasis)

In this respect, if the capitalist state is the critical sponsor of identity, then what are the implications for identity and its politics in today’s China where an epochal shift from state socialism to unbridled neo-liberalism (Solinger 2009) has been in progress for several decades? 
      This is a question that queer theorists often ignore by quickly making diversity or identity into their primary discourse. As a result, there is a risk that studies in this area fail to note how sexual identity can be normalised and assimilated by the market logic. To expressly prove this point, below I review an important legal case on homosexuality in order to examine the contradictory nature of sexual identity and how it is embedded within the workings of the state and capitalism. 

Homosexual Identity as “defamation”
In the previous history chapter, I illustrated the details of a landmark 1995 legal case where for the first time the Chinese state agreed to hear a civil suit under the category of “homosexual defamation” instead of simply categorising the case as one of “hooligan behaviour.”  Here I expand the discussion of this case and show how it demonstrates the inextricable implication of both the state and neo-liberalism in the identity terrain. Rofel (2007), for instance, remarks that in this case the Chinese state's attitude towards homosexuality was to define it as a mental disorder, and thereby retain its longstanding ambivalence over “how to weigh non-normative sexual desires in relation to the triangulated concerns with socialist repression, self-regulation interests, and excessive passions”(2007:149). 
      The fact that the term “homosexual” was claimed to be defamatory implies that from the 1990s onwards homosexual behaviour in China had become an issue of reputation rather than sexual misbehaviour. The case ended in a judgement for the plaintiff, which declared that his social reputation had indeed been “harmed” by being labelled a homosexual. The court ruled that defamation had occurred and thereby accepted the possibility of a gay or lesbian identity being attached to someone not belonging to this subject category. 
      This judgement implied that there is such a thing as “homosexual identity” with which someone can properly be labelled and which, if misapplied, would in the judge's view cause harm. In this perspective, I glimpse a paradox in this case:  the plaintiff complained to the judge, saying, “I am not a homosexual,” but this short argument in fact shows an inherent multiple meaning. First of all, “I am not” seems like a “mirror” statement. It means someone might be a homosexual but ‘I’ am not. Thus, there is a “category” called homosexual, which the subject could belong to or not.  Moreover, the tricky question that can be found here is: Why did gay men and lesbians celebrate the outcome of this case, as Rofel observed? 
      My answer is, it could be because the homosexual rights NGOs and activists in China finally found a position from which to justify their identity in the state's discourse. From my point of view, they found a language given by the nation-state. They were “recognised” and they felt included. It was no matter that they were labelled as a group or given a recognised identity that can harm someone else’s social reputations.  It can also be seen from the homosexuals’ reaction that the governance is ambivalent, and lucidly deployed towards homosexuals in China, showing how people are starting to look for an identity and belonging, but ironically showing how they can accept sexual belonging at the same time, after this identity has been stigmatised as a crime of “defamation.”
      As a result of this case, homosexuality in China since the late 1990s has gradually been shifted within official consideration from the category of behaviour to that of identity (Hildebrandt 2012). In 1997, the Hooligan Law under which homosexual acts between men had been prosecuted was repealed and in 2001 the Chinese Association of Psychiatry deleted homosexual behaviours from its directory of mental disorders. The repeal of the Hooligan Law and of the stigma of pathology has yet to be hailed as “progress” by homosexuals in China” (Sang 2003:169). Nonetheless, at the same time new forms of state activity in relation to sexually marginal groups, including prostitutes, have been policed in post-Maoist China (Zheng 2009); when the government has increasingly embraced neo-liberal ideology and practices. This shift has offered a fertile terrain in which for identity politics to take root but, as I have shown, the legal case outlined above also shows that identity is a contradictory space. However, here I emphasise that I do not intend to attack or condemn gay, lesbian or other sexually marginal identities. What I am primarily concerned with is the discourse of identity and its consequences when homosexual identity is proclaimed in an act of self-recognition, and the way in which it deals with issues of governance arising from the coercive power of present-day China. It is also vital to be alert to the precarious position of homosexuality in China and to question how it is able to negotiate with the state under the neo-liberal regime. In other words, what political effects should be observed when gay identity is gradually identified as a proper intimacy after the Law’s recognition? This inquiry can also be seen as a problem of global politics and neo-liberalism. Pheng Cheah (2010) accentuates, when global capitalism and law operate as a double force to sustain the nation state’s sovereignty. In his analysis, those who are unable to join the game of neo-liberalism increasingly and unavoidably become the “necessary strangers” in our world, as they do not fit neatly into any category of citizenship as defined by national law. Here migrant sex workers are a significant example, as Cheah comments. He also analyses the noted film “Durian Durian” (2002) by the Hong Kong director Fruit Chan, which is the story of a female prostitute from the far north of Mainland China who moves to Hong Kong illegally earning money as a sex worker. 
      Cheah rereads the ways in which this sex worker cannot fit in, even in light of her Chinese citizenship, as she is not protected by Hong Kong’s jurisdiction even though since 1997 Hong Kong has been a Special Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. It is the “one country, two systems” status of Hong Kong, agreed with the British in the form of the Basic Law prior to the territory’s reversion to China, which denies her this protection/integration. As a result, on the one hand the migrant prostitute is urgently needed for her body by the global sex tourism industry (where Hong Kong is a vital hub of global capital). On the other hand, however, migrant prostitution affords no legal and citizenship protection thus she can even be exploited in Hong Kong. 
       “Necessary strangers” are those who are not taken account of and are thus excluded by nation-state planning and the interests of global capitalism in Cheah’s analysis. As a new centre of global capitalism, China offers exceptional opportunities to inspect how far the nation-state and global capital can collaborate and reshape identity into more complex and/or experimental forms by deploying conditions of citizenship, rules of capital, welfare benefits and so on. It is in this sense that identity must be viewed from both micro and macro perspectives to see how it is unevenly reproduced and embodied among different bodies, which is the focus of this chapter.  












Situating my research questions in my empirical research with Money Boys, I intend to find out how we can “talk about” class, and its entanglement with sexuality in neo-liberal China today. As feminists have insightfully pointed out, at least in the Western context, writing about the “self” often runs the risk of exploiting people from different class or race backgrounds (Skeggs 2004; Steedman 2000). 
      My fieldwork consisted of four months of fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai, between March and July 2010. My research focused on rural –to-urban working-class Money Boys and I interviewed thirteen of these in Shanghai (see Interview Appendix 1). In addition to conducting these interviews, I also met informants in various places including brothels, gay bars, a ballroom dancing club (mostly for the working class, middle-aged), middle-aged drag queen shows and a foot-massage salon. Many issues and insights from my participant-observation of these places are presented in other chapters, but my focus of this chapter is the interviews themselves, which constitute the core of my research. 
     Of my interviewees, eleven are in their twenties, one in his thirties and one in his forties. All except one are from the outskirts of Shanghai. Two have changed their sex while two others work as transvestites. I did not get consent to use a recorder during my interviews as they were all very concerned about being discreet. However, I wrote down all the details of each interview, and kept a fieldwork diary during the months of this activity. Each formal interview lasted approximately two hours. Furthermore, less formal interviews followed when I became friends with some of the interviewees.  This may seem a very limited sample, but I would defend my numbers here since, as Ryan-Flood and Rooke (2009) note, when conducting an ethnography of LGBT or queer lives, it is particularly difficult for the informants, who worry about being discreet and are reluctant to share their privacy with the public. As they demonstrate:
“Working on sexuality and intimate life is about navigating through various sensitive issues. Writing about minority groups brings certain expectations and responsibilities. The researcher may grapple exposing the lives of vulnerable groups to a hegemonic audience who may be unfamiliar with or unsympathetic to their difficulties. There may be more immediately pressing problems with recruitment-the minority may not be highly motivated to participate in research, for a variety of reason. They may feel uncomfortable exposing their lives to a researcher or they may feel over researched and scrutinized.” (2009: 117)

In this respect, carrying out research on the sexually and socially marginalised is not an easy task, as it focuses on people who are negotiating stigma, indifference and exclusion in their daily lives (Smith 2005). I have to admit that conducting research on Money Boys was challenging. Firstly, unlike concubine culture or female prostitution, which has many research references (Hershatter 1997; Ko 2007; Zheng 2009; Susan Mann 2011), there was little existing literature in this area and I initially found that there was no published academic literature about Money Boys to which I could refer before my field work. I was subsequently able to collect some data from NGOs concerned with male prostitution in Beijing. It was also difficult to meet people who could offer to help me to find interviewees.
      This is perhaps unsurprising given that prostitution in the PRC is still strictly policed and so “trust” is not lightly placed by people from these circles on outsiders like myself. More importantly, I somehow was cautious of my personal safety while doing my fieldwork. Here is an interesting example of the kind of situation that could easily have led to serious problems for my study. From one my 10th of May 2010 fieldwork notes, I wrote: 
“One night, in a famous Shanghai gay club, my key informant a native friend Ray, suddenly reminded me of a young man we ran into in the pub who Rex said must be a “government spy”. I asked why he thought this and Ray explained that in China a stranger would not come to join you and begin a conversation by talking about politics and being outspokenly critical of the Communist Party. “Oh my, this is very tricky” Ray commented. Although I could not tell if he was right or not, Ray suddenly reminded me of some woeful stories, written by the pioneering oral historian Chou Hua Shan, who recounts how in 1990s China, many policemen worked in pairs, doubling up as gay men, hanging around in homosexual venues, to spy on or harass gay men for money. Amongst Chou’s stories, the most frightening was about an American gay man who in early 1990s Beijing discovered that his room was equipped with a hidden camera after he was mugged by a Money Boy and asked for help from the hotel staff and police. This American informed Chou that he told the police he had been mugged by a female prostitute but they soon found out he was lying (by saying he was having sex with a woman) from the hidden camera set up in his room.” 

Concerns for my safety certainly made the fieldwork harder. There were moments when I became convinced that people around me, most of them working for an NGO, might be spying for the government, and such paranoid thoughts sometimes made me morally uncomfortable and held back the pace of my work. I also had to be very cautious when I made contacts with people on the Internet, due to the notorious government snooping and censorship online. I remember that in the week I arrived in China, Google had just decided to abandon further investment in China because of censorship. This then explains why creating a network was slow. Nonetheless, this chapter proves that my research is still strong enough to engage my research questions. 
       The research process is detailed below, beginning with the pilot research online, which is concerned with how I tease out the intertwined class and sexuality of the clients. After the pilot study, I move to my fieldwork research, introducing how my research, deployed using in-depth interviews, could revitalise a Chinese native form of telling politics – Su Ku, and also from Su Ku, how I can recapture the interplay between class and sexuality. Lastly, I look at how this method also clearly embodies how a new economic regime, namely neo-liberalism, is reformulating this interplay. 

Pilot Research: A Myth of Sexuality and Class
I first became aware of Money Boys from reading on the Internet. As the economic connection between Taiwan and China increased from the late 1980s, more and more Taiwanese businessmen were able to visit or work in China. Chinese trafficked sex workers, migrant marriages in Taiwan, and Taiwanese sex tourists in China, have all become noted “social problems” in the daily life of both states (Jackson et al. 2008). Male-male prostitution nonetheless is rarely discussed or published in the traditional mass media. Information about this has however appeared on the Internet since the early 2000s, when a few sex tourists began to share their sexual experiences. One of the most popular online communities in Taiwan, kkcity, the most famous BBS (Bulletin Board System) virtual community in Taiwan since 2001, has become a principal means for LGBT people in Taiwan to share information (Berry et al. 2003). It was from kkcity that I began to notice that a group of people were recounting and sharing their sex experiences with Money Boys. 
      Feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith (1990) reminds me that understanding and using texts (including official documents, magazines and newspaper articles) as the carrier of social relationships is vital for sociologists in order to scrutinise power relationships, as texts, in fact, mediate power relationships, such as the system of patriarchy. Smith demonstrates:
“The power relationships which come thus into view from the standpoint of experiences situated in the everyday world are abstracted from local and particular settings and relationships. These forms of communication and action are distinctively mediated by texts. The textual mediation of its forms of organization are fundamental to its characteristic abstracted, extra-local forms, and its curious capacity to reproduce its order in the same way in an indefinite variety of actual local contexts.”(1990: 2)

This point of “mediation” implies that the website and other discussions and accounts from clients on their blogs and in other virtual spaces should all be seen as a dynamic and mediating virtual space. Indeed, when reading these websites I kept repeatedly looking at these websites and blogs until I found that the hidden connections between sexuality and class are interestingly and subtly embodied through these virtual spaces and communities – as a form of “myth”. But how does this myth help me to continue to frame my research process in the fieldwork? In short, the pilot study in my chapter served to dovetail my research questions and my fieldwork, in order to verify whether the research questions could be extended into the fieldwork. In so doing, let me begin my pilot study with the observation of websites.

The Myth: Working Class and Heterosexuality
While browsing these websites, I encountered numerous flashing pop-ups, colourful on-screen advertisement bars and whole WebPages (see Photo 6), often with images of half-naked men or sensational advertisements for professional masseurs, Body technician services, or “Shanghai Brokeback Mountain” and so on. These advertisements clearly imply the marketing of sex. These companies always advertise themselves as beauty salons or spa centres, and always display several photos of topless or near- naked photos of men.

(Photo 6, “Money Boys On-Line”, print-screened from website by the author)


(Photo 7, “Money Boys On-Line”, print-screened from website by the author)


Money Boys featured on these website are called “technicians” (技師;ji shi). In this particular context, it would imply that they are professional masseurs, or “body technicians”; each technician also has either a quite masculine or sexually loaded name. For instance, one website, Shanghai Male Salon (see photos 6 and 7) presents profiles of ten technicians, with working names such as “Sexual Dandy”, “Super Size Man” or “Macho Police.” More interesting than these straightforward marketing ploys are the statements which accompany them. They are not merely decorative.
      Firstly, they often claim their images are all genuine and they also claim that their “technicians” are actually only part-time workers who in fact have other careers as athletes, models, personal trainers, policemen, soldiers, and so on. Yet in the PRC, which is effectively run as a police and military-controlled state, it seems practically impossible that policemen and soldiers would be able to double up as prostitutes, releasing personal information and images of themselves online. Instead, an interesting question would be: Why is it important that Money Boys should apparently have “legitimated” careers as athletes or policemen? What is this believed to the potential clients? In my account, the answer is probably to do with intertwining myths of sexuality and class to which these clients subscribe. That is to say, the issue is not whether these Money Boys are real soldiers, models or not, but why these masculine roles are favoured, imagined and desired? The myth is carefully examined here. 
      Searching for discussions of this topic online, I found a blog called “Comment on Money Boys”, set up by a Cantonese businessman, which seems to show how this apparent myth works. This blog is the most popular one about Money Boys, and its owner, who calls himself Mr. Big Bird, states that he has more than ten years experience as a sex tourist in Mainland China and is happy to share his sexual adventures online. Since 2005, he has reposted photos of Money Boys from brothel websites, rating them and exchanging accounts of experiences with other bloggers. But amidst the feverish sharing of sexual experiences one comes across many stories of confusion and anxiety. 
      The “real” sexuality of Money Boys seems particularly troubling to many clients who tend to assume that Money Boys must be straight men as they are from rural working-class backgrounds. This dogmatic assumption traps them in confusion over the “real sexuality” of Money Boys, and for me this kind of confusion deserves to be called a “myth of sexuality.” By this I mean the clients’ fetishism of working-class Money Boys and their “straightness”. This fantasy recurs frequently within many clients’ experiences, as they show off how lucky they are to meet a decent Money Boy who can perform gay sex so well. In accordance with this fetishism of the working-class men’s body, Mr. Big Bird tends to have sex with men who have “dragon” or “phoenix” tattoos on their body, as these kinds of tattoos are usually associated with gangs or with working-class culture in China. Mr. Big Bird also once confessed how he had a wonderful sex encounter with a “heterosexual” Money Boy from Mongolia:
“This Mongolian MB was just amazing! I had ordered his service several times! Now I can say we are friends. As he is straight, it was quite difficult for him to get “hard” while having sex with men. But, I still recommend him to all of you guys, as his service attitude is also carefree. Big Plus! He can even be a bottom (passive, receive role in sex)!! If you are looking for a mature MB, he is what you want!​[10]​”  

But this myth of Money Boys’ class backgrounds and sexuality can also lead to negative judgments. Some clients attack Money Boys online, and say that using their sexuality to make money is immoral:
 “A lot of guys from that brothel are good looking but after all, they are country bumpkins. They have bad attitudes and can’t get a hard-on while having sex. I won’t pay my money for them anymore.” (Anonymous; 1st May 2008 cited from kkcity)

From these myth-making stories of paradox and confusion I came to an imperative question: how and why do people think that a working-class male from a rural background cannot be homosexual?  For this question, Tong Ge's (2007) research on Money Boys helps to recapture this question.  One Money Boy complained that before he started his escort career and worked as a builder in Shanghai, most men he encountered in the city explained that he could not be gay since he is from the countryside and is working class. From his story, we can see the extent to which this myth of sexuality is complicated by ideas of class:
 “This is really ironic… some people who assumed I am a Money Boy, would give me some money--- but you know what, I didn’t care what they think about me! Just give me some pennies, as I’m bloody poor! But the most irritating are those who did not give me money who are often worried by me. They wonder they’d get mugged or overcharged by me for they were suspecting why I could do anal sex so well. Some even ran away just as I started to kiss them, some guys asked me: How did you learn anal sex? How come you can fuck that well…! This is a joke! They think only city men know how to mess the ass hole? Or they think that there is no such thing as homosexuality in the countryside? Anyway, I’m bloody poor, I am. But if I one day become rich, I will definitely go to the city, and pay money to fuck those city men’s ass holes.” (2007: 239; my translation)

The myth that I want to reveal here shows us another instance of sexuality in contemporary China being affected significantly by class. Indeed, from the myth I show above, in my account it seems that the working class – as the political hero of the Maoist past – has now been placed as a “belated subject” who cannot be attached with the “new” sexual identity. This is why people contend “they cannot be gay” and feel suspicious about or surprised by their gay sexuality. Or indeed clients hope to find that although they are available for gay sex this is not their personal preference. This ironic logic reminds us again, as I have shown in the history of homosexuality in China, that the field of same-sex sex always bristles with paradox and myth as it was always unevenly imagined and represented by different discourses and actors; social reformers, nationalist writers and the mass media came to imagine same-sex sex in different ways for different reasons. 
      Current Chinese conceptions from the open and participatory discourse of the Internet show how the rural working-class citizen is imagined as a person who cannot be related to same-sex “identity” as that same-sex sex is subtly embedded here with class. This finding directly leads my research questions towards a deeper investigation into how class and (homo)sexuality are imagined and perceived in a Chinese context. Following my pilot study, I sought in my research to engage more deeply and revealingly with the tension between class and sexuality in China. Employing the politics of telling in my fieldwork, in the next section I show how this enabled me to extend and develop my understanding of the issues surrounding the intertwinement of sexuality and class. Before delivering this account, however, it is appropriate to make some remarks about my methodology. The in-depth interview as a primary qualitative research method has been criticised as “outdated” by Savage and Burrows (2007), declaim that it is no longer adequate to tackle new forms of sociality or “knowing capitalism!” 
       But I insist that in the Chinese context it remains a rewarding way to excavate issues of class and sexuality, especially when deployed consciously within the consciousness of Chinese revolutionary traditions such as Su Ku (Speaking Bitterness) politics. 
       In the next section, I want to introduce Su Ku politics, as an imperative political activity in the Maoist era, which was used to encourage the peasants and working class to voice their sufferings, especially class struggle, and to support the powerless in venting their anger, sorrow and repressed emotions in public spaces, such as streets and community centres. Su Ku was a political manoeuvre set up in the early years of the Maoist era in order to facilitate attacks on the middle class and the elite of society. The characteristic scene of Su Ku was a group of crying peasants on their knees accusing a landowner who was forced to admit his or her exploitative actions towards the peasants and servants working for him/her. In this chapter, I claim that Su Ku was a useful research resource for my interviews, helping to reframe the class issues in my informants’ rural backgrounds. I go beyond this to reinvent Su Ku as a relevant format for the narration of my informants’ sexual experiences. 
      The intersection between class and sexuality will be carefully examined through my interviews. As Puwar (2004) remarks, the researcher ought to be cautious not to slip between differences (such as gender, race or class) “automatically”. In order to avoid homogenising differences, we must therefore work towards a kaleidoscopic framework of analysis where differences can enter into dialogue and enrich each other. My own research approach reflects this point, as I explain below, as Su Ku provides a “linguistic space” in which it is possible to identify and explore how “differences” encounter and reshape each other. Let me open up this encounter of difference in Su Ku politics by recalling a difficult interview with one of my informants, Joe:
“Joe has lived in Shanghai for five years. He seems very happy in this city, has never encountered trouble, never had problems with his business. Too bad! In the beginning I was wondering, as he cannot tell me any “special” experiences of being a Money Boy. He just kept smiling and reiterating what a lovely life he is enjoying in Shanghai...well…but from his words and attitude, I can sense his confidence. Depending on luck and of course, his charming appearance, Joe told me he can get up to 15 customers each week, and can earn thousands of RMB. He sometimes meets clients in the gym; Yet he is adroit (clever/sharp?) His questions, which make me frustrated but why? Am I too keen to find “unhappy” life stories? Or has the social stigma in fact already embedded itself in my mind, leaving me to expect certain responses, but feeling confused when they do not come? Or is it this schema (assuming they are living a particularly wretched life?) that confines sex workers to their unhappy life?” (Fieldwork notes from 20th June 2010)
 
This interview became very imperative to my work despite the fact that I initially regarded it as unsuccessful. I felt this way because the interviewee seemed to refuse to engage with my questions and merely repeated that he had never felt uncomfortable about being a Money Boy. Strangely enough Joe’s reserved but polite attitude made me anxious: I found I could not obtain any useful information from him. Contrary to the unpleasant stories that my research expected to hear, Joe’s life seems full of joy and not particularly “dramatic.” It consists of going to the gym and hanging out with friends at clubs or bars in Shanghai. In other words, it corresponds to the conventional life of the young urban generation in China. His account left me strangely nervy, as I had not expected to hear any positive stories from my interviewees. 
      But soon when I came back from the interview, in my guest-house of Shanghai, I started to reflect on his reaction to my questions and suddenly realised that the problem could be my own naïve attitude, that is, my emphasis on and concern with suffering or bitterness. I wondered if the reason I felt bad was because he had not given me what I wanted, i.e. struggling or bitter life stories? Why should he not have a carefree life as a Money Boy? Joe challenged my research as interviewing was no longer enacted as simply a tool to collect stories, but a wrestling encounter between the interviewee and me. Hence, I examine the dynamic between interviewer and interviewee later in this chapter, but I must continue to reflect on the question of bitterness in relation to Joe here. 
      As I briefly explained above, bitterness speaking was once a vital tool in the communist revolution years embedded in the politics of class struggle. I want to claim that, in today’s China, it is still useful to remap and scrutinise class politics. My reanalysis of bitterness shows how it can help to rethink class in a new way, when viewed from the perspective of sexual politics. In other words, I argue that through Su Ku, this thesis continues to suggest how this specific emotional force – that is, bitterness – matters in Money Boys’ value- practising. That said, before unpacking the ways in which Money Boys begin to experience value and to practise what they desire for their futures, during my research process I specify that Su Ku as a specific emotional performance, has grounded their decisions and has been used to explain their choices. 
      It is an affect that is deeply schemed by class, from the Chinese Communist ethos, but is also made complex by my respondents' sexuality. Su Ku is helpful to an understanding of what is behind value practices and performances, as it provides an understanding of an affective picture that Money Boys are deciphering, and this also helps us to elaborate their value decisions more critically. But before presenting the Su Ku politics, it is necessary to look into how the cities, where I conducted my research, giving the space to let my informants perform their skills, and how it at the same time, reframe my research.

“Better City, Better Life” (Shanghai Expo Slogan 2010)
“The modern city is a place for banking and prostitution and very little else…” ("Frank Lloyd Wright, Architect 1867-1959)
Here I want to introduce how my informants’ lived experiences actually help me to frame my research, which cannot be executed if conducted outside of a city. In other words, Money Boy’s self-learning of being a Money Boy, enable this research to enquire why and how cities in contemporary China have actually become a hub of generating different values. That said, in cities, different bodies from different places carry different capitals and produce values in different ways. I want to frame, how through cities, that we see different gendered or classed subjects emerge. In China, perhaps the biggest new subject group are those rural immigrant guest workers who move into urban cities (Solinger 1999; Whyte 2009), following up the drastic needs of labour force for the boost of service and construction industries (Yan 2008). But for Money Boys, same as the migrant workers, they came to cities in order to make a better life, for my respondents have all been involved in various kinds of part-time jobs such as waiters in restaurants, receptionists in hotels and so on. But different from others, my informants gradually entered the sex industry, that is: “jump to the sea” (Xiahai; means selling sex in Mandarin), with their (youth) bodies in order to earn a “rice bowl of youth” (qingchunfan). Yet, not merely to justify the importance of cities in today’s China, the research is more interested in looking into how Money Boy’s lives are transmitting in cities, and at the same time reshaping the urban fabric. I do not envision their lives will remain in cities for good. As I will describe later in this chapter and in the rest of this thesis, most of them are hankering to move, to move forward or abroad. Cities in China thus should be regarded as dynamic places that mediate those lives who are desiring to move, that is, those bodies who are “between” spaces instead of  “in” spaces (Knowles 2000:84). So the key is to contextualise different bodies’ different strategies of surviving in the transition. 
     From rural to urban, and thinking about the next stage, but carrying the filial responsibilities to their family, the research sees Money Boys as the subject of  “various forms of transits” (Knowles 2000:84) instead of a “sex worker self” as a whole. Before discussing the politics of transition, it is necessary to specify that Beijing and Shanghai are the cities that this research went through.  

Framing City in Post-Socialism China

In a geographic sense, “making cities” in China can be seen as the most important political-economic project, when all PRC’s leaders for decades have announced urbanisation as the key for China’s future (Dutton 2008). In this regard, Beijing and Shanghai, two of China’s leading cities, served as the political and financial centres. Both have more than 20 million residents and thus are fine cases to witness the progressing urbanisation in today’s China. The two cities not only presented their abilities in hosting the 2008 Olympics and 2010 World Expo, they are also the superb magnets that attract vast rural-to-urban migrants, foreign tourists, residents and workers. According to China’s official population statistics, the “floating population” (Fu Dong Zen Koh), that is, the number of domestic rural-to-urban migrants is near 150 million. The same data bate also addresses that 82% of migrants live in the East-coast cities, particularly in the Special Economic Zones. Beijing, the capital city, had 41% non-native residents in 2009, and Shanghai as the financial centre had 31% guest migrants from other provinces in the same year (Wu 2011); and among rural migrants, more than 60%  work in factories and service sector. Most of them are rejected for registration within the urban hukou. However, without hukou, migrants cannot acquire social benefits or pensions from the cities they live, including public education, medical insurance and so on. One can thus spot a dilemma that exists within the urban life in contemporary China, especially within those leading cities, which have become the magnet for rural migrants. On the one hand, cities provide new opportunities for jobs and a better life. As I will depict later in this thesis, many young people come to cities to make “futures” when the rural hometown is losing job opportunities, and farming is no longer an attractive career for which young Chinese people are hankering. On the other hand, however, cities do not necessary provide full protections for “outsiders” when material struggles remain. Zhang Li (2010), for example, declares how cities in China has shown this interplaying of including and excluding face:

   “The city is at heart of these breathless changes and ruptures. City space has become the very subject of transformation, a key site of social struggle, and a source of popular imaginary regarding the trajectory of a society in the remaking. Yet, not all Chinese cities have the same fate and opportunity in this process.” (Zhang 2010:127)

As mentioned above, this research is not focused on the movements of Chinese urbanisation. But I am also aware that this a research cannot avoid noticing the ways in which cities, particularly Beijing and Shanghai in contemporary China, perform a vital role to reshape China’s future. To my research, cities become imperative hubs that Money Boys inhabit where they learn how to redefine and reapply values. Below I am going to document the ways in which my research was designed to be conducted in Beijing and Shanghai, and how from this perspective, I also witnessed the ways in which Money Boys learned about value making in cities.

From Beijing to Shanghai;  From Peasants’ sons to Money Boys

Prostitutes were important figures in this research for a new and improved past, making it likely that the meanings of prostitution will continue to be re-created and negotiated in China as elsewhere. (Hershatter 1997:398)

This research was designed from the beginning to be conducted in Beijing, China’s capital city, because I was a volunteer for a LGBT rights NGO, Aibai, based in Beijing. Aibai conducts public lobbying for LGBT rights and education, unrelated to any issue of prostitution. But, as many other NGOs in China, Beijing is the main city that the grassroots organisations inhabit, for the city is the political centre of PRC. I did struggle to establish the network of Money Boys in Beijing for interviews. I however ended up moving to Shanghai after one month in Beijing when I finally got the contact of another NGO, Leyi, which is the only NGO that focuses on (same-sex) sex workers rights in China. I did not interview Money Boys in Beijing, though working with Aibai helped me to network with activists and academics who are working on Money Boys and sexuality work in China. Meeting them in Beijing helped me acquire precious information and knowledge of China’s sexual and gender politics before the formal interview work in Shanghai. Now let me move the discussion to Shanghai. As the biggest urban city in PRC, Shanghai has more than 20 millions inhabitants (Beijing has 21 million and Shanghai has 23 million). Unlike Beijing, which has traditionally been a political and culture centre for centuries, Shanghai in modern Chinese history is particularly recognized as a southern, warm city that produce desires (Hershatter2002). Far from the cold north, as Western imperialism’s most desirable colonised port city in 19th century Mainland China, Shanghai has continued as a city that mediates the encounter between Western and Chinese cultures. It is a port city that has always encountered the imperialism invasion but powerfully took and digested Western culture in its own way. Historian Gail Hershatter illuminates this account and the importance of Shanghai in Chinese history:

“From the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, Shanghai was a treaty- port – a place where Westerners governed part of the city, where Western and Japanese businessmen, sailors, industrialists, and adventurers made their homes and sometimes their fortunes. Shanghai was also China’s biggest industrial and commercial city, a magnet for merchants from around the country and for peasants of both sexes seeking work, and the birthplace of the Chinese Communist Party. Shanghai embraces populations from various nations, regions, and classes, and harboured political agitators ranging from Christian moral reformers to Marxist revolutionaries.” (Hershatter 1997:7; my emphasis)

Shanghai is Mainland China’s first and leading cosmopolitan city in modern history (Farrer 2002). The neon clubs, bars, department stores, brothels, French-colonial style architectures along the River serve as landmarks of Shanghai urban culture. Shanghai is China’s first port city to confront the modernity from the West (Hershatter 1997). Besides, for example, that Shanghai style literature (Hai Pai Wen Xue) were infamous devalued by those nationalist writers and social reformers for the former’s concerns are more about sexual desires and personal affairs rather than social and political critique (Wang 2006). 
     Though this Shanghai’s life style was condemned during the Maoist time, it soon was re-enlivened when Deng Xiaoping re-opened the foreign markets and capitals in 1980s, rebranding Shanghai as China’s new “Pearl of East” which aimed at replacing Hong Kong to become the new global financial centre of the East (this was also used at that time to compete with the British colonial government in Hong Kong). Quite successful, today, Shanghai has become Mainland China’s richest city. By looking back at history, as here I am iterating, Shanghai has always been a city related to sex culture, particularly prostitution (Hershatter 1997). As explained in last chapter, the burgeoning of prostitution in Shanghai at that time has yet became a battlefield for the State and nationalist reformers to attack as a national shame and social ill (Sang 2003). Reformers criticised China’s “lateness” to enter modernity and related its semi-colonised precariousness to the booming of sex industry: Chinese men do not worry the national fate but pathetically indulge in sex (consumption). Nevertheless, after a long-term silence during the Maoist time, the coming time of neo-liberalism in China has reopened the sex industry and Money Boys have become a new intricate gender subject that emerges in urban Shanghai (Kong 2012). This, to some extent, can also explain that when asked, most of my friends in Beijing and Shanghai, including Money Boys, informed me that Shanghai is a comfort zone for sex culture compare to Beijing. For, at least regarding prostitution, the government will be more concerned in the capital Beijing. This aligns with Michael Dutton’s comment that Beijing, after all, is the most “policed” city in China (Dutton 2008). 
      When I conducted my research in Shanghai, I soon noticed that unlike Beijing with only one noted gay club “Destination” at that time, Shanghai has numerous gay bars and clubs across the city, as well as more brothels of Money Boys. Given this knowledge of the particularity of Shanghai, that is, a city of “intimacy”, one can more precisely realise the ways in which sex or sex workers are recalled into the fabrication of the city, as Hershatter notes this linkage, “Studying prostitution and its changes thus illuminates the thinking and social practices of many strata of Shanghai society” (Hershatter 1997:8). More critically, as cities in China addressed by numerous researchers as a magnet for outsiders - particularly young rural migrants who seek to fulfil their dreams or escape the rural poverty (Pun 2005; Jacka 2006; Yan 2008; Zheng 2009; Fang 2012), this thesis seeks to revisit sex work and examine how Money Boys survive in Shanghai city. On the other hand, it is also in this city where my respondents learned how to learn to survive, to become a Money Boy. Below the story of one of my interviewees, Lotus, serves as an opening case to unpack the discussion of the journey of becoming a Money Boy.

Self-making: Becoming a Money Boy
Lotus came to Shanghai for about five years. When we met in 2010, during my research in Shanghai, she told me she decided to change his sex two years prior. This decision for Lotus to become a woman, as Lotus reminded me, was partially so she could attract more clients, as are the majority of clients in the sex industry are heterosexual men. In addition, changing gender for Lotus might give her greater opportunity to find a Mr. Right. For a friend of her really make this dream come true. Bearing this dream in mind, the first step for Lotus to transition is to implant plastic breasts. Two years before I interviewed Lotus, she took a 10- hours-long train back to the far northeast China to do the surgery, as they found an underground doctor who charged quite a bit less than what is typical. When Lotus came back to Shanghai, s/he started to take hormones and kept prostituting in Shanghai city. From the street to the high-end five stars hotels, she tirelessly learned how to trade her own business. Nevertheless as one of my friends Ray, a NGO social worker told me, he was a “Tu Baozi” (country pumpkin) when he first time came to Shanghai at19 years old. With a strong tone, Ray told me that:“ You know what, I did not even know how to be a Money Boys when I came to Shanghai, I knew nothing and nobody to help me settle up in the beginning!” 
       That is to mean, even for selling sex, which seems like one of the most basic, non-skilled forms of work, is still not easy for these young farmer’s sons to do in the very beginning, as there is no network of brothels to contact, and no computers and internet to approach clients on-line. That is to say, being a Money Boy is not quite easy to begin: “It took me a while, after fooling around doing numerous different jobs in Shanghai.” Lotus revealed. Though Lotus always has to wrestle with many challenges toward her rural and gender background in daily life. A couple of times, Lotus told me the far-north countryside accent has led to discrimination by local Shanghai residents. “Particularly those middle-age women I have found are the most irritating; they are mean and really biased women!” Lotus murmured. Besides, Lotus also had to learn how to handle those clients who suspect or even demean her “true” gender. For example, on the street, Lotus frequently has to squabble with clients who insist to “know” her “real gender” or assert that they would not have to pay her. In daily life, in terms of shopping, Lotus has to face some “frightened” sales clerks when their customers is a tall with many voices MtF. Lotus laughingly told me once she had to chase a sales lady through the whole floor, questing for a reason why she refused to serve her, and the sales lady ran away to the office. 
       What we shall learn from Lotus’s experiences is how Lotus learns and practices her skills to survive in the city. It includes dealing with harassment, malice or frustrations from work and daily life, for her immigrant and shifting status, and her non-normalised body/gender. Lotus is a subject living in many forms of transiting indeed.  She learns to give discounts to clients who are also peasant workers in cities, most of them are truck drivers. However, she charges much more for foreigners, and she learns to be “nice” and “friendly” to people who work in NGOs or related people such as me, who she thinks can protect her if any unpleasant things happen (such as police harassment). Nonetheless living in the city in the meantime offers Lotus a space to practice her future, that is, to live abroad. So Lotus tirelessly learns to use English, from friends working in NGOs and practising with her foreign clients. 
      Lotus is skilled in bribing or befriending the doorman of hotels, or the police and security guards in the expensive boutiques, in order so she can be escorted around or enters the lobby and bars of hotels. Lotus makes many friends in the city, such as those lesbian friends who lent her money to do the surgery. However, Lotus’s life as a Money Boy is uneasy. Most of the time she is fretful with financial insecurities and emotional breakdowns, including insomnia, are not uncommon. She cannot always find women’s shoes that fit her foot size, and the bodily pain after the surgery remains. Lotus still keeps her steps moving across the city though. From the dark alleys to the neon bars, Lotus holds a wish to shift her journey from the city to the world, that is, to transmit herself or her lives to another form. 
      My main concern here is how we understand that a Money Boy’s life as a sex worker in a city is rooted in their daily self-learning or developing. In a more theoretical angle, Aihwa Ong and Zhang Li (2008) state that the neo-liberalism experiment in China is recalling and remaking many multifaceted “selves.” While some of these ‘selves’ align with State governance, others, like Money Boys in my view, shall be read as contradicting neo-liberal and state camaraderie, when they reveal the interplay between inclusions and exclusions (Kong 2012). 




Unlike Lotus, as an MtF Money Boys, Robert is a young guy in his mid 20s. He is from a small town, which is not too far from central Shanghai. With great looks and a quite charming and welcoming attitude, Robert’s career of becoming a Money Boys looks good.  For Robert, instead of selling sex, “making friends” is a better way that he prefers to describe his job. And he really knows how to make friends. By knowing I study in the UK, he jauntily told me how he got this name “Robert” from a British white man he ran into in the underground train station. 
      That was a winter afternoon in Shanghai, when Robert noticed that a Laowai (foreigner) kept checking him out on the train until they both left the station. That Laowai approached him in the end, and invited him home to have a one-night stand. Since then they have been friends, and Robert was quite happy to be given “Robert” as the first English name he had in his life. Robert was keen to ask me if I wanted that British guy’s mobile phone number, since I am studying in England, right after I asked whether that guy is handsome or not. In the meantime, to my surprise, he gave me his “real name”, which showed his sincerity of wanting to befriend me - his real “identity” can be known. After a couple of times that we had met in town, he suddenly asked me one day if I wanted to have sex with him. I politely rejected him with an excuse that we had no place we could go, particularly because he lived in the brothel and I lived in a shared flat with many Taiwanese tourists. My refusal nonetheless did not distance Robert and me, in terms of our research relationship. 
      For, Robert is really good in maintaining his relationship with people including his clients, pimp and Chinese girlfriend. He cooks well and patiently tidies up the flat. His warm personality lets other Money Boys in the brothel rely on him, and his charming attitude allows his clients and girlfriend to stay with him. Robert knows the importance of relationships; no matter whether they are short term or long term, he tirelessly maintains them for different reasons. He learned how to use email better from me, as before he only used a couple of times. He also asked if I could help him set up an on-line profile for attracting more clients. Robert is also recently joined an insurance-sales programme in order to think about the next step of his future. He went to the gym, manicure boutique, and a nice hair salon as other urbanities do in order to keep an attractive appearance. 
      Living within these multi and intricate relationships in Shanghai requires skills. Skills, however, become usable through daily practises, they are not naturally given, and Robert is the one, among my interviewees, who deals with this best. As Knowles and Harper (2009) acknowledges, the “skill” that people use in daily life but is no confined in the employment use only. Skill has more intricate and situated meanings: “Skill is compressed knowledge about the world and how to operate within it. It is not confined to employment. Skill is generally demonstrated in the practical operation of routine activities in everyday life.” (Knowles and Harper 2009:232). The authors stress “translation” as a necessary and vital skill that migrants practice. In this account, Robert’s efforts can be comprehended as daily skill exercises, and likewise what Lotus does. Specifically speaking, as migrants, they show how different gendered bodies use different skills to bargain in daily life. These skills are performed in how they make friends in daily life, and in the ways they deal with difficult clients, police, NGO social workers or people like me, who long to listen to their stories. Robert performs these skills adroitly while Lotus faces more challenges. Both, however, shed light on how Money Boys’ experiences in Shanghai are characterised through daily skills practices and performing. They are subjects who oscillate between the rural and urban and the present and the future, and need endless skills practising to live in the situation of in-between. 


















Su Ku: An Old or New Telling Skill?

A recurrent image from the Cultural Revolution years is of the peasant, mostly depicted as peasant women, protected by Red Guards, kneeling on the ground in the street, shedding bitter tears, or in public squares, or community centres, venting their bitterness and fury, telling people of their sufferings at the hands of “evil” landlords, bosses, teachers, and so on. Launched by the Chinese Communist Party, Su Ku became a principal activity to mobilise the revolution (Farquhar and Berry 2004). It was also a ritual to establish collective class-consciousness. Anagnost (1997) notes how before the communist revolution class was an abstract and distant idea for many Chinese people, suggesting that in pre-revolutionary era, Chinese personhood was immersed in Confucianism shaped and constrained by its federal family-centric value. Given this perspective, in order to launch a nationwide socialist revolution, the first vital task was to break down Confucianism and establish collective class-consciousness. Su Ku, for Anagnost, was developed as a political tool to encourage the peasants and working class to give public voice to their personal stories, experiences and, most importantly, class suffering in order to initiate their sense of class-consciousness. It is thus a practice of class, or a “social ritual” to enable “I”, the victim of class, to justify myself in joining the working class revolution. Anagnost argues:
“The job of a revolutionary vanguard was to present the peasantry its image in history to help it achieve its historic destiny. The speaking bitterness narratives provided this representational function. They worked on people’s ideology not as a process of conscious intellection but as a system of representations or images that encouraged people to “see their specific place in a historically peculiar social formation” in a way which was entirely new to them but which still articulated with their sense of social reality. Likewise, the narrative structure of speaking bitterness hailed the peasant subject as its speaker as “I” victimized in the context of “enchanted relationships” with those who in the process become identified as class enemies.”(1997: 30; my emphasis)
 
Moreover, Anagnost (1997) declares that Su Ku is not merely a linguistic act, but should be regarded as a form of bodily performance, from the tears to the physical violence in the frantic Cultural Revolution. During this time and the years that followed, Su Ku activity was always a dreadful, violent attack on the middle class including landowners, academic elites and others; she indicates that “speaking bitterness was elevated to the status of “history speaking itself,” but the body provided the material ground through which this history was real. The speaking voice and the body became tied in the labor making present the abstracted circulation of a dispersed social evil” (1997:18-19).
     Su Ku could thus be seen as a specific “speech-act” skill that successfully promoted the formation of class-consciousness in the Maoist years. What I want to emphasise is that through this process Su Ku also entered a repertoire of Chinese-native moral and bodily performances by Chinese citizens. Indeed, Farquhar and Berry (2004) notice that in the 1980s, after the end of the Cultural Revolution, there was widespread popularity and cultural ferment surrounding “Wound Literature” (傷痕文學;Shang Hen Wen Xue), launched by writers from the social elite who reminisced and wrote down their sufferings from the collective factory or the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. This writing should be seen as an extension of Su Ku politics. In other words, after the Cultural Revolution, for the elite writers, their writing of their sorrowful memories usefully recalls elite, middle class bitterness, and it thus could be seen as a new form of Su Ku politics which hinges on the middle- class mind. Therefore, Su Ku can be seen as a skill that expresses personal experience as affected by historical and state violence. From its history, Su Ku is also clearly entangled with class. 
      In this manner, therefore, rethinking Su Ku as an intertwined performance with bodily and linguistic aspects not only inspired me to deploy interview as my research method (so as to frame the research around personal telling), but also pushed me to engage critically with my interview process by seeing how “bitterness” could be reframed in terms of class struggle. And how bodily performance - that is, sexuality - is also related to class. By incorporating this new understanding, for example from Joe, I found therefore that the “happiness” that he kept showing in my interview, could ironically be considered alongside “bitterness”. Bitterness and happiness are not clearly separated – if one looks more deeply into the interview narrative, we might suddenly find that happiness thus served as a moral expression to soothe bitterness. 
      I observed this relationship at work through most interviewee responses, as “happiness” seems always to be conditioned or used to soothe and negotiate class and bodily experiences as rural migrants and Money Boys in Shanghai. In this vein, from my interviews, “bitterness speaking” has shifted to become a moral self-adjustment, oscillating and negotiating the gap between bitterness and happiness. But a personal moral adjustment with regard to happiness and bitterness is also interrelated with class and sexual experiences, which made the interviews more complicated. 
       For example, for Xiao Lang, an in-process transgender Money Boy (Xiao Lang had just undergone surgery for plastic breast implantation), just barely surviving in Shanghai, “being a happy person” was always iterated after Xiao Lang had told me about unhappy and sometimes sorrowful stories: 
 “I’ve been telling myself all these years, that, life should be as easy as possible—since it’s hard to earn money in Shanghai Well…happiness is a simple thing, but (silent for a few seconds), “I think it is very important for me…like for example…when on the street to cruise clients, I always try to tell those young kids who are very new to this business to be kind to each other, that there’s no need to quarrel with each other. Isn’t it? … after ten years of fooling around in this country, I think I do my job very well. (Interview Xiao Lang; 15th July 2010)
 
From our interview, happiness seems to function as a mediator to deal with the pain and bitterness of life. From a Muslim background, Xiao Lang is struggling with the decision to be a Money Boy who sells sex, as well as a son who changed sex. Xiao Lang is floundering between homesickness, religious faith and economic hardship, as well as police harassment on the streets or clients’ retaliations after they discover Xiao Lang is a “man” and also with insomnia and pain from the plastic breast implants. 
      Just recently, after my fieldwork, I heard from a mutual friend that Xiao Lang has had another surgery to remove the plastic breasts due to struggles with his faith. This is a necessary moral technique, to accommodate bitterness and happiness into the account of moral adjustment. Some interviewees explained that practicing this technique is pretty necessary and “practical”. Another interviewee Xiaoxue notes:
“Today no one cares about whether you live or die, as you are a nobody in this country …I think it is better to be practical. Very simple, fighting to survive, to get a bowl of rice...this is life isn’t it? … Just be practical whatsoever… I want to make enough money and move somewhere far away from Shanghai, have a small business with my boyfriend, well, begin a happier life.” (Xiaoxue Interview; 7th July 2010)
 
As documented, Su Ku always involved bodily experience and performance, though unlike in the highly sacred Socialist past, in “new” China, Money Boy’s bodily and sexual experiences are tough and challenging. Take another interviewee Linda for example: I noticed how Lotus, also an in-process transgender Money Boy, practices this skill in her/his bodily experiences; for, with a tall and slim physique and quite big shoulders, Lotus has always had to deal with unfriendly and even verbal abuse on the street. Lotus is not afraid of standing up for her/himself “Being a human like me, in this country, I have nothing to be afraid”, “I don’t care if I die tomorrow, seriously, I really don’t care at all ”and this attitude is always related to those discontented experiences in Shanghai. But Lotus also revealed when we met in Shanghai that she is now learning how to fight back against indifference or insults in the street. Lotus offered me a story:
“One day I went to a luxury department store to purchase some lovely pants but, just as I had finished asking that bitchy saleswoman -“How much are they”- she did not respond to me at all! You know what, what she did do was suddenly run away, looking terrified! (Laugh) I decided to chase her out of rage. I chased her to her staff room, and then shouted loudly “Why did you run away” I kept asking her but she was too shocked by me, and could hardly answer for a while then she said, “I just have to make a phone call” “But why did you run away? Why you r-u-n a-w-a-y!” I was so angry that I asked her this more than ten times.” (Interview Lotus; July 25th 2010)

     What I intend to comprehend, from the examples of Lotus and other interviewees, is how Su Ku is indeed a bodily performance, but also how it has to be accompanied by the act of moral adjustment. It is a new form of storytelling throughout my interviews, which combines class and sexuality by fusing moral and bodily experiences. 
       Of course this fusion of moral and bodily expression shows itself in further aspects, such as in the relationship with values such as filial piety and cosmopolitanism (this is discussed in the following chapter). In this vein, one of my major concerns in this chapter is how the technique of Su Ku can express the story of new economic lives in China whilst being so deeply embedded within class and sexuality. This resonates with my main research question, as I inquire how Money Boys experience value from such an intersection of class and sexuality. The research chose the interview as a research method to explore the new form of Su Ku politics in today's China, which shows the ways in which the intertwinement of class and sexuality can be re-evaluated from the narrative of bitterness and happiness, which may be a new moral adjustment in today's China. 
      Lastly, as implied above, if the identity politics of Chinese homosexuality is located in how to bring private desires into public discourse so as to mobilise a collective movement, then, in the case of Money Boys, Su Ku - once deployed as a political tool to bring private experiences of suffering to public notice – shows once again how these cannot be separated from each other. What is also clear is how in Chinese society today this knot of public and private is also classed, which can be excavated through the lens of value. Relating this theoretical point to the discussion of methodology, we can see that the notion of interview as a one-way method of bringing the private (story) to the public misunderstands the complexity of the interview format itself. Interview is a dynamic and interactive process, so the chapter will continue to exemplify below through an account of how my interviewees continually challenged and reshaped my research. 

Truth or Dare? The Challenges from the Interview
“But the problem of interpretation without having recourse to historical and cultural contexts demonstrates that the voice of pain is not enough. Without the wider web of social relations in which they are embedded, these testimonies exist merely as the stated truths of personal experience” (McRobbie 2005: 177)

Bourdieu (1999) and his team in their ambitious work with the poor in Paris and America introduced an in-depth interview based on social research methodology in order to research the lives of the powerless. One vital point that they have reiterated throughout this book is the need to acknowledge and examine the dynamic relationship between the interviewee and interviewer, which he called a “social exchange”. Bourdieu, a sociologist who embraced reflexivity throughout his research, announced that there can be no social research which avoids the exchange relationship; in regard to the interview, he reminded us that it might become violent or exploitative if the researcher ignores the dynamics of power inherent within the exchange relationship. As he puts it:
“It is the investigator who starts the game and sets up its rules, and is usually the one, who unilaterally and without any preliminary negotiations, assigns the interview its objectives and uses. (These, on occasion, may be poorly specified – at least for the respondent.) This asymmetry is reinforced by a social symmetry every time the investigator occupies a higher place in the social hierarchy of different types of capital, cultural capital in particular. The market for linguistic and symbolic goods established every time an interview takes place varies in structure according to the objective relationship between the investigator and investigated” (1999: 609)

A similar point is elucidated by Les Back (2007) whose book probes into the politics of listening, emphasising that it always relies on a relationship between the interviewee and the interviewer. Applying this idea, for example, we could look at the way in which different class and gender representations could be accommodated by different research methods, the interview being one important method (Skeggs et. al 2008). By and large the authors remind us of the active and dynamic forces present in the interview. In the context of my own research, I certainly sensed the dynamics of power in the relationship between the interviewees and myself. They usually surfaced when the interviewee refused to give a specific answer instead of choosing to stay silent. These “silent answers” reveal a lot about the interview as a research method. This fine example is from Hank: 

Me: So do you have a girl friend…I mean, are you a homosexual? 

Hank (silent for few seconds) replied, “I don't know what the importance of this question is. It’s not a big deal...What about all the men who have wives but still come to mess around with me? Do you think they are homosexuals?”

I stayed silent and then Hank continued, “I want to have a happy life. I mean, no one can force me to do or not to do anything” (Interview with Hank, 6th July 2010).

Hank’s refusal to answer my question on the one hand shows that the “interviewee” does not have a passive role in the interview: he/she could resist or even manipulate the linguistic power and dominance of the interviewer. Furthermore, he challenged my question about sexuality, saying that it is the client’s problem rather than the Money Boy’s. Another example of this challenge came from Joe. In our interviews, he repeatedly asserted that the life of a Money Boy is comfortable, and that clients are never rude or bossy. When I pushed him further, he suddenly said “only Taiwanese clients are annoying as they are so picky and difficult to please.” 
      This answer made me a bit embarrassed as I am a Taiwanese and he knew this so for a few seconds I did not know how to respond. But when I noticed him smiling I wondered if Joe was enjoying how his answer had perhaps left me a little snubbed. Joe soon smartly swallowed his words and said, “Everyone is very nice to me”. Lastly, another challenge of the interview lies in how to extract truth from the answers. As interviewers, we at times naively ascribe truth to every answer we obtain, perhaps out of a researcher’s satisfaction with his/her own power. Nevertheless, on many occasions telling the truth is ambiguous, hard to identify or justify. One of my interviews is a particularly good example of this process. In a meeting with Xiao Xue, a drag performer in his mid-forties, he confessed to me and another friend Ray that he sells sex, before suddenly denying it:

 Me: How much is your room rent per month?

 Xiao Xue: Well…a few hundred. 

 Ray laughed and said: Err…so how can you afford it? 
 As you don’t have a proper job?   

Silent for a few seconds then Xiao Xue finally smiled with a sense of bitterness and said: “I have my own way.”  Then I ask: Hmm, what do you mean?  

Xiao Xue: silent again, then he looked at us sternly, smiling with a strange sense of bitterness, saying: I do sell sex. 
Me: wow, are you joking? 

Xiao Xue replied: I am just kidding. That’s not true.
 
Ray: My God, are you serious? You never told me before. Tell me more! Ray asked desperately. 

Xiao Xue silent for few seconds then asked if we could stop this topic. Ray and I kept silent. But just when Ray and I left Xiao Xue’s small, dark room, suddenly Ray told me that Xiao Xue has a girl friend.  “Xiao Xue is a real queer because he does everything.” Ray gave me this statement.  (Interview 19th July 2010)

After this interview with Xiao Xue, I wondered if I should ask him to confirm whether he was telling the truth or not? What if he was lying? What if he instantly regretted telling the truth and tried to cover it up? If he was lying, how could I include him in my research? 
       Henceforth, from here, one can see how the interviewee can erase or colour their answer, as they try to manage the “truths” which emerge from the interview, while the interviewer has to try and track the interviewees’ words in order to find what he or she believes to be factual. This is essentially a wrestling match between the interviewee and the interviewer. And these issues make the interview process more challenging; as it becomes a game of linguistic power, as Bourdieu (1999) demonstrate. Overall, the ambiguity and partiality of truth of from the interview ultimately reshaped my knowledge on bitterness, the politics of telling, and then the picture of sexuality and class in today's China. That is also to say, the practice of interview has allowed me to reconsider and re-examine my research on value as possessing a new but more complicated “performativity” in contemporary China. In short, to apply interview in my research on Money Boys, is to enliven the understanding of value regarding its important role in mediating class and sexuality confrontations, which we can tease out from interviews.
      Skeggs (2004) remarks that the politics of telling for researchers is certainly challenging but can also be realised as a “practice” for researchers to experience, and tackle power relationships in the research process. It improves our research skills rather than trapping ourselves in the “moral difficulties” of worrying about exploiting the interviewees:   
“This is a practice that understands the relations of production and is aware of the possibilities for appropriation; a practice with an awareness of the constraints of disciplinary techniques and the power relation of location and position, one that does not reify and reproduce the categorizations of exploitation and symbolic violence. A practice aware that self-constitution is about access to resources.” (2004:131)





This chapter has demonstrated that one can see how class and sexuality can be articulated in a new way through the politics of telling. From the literature accumulated about clients and Money Boys, we are also able to see how sexual identity can be unevenly and unequally distributed in the specific form of media or politics. What is more, regarding methodology, I have also shown that the interview, when used strategically, can tease out the “speaking” of bitterness within my research setting. It reveals certain challenges in working with the interviewee, helping to reshape my research setting. One thus realises the ways in which the interview can be a dynamic and interactive research method and practice, one that constantly challenges power relationships and questions of sexuality between the interviewer and interviewee. 







Classed and Sexed Neo-liberalism and Cosmopolitanism

“My argument, in brief, is that the place of lesbians and gay men in China is intimately connected to cosmopolitanism, because it is through the expression of desire that they, as well as other Chinese citizens, are able to feel a part of universal humanity. The fact they must do so is itself a result of the embrace of neoliberalism, which changes the relation of China to the world economy and the terms by which its people can relate to each other.” (Rofel 2010: 427)

In summer 2011, after successfully hosting two global events, World Expo (2010) and Summer Olympic Games (2008), in Shanghai and Beijing respectively, China once again became embroiled in human rights controversies by jailing the Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaopo and the world acclaimed artist Ai Wei Wei for their ongoing critique of government, political corruption, and social inequality. But at the same time, China’s LGBTs groups were facing their own highly public human rights controversy. Debate was ignited by Lu Liping, China’s well-known award-winning actress, who attacked homosexuality as an immoral crime on Weibo (China’s mini-twitter, which has billions of users). In fact, Lu’s reasons for condemning homosexuality were not novel in the West – for her embrace of the family and heterosexual value stemmed from her Christian faith. However, for China, a state that has strictly repressed religion in society since the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, Lu’s opinions were unwelcome by many in civil society and initiated a wave of backlashes from her colleagues in the entertainment industry in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Movie stars, celebrities, and media critics​[11]​, and many online users, started to criticise Lu’s opinions. On Weibo, thousands of people deplored Lu for not having respect for people and for not appreciating the many homosexuals in her industry who had helped her career.​[12]​ 
      Moreover, in the end, Lu was rejected from the Jury of the Golden Horse Film Festival in Taiwan – the acclaimed film festival in Chinese-speaking areas, where she had won the best actress award the previous year (2010)  – due to her insults towards gay and lesbian people. In this backlash towards Lu, her critics particularly focused on Lu’s ‘dated’ vision of human rights, which did not follow along contemporary trends of globalisation. In China’s academia, Li Yinhe, China’s leading public sociologist, proposed an official plea for legalising same-sex marriage to the National People’s Congress – China’s highest state body and only legislative house; there she informed the Chinese government that the acceptance of homosexuality could transform China into a global role model of human rights.​[13]​ Li denounced Lu’s opinions, and said they were against the global fashion for respecting homosexuality in democracy.​[14]​Within this debate on homosexuality, the Chinese government has surprisingly shown a clear position. On 4th July, China’s official TV propaganda Channel, Chinese Central Television (CCTV), unusually made a supportive statement on homosexuality when Lu’s opinion became a heated topic in Chinese-speaking regions. Through a CCTV programme, 24 Hours, the commentator denounced Lu’s point of view as unwise, as he stated: 
“Needless to say, there has been a group of people who are different in our society. But the same as us, they are contributing to our society as well. Therefore the homosexual group has the equal right to live and develop. Then we are not allowed to either act on or “even spread the wrong ideas” to harm their rights.​[15]​”   

More unexpectedly, CCTV gave its support to homosexuality by reiterating Voltaire’s famous motto from the Enlightenment, “I might not agree with your life style, but I will defend your rights to live differently”​[16]​ to include the ways in which homosexuality in China should be treated seriously as an issue of freedom of speech and respect of difference. CCTV’s surprising statement soon caused extensive feedback and responses from LGBT activists and mainstream individuals in the PRC. Unlike the legal case of homosexuality as “defamation” which I have highlighted in the previous chapter, in this instance, however homosexuality was not only named and seen by the government. By contrast, the offender (Lu) was rebuked and LGBT rights were legitimated by Chinese government. Accordingly, this story actually raises some interesting questions as to why homosexuality has become an issue of freedom of speech, with a tint of cosmopolitan humanism, but where the political dissent still has to be silenced by the PRC. In other words, why cosmopolitanism becomes a critical resource for the performance of identity for homosexual groups in China?  
      This chapter will answer these questions by engaging critically with neo-liberalism and cosmopolitanism. It looks at the ways in which neo-liberalism is viewed through the economic lens of value by engaging in a critical examination of neo-liberal theories. It allows for a more productive view of the ways in which the disposition of value, such as cosmopolitanism, is unevenly inscribed onto different bodies through class (Skeggs 2011). That is also to enquire, how value is formulated through neo-liberalism and is ultimately embodied through (classed) bodies. Taking this point as my argument, this chapter further illustrates how in present-day China, this processing of cosmopolitan identity has been intensified through class. Yet in particular I attempt to put forward how the “classed other” (and their value) is not being wiped out by neo-liberalism cosmopolitanism, but is being called into the neo-liberal regime in different ways to be exchanged and exploited. 
      This chapter is divided into three sections to illustrate my argument. In the first section, I trace the root and routes of neo-liberal theory, comparing the Marxist critique on neo-liberal violence and the Foucauldian view that proposes neo-liberalism as a set of uneven skills performed by the individual and state body that feeds into governmentality. The second section moves into cosmopolitanism, examining how it comes into effect in neo-liberal China today, through the body and through sexuality. By engaging with cosmopolitan theory, I argue that cosmopolitan value is formulated as a self-centric politics, where other values are fed into the cosmopolitan self’s self-actualisation. Thus, the vital question is how to expose the unequal exchange rather than stating that “the Other” is outside of the cosmopolitan self? Taking this argument to explore my empirical case, this chapter also challenges “stranger-making” politics in China. I emphasise that cosmopolitanism does not exclude the working class out of its regime but rather it brings another self into its logic. In short, cosmopolitanism circulates value that interplay between the self and others. In my account, only through this interplay can we tease out the violence that is performed by the privileged self in extracting value from the other. I also emphasise, through my informants in China, that the “Others” are still able to challenge and interrupt this unequal exchange via their sexual experiences and bodies.  
      The third section concludes this chapter by suggesting that the point of value is a key to understanding how cosmopolitanism has centred on the neo-liberal regime in today's China. As such, if, as Doreen Massey claims, neo-liberalism is a politics that ‘touches upon the ethics, the way of being human‘ (Massey 2010, 6), then how do we understand the pursuit of being a cosmopolitan for Chinese citizens, based on what values which animate this desire? Before entering the proposed study on intertwined value, one issue of specification demands clarification. It is vital to be precise about exactly what is being referred to by the term neo-liberalism in order to use the term successfully. 
 
Rethinking Neo-liberalism
 “Treating neo-liberalism as simple shorthand for marketisation not only runs the risk of dehistoricising the process (as if the obsession with markets and capital flows was only invented recently) but also marginalizes the tensions and competing interests that lie at the heart of neo-liberal projects.” (Freedman 2006: 37–38)
     

“This was not, then, a moment of potential crisis just about finance, or even about   economic theory. It ran more deeply than that. It was about a way of being human. It came near to questioning the wider hegemonic ideological framing of life. It touched upon the ethical.” (Massey 2010: 6)  

In the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology neo-liberalism is defined as a loosely conceptual term that has been employed more often in the realm of economics than in other social science disciplines:
 “A loosely knit body of ideas which became very influential during the 1980s and which were premised upon a (slight) rethinking and a (substantial) reassertion of classical liberalism. The most prominent neo-liberals are libertarians, enthusiastic advocates of the rights of the individual against those of the coercive state, chief amongst whose protagonists are Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and Robert Nozick. As these names suggest, neo-liberalism has had far more influence in economics and political science than in sociology.” (Scott and Marshall 2009, 443)

Nevertheless if we look more deeply into contemporary social knowledge, we will find neo-liberalism is not only gradually discussed in different disciplines, but also has awakened numerous debates within various social fields. The Marxist critique of neo-liberalism can be a helpful guide to depict a basic picture of neo-liberalism. For Marxists, neo-liberalism, as a primary value of global capitalism, is intricately bound up in interconnected economic and political power relationships (Callinicos 2003; Harvey 2006). 
      However, neo-liberalism, as a political and economic ideology and policy that aims to privatise everything to promote accumulation of the most capital, was not new when it gained dominance in the 1970s. It is Harvey (2006) who states that the ideas that make up neo-liberalism had always existed in advanced states, though the policy was not employed as such until the late 1960s, when the oil crisis empowered first-world states to put neo-liberalism into practice as part of their democratic strategy for maintaining their dominant political and economical positions in the world. 
      From this specific Cold War background, neo-liberalism first entered the central world stage. The central ideology of neo-liberalism can be traced back to the Austrian philosopher Friedrich A. von Hayek  ([1944] 2001), who proposed an economic theory on the subjectivist level and philosophical ideas in the Cold War context, which were ultimately accepted by the state and promoted by his fellow students, such as Friedman and Baker from the Chicago School (Wang 2006). In doing so, neo-liberalism finally came to be associated with the United States’ political-economic policy in the nation’s support for Pinochet’s totalitarianism in Chile, and was significantly associated with Reaganomics and Thatcherism in the 1980s, when the so-called “big government” and the welfare state were seriously attacked by neo-liberals (Larner 2005; Hall 2011). Plus, neo-liberalism was promoted to unlock obstacles to the circulation of global capital, including the freedom of global investments, and so on. These policies came to be referred to as the Washington Consensus when exported to the Eastern Bloc as a set of adjustment strategies to restructure socialist economies for engaging in economic competition (Ong 2006). 
      In a similar vein, David Harvey proposes the four conditionalities of his methodology on neo-liberalism. They are (1) The material embedding of the capital accumulation process in the web of socio-ecological life; (2) Accumulation by dispossession; (3) The law-like character of capital accumulation in space and time; and (4) Political, social and ‘class’ struggle at a variety of geographical scales (2006: 80). However, I am more concerned as to how the process of accumulation and dispossession within global capitalism has occurred in people’s daily lives. As to his challenges to theorists such Braudel and Habermas, Harvey asserts that their placement of people’s daily lives as outside of the capital accumulation process is problematic. 
      Firstly, Harvey argues that Braudel’s category of capitalism, in which the lowest layer, called ‘material life’, was defined as the stratum of ‘non-economy’ merely functions as the soil that nurtures the top layer inhabited by capitalism (2006: 81). Harvey therefore rejects Braudel’s category and insists that contemporary individual’s material lives are absolutely affected by capitalism, which is very economic. Harvey then also challenges Habermas’s picture of the place called ‘life-world’, which is insulated from capitalist social relations in Harbermas’s account. Life-world is an independent field for Harvey in fact runs the risk of ignoring how capitalism dominates our social life, so he demonstrates that “life world” should be critically acknowledged through the lens of capital circulation (2006:82). To be more practically probing into people’s daily lives under neo-liberalism, Harvey employs Lefebvre’s analysis, which attempts to liberate daily life from the dogmatism of Marxism and highlights the ways in which everyday life contains a set of possibilities for transformations that is, the possibility of revolution. In a word, Harvey exemplifies a Marxist critique in order to define neo-liberalism as a battle of daily life:

 “Almost everything we now eat and drink, wear and use, listen to and hear, watch   and learn comes to us in commodity form and is shaped by divisions of labor, the pursuit of product niches and the general evolution of discourses and ideologies that embody precepts of capitalism. It is only when daily life has been rendered totally open to the circulation of capital and when political subjects have their vision almost entirely circumscribed by embeddedness in that circulation that capitalism can function with affective meanings and legitimacy as its support.” (2006: 82)

From this point of “embeddedness” in neo-liberal capitalism, it can be noted that the Marxist critique’s aim is to comment on exploitation from the aspect of daily lives. And for me, this is partly to provide a basic understanding of how capital accumulates under neo-liberal logic. For example, in terms of China’s economic revolution, inspired by China's leading historian, Wang Hui's (2004) who scrutinises the new Chinese character of capitalism, Harvey (2006) argues the ‘uniqueness’ of the Chinese case where neo-liberalism is a mixture of the Keynesianist state-controlled authority and arbitrary capital accumulation, which is also based in a dramatic reformation of class structure:
“China has, in short, been experiencing a radical process of bourgeois and capitalist-class formation (rather than a restoration of pre-existing class power as in the US). Communism had ever eradicated structural inequalities in the Chinese economy of course. The differentiation between town and country was even written into law[....]but this structural inequality quickly transformed itself into disparities in income among different class, social strata and regions, leading rapidly to social polarization.”(2006:49)
 
But, how do we understand this class polarisation in people’s daily lives under a new economic regime?  How do people ‘feel’ and experience neo-liberal violence? This is something that Harvey’s political-economic critique does not address, although he continuously reminds us that neo-liberalism is an unstable process embedded in people’s daily lives; but his methodology cannot help one to delve into the ways in which the subject is thinking, negotiating, and perhaps joining in with neo-liberalism. The mass public, the individual in this likely analysis, is not accounted for. 
       To put it another way, we need a more productive means in needed to probe into neo-liberalism, that is, a means to explore the ways in which the subject experiences neo-liberalism. A tragic case from Pun Ngai's (2002) ethnography can exemplify this entanglement between body and class experiences. In the 1990s, Pun interviewed Chinese immigrant factory workers in a European-invested toy factory in the Shenzhen economic zone – the role model zone of Deng Xiaoping's ‘open-up’ economic policy from the 1980s – where a serious fire had occurred in which eighty workers’ lives had been taken and twenty people had been seriously burned. In an interview, the female dagongmei (which means “migrant worker daughter” in the PRC and Hong Kong) Xiaoming, who survived but whose body had been seriously burned, told Pun her life story from the bed of the hospital. First of all, Xiaoming explained how the urban city had sparked her desire to move to the town from her rural hometown:  
“Young people don’t like tilling the fields. I didn’t either. Everybody said working ‘on the outside’ was fun and I could earn a lot more money that way[...] Getting out the first time was exciting – the big city, the skyscrapers, the shops, and so many people… It was like watching a film, and I was there. Everything was interesting to me, and I found myself very rustic and innocent“(2002: 242)

Subsequently she indicates that it was the end of her factory life, due to the fire:
Every day I would be worn out, all my energy gone... But I felt happy there. I had dozens of relatives and friends; we chatted a lot and helped each other. From that point on, I never thought of working in another factory…Every three months I could send about 600 yuan back to my hometown to my father. I thought I could at least work there for another two or three years.  But then the fire happened.” (2002: 242)

This national tragedy happened in the early 1990s, when neo-liberalism had just landed in China after its promotion by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, who employed market logic and opened up policy to foreign investment as his strategy to resolve his crisis of legitimacy crisis at home and sooth negative sentiment about China’s human rights reputation after the violence on June 4th 1989 (Wang 2006). Nevertheless, being a feminist sociologist, Pun (2002) condemns global capitalism and its comradeship with Chinese patriarchy, as it forces her informants, those young dagonmeis, to take risks as they work in sweatshops, in order to continuously earn money to feed back to send back to their families until they return to their hometowns to get married; she then berates this shuffle between global capitalism and patriarchy:
“Their situation was one of being torn between familial expectations and industrial demands, between inevitable pressure to get married and the temptations of city life. And sometimes it seemed that the capitalist regime was making use of such cultural expectations by extracting maximum labor from these women workers during the best years of their lives.”(Pun 2002: 346)
  
If the Marxist critique has shown that class transformation –that is, the removal of working-class consciousness and the birth of a newly rich middle class – is the most important project of neo-liberal China (Solinger 2012), we thus must keep asking: How is this class transformation experienced at the level of the human body? How is this classed experience embodied? And how has desire been sparked by the capital? This contention, as Chapter One addressed, is somehow elucidated by Foucault-influenced thinkers, when they move neo-liberal critique to the field of individuality, highlighting a new understanding of neo-liberal politics as a technology of the self where the individual claims the “freedom” to be able to self-manage and adjust into entrepreneurship (Larner 2005; Zhang and Ong. 2008; Hoffman 2010), or as Kleinman's (2011) research team seeks to chart – the new value turn in China which I introduced in Chapter One. 
      In this vein, morality has also become the battleground of neo-liberalism. Where our personal choice has to be evaluated in order to fit the needs of “national obligation” through the “micro-moral domains or communities such as families, workplaces, schools and leisure associations, neighbourhoods”(Miller et al. 2008: 214). Ong (2006) states that neo-liberalism should be seen as a return to a primitive form of individualism, that is, an individualism which is competitive or possessive, and constructed, often in terms of the doctrine of consumer sovereignty. 
       This is why Massey (2010) iterates that it is not simply about the economy, as neo-liberalism for her has deeply touched on “ethics.” In the same way as Miller and Rose (2008), who demonstrate that the “ethical” aspect of neo-liberalism lies in the citizen’s moral obligation to the nation (in the West). This can also be noticed particularly in their analysis of the UK milieu where neo-liberalist demands have been intensively promoted by Thatcher’s right-wing regime since the 1980s. Perhaps the most salient point of Thatcherism was how it aimed to vitalise a sort of moral commitment to the individual, asking British citizens to discipline themselves and each other – as there was no ‘society’ in Margaret Thatcher’s agenda. She proclaimed in 1987:
“I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand ‘I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!’ or ‘I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!’ ‘I am homeless, the Government must house me!’ and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first.”(Thatcher 1987; my emphasis)​[17]​ 

Certainly, one can sense here that Thatcher’s call for a new social morality was based on her faith in fundamental individualism, which she also believed to fit into the national interest. As Stuart Hall (1988) states, what occurred during the Thatcher years was not only that her regime successfully hawked aggressive privatizing entrepreneurship and extreme individualism in British society. Moreover, Hall indicates that Thatcher also made those values into a set of social discourses that, when applied by the mass public, were to serve as common sense, for both the poor and rich or women and men, to ideologically convince them, the public, that discourse made by that government was right and needed. It becomes hegemonic as Hall concludes – “one thing we can learn from Thatcherism is that, in this day and age, in our kind of society, politics is either conducted ideologically, or not at all “(1988: 274). 
        As such, we have to pay particular attention to what Hall (1988) emphasises here as the way in which common sense under neo-liberal doctrine is assembled through multiple contradictory values. Hall contemplates that what the neo-liberal state does quite well is to moderate a set of contradictory values into a common language or discourse. During the “Thatcherism yeas”, Hall explains, the market-led entrepreneurship had on the one hand persuaded people to believe that wealth actually added to the value of individualism. On the other hand, however, fledgling neo-liberalism also promoted heterosexual-familial values to citizens, which were successfully accepted by many British career women who quit the job market and decided to become full-time housewives (1988: 119).  As a result, one thing that neo-liberalism did particularly well under Thatcher, and in subsequent regimes was to regulate different values as a hegemonic moral discourse. 
        Similarly in China, when looking into the formation of neo-liberalism, it is possible to notice that both Foucauldian and Marxist perspectives are used. The Foucauldians’ views on neo-liberal China are those of a dynamic doctrine of mutations (Ong 2006) – here different deployments of power relationships and discourses call different subjects, while the Marxists understand neo-liberal China as a regime that has combined one-party led autocracy and exploitable marketism which represses demands of democracy from civil society (Wang 2003; Harvey 2005). In my view, both theoretical accounts recognise the ways in which neo-liberalism in China is a new but complex doctrine that is at pains to make and generate different values. Hence, what primarily concerns me in this chapter is to point out that cosmopolitanism has been conceived as a common value, which dominates the imaginations of both Chinese citizens and the State. 
     As I have discovered in the last chapter, certain theorists, for instance Eng (2011), affirms cosmopolitanism as a vital resource, accumulated by Chinese gay and lesbian groups in order to “go beyond” identity politics through its promise of breaking national boundaries. Eng demonstrates that humanism or global universalism lies at the heart of cosmopolitanism and can be a tool, performed by Chinese sexual citizens, to connect with global human rights value. There is a likely recognition of cosmopolitan value can be best acknowledged by Rofel (2007), as she emphasises: 
“A sea-change has swept through China in the last fifteen years: to replace socialist experimentation with the universal human nature imagined as the essential ingredient of cosmopolitan worldliness. This model of human nature has the desiring subject as its core: the individual who operates through sexual, material and affective self-interests.” (2007: 3; my emphasis) 
In this perspective, one can interpret Rofel as recognising the core of cosmopolitanism as registered in the issue of “human nature” and sexuality, which she asks “What does it mean to be a gay man in today's China?” (2007:21). Nevertheless Rofel does not ask how, and why this happens. Specifically, Foucault-influenced thinkers tend to comprehend that modern political-economic doctrine as being not only characterised through class, but instead as functioning through the dynamic assembling of intricate social relationships and discourses, such as social contracts such as insurance on medical and finance income and so on, community participation, volunteering, or other personal decisions. All of these relationships combine into an umbrella form – governmentality (Larner 2005; Ong 2006; Miller and Rose 2008).  
      In my view, what should be of particular note is how desires, including cosmopolitan desires, as Rofel points out, register in the market fabric. That is to say, the configuration of human nature that represented as cosmopolitan desire in this chapter cannot be inspected without looking into its relationship with the market. This is a significant point that Foucauldians often ignore and an instance where they cannot map out the materiality of human nature onto the terrain of modern economic doctrine. 
      Hence, to overcome this theoretical barrier, by relating the market to human desires Graeber (2001) states that to examine the way in which human desires that are rooted in the market-based society are now greatly reshaped by our everyday experiences and so thus need to be examined. “Human nature”, he accentuates, is socially influenced by the market. It is therefore impossible to discuss human nature without linking material conditions in his account; the character of modern human beings for Graeber is:
“Unique individuals who have unlimited desires; since there is no nature cutoff point at which anyone will have enough power, or money, or pleasure, or material possessions, and since resources are scarce, this means we will always be in at least tacit competition. What we call ‘society’ is, if not pure obstruction, then a set of tools to facilitate the pursuit of happiness, to regulate the process, perhaps clean up after its mess.” (2001: 310)

As a result, below I expose the way in which cosmopolitan desire in China is embedded in the material conditions, that is, in the intertwined relationship between the new classed Self and Others. Cosmopolitanism in China is also about the State and the individual's cooperation in making a new Chinese “proper self” which has the ability to be global. Therefore I interrogate this cosmopolitan selfhood as being upper-middle class centric. Before unpacking this argument, a basic picture of cosmopolitanism theory is needed, as through the root of cosmopolitanism one witnesses how its fundamental value has characterised the modern national-state, attached to the imagination of the modern citizenship. How the nation-state employs cosmopolitanism to define its citizenship, determining who can be included and who is excluded.




Cosmopolitanism Roots and Routes

“Also, it is important to keep in mind that individual's 'goods’ and ‘bads’ are discursively articulated in systems of value that link together ‘goods’ and ‘bads’. These in turn are then functionally and structurally related in such a way that if we define something as 'good', the conditions necessary for its occurrence are also considered 'goods'.” (De Angelis 2007: 26–27)

Amid the burgeoning concerns of globalisation, Harvey (2007) illustrates how, in academia, theorists began to bring cosmopolitanism back to the centre of their concerns in the 1990s. Harvey calls this arising interest in cosmopolitanism bourgeois centric for it was firstly often Euro-US centric. Secondly, cosmopolitanism is mostly used and promoted by theorists who do not see the material conditions at the heart of cosmopolitan desire; in so doing, he seeks to rekindle a new and democratic cosmopolitanism theory, which is sensitively aware of how theory of cosmopolitanism is regulated by the global capitalist system, but also practiced by its local socioeconomic contexts. 
      Following Harvey, this section delves into cosmopolitanism theory, and reviews how it has formulated from philosophical imaginations into social research. However, I do not attempt to follow Harvey, to propose a “better critical cosmopolitan theory”, but rather to explore the ways in which cosmopolitanism become exclusive when it operates as middle-class self-centric politics in the neo-liberal milieu. Overall, my intention is not to exhaust entire debates and discussions on cosmopolitanism. Instead, I focus on how its traditional ideas can be helpful in rethinking the idea of new Chinese selfhood, which is now situated in the cosmopolitan imagination. Let me unpack my argument from an account of classical philosophy.

Kant and the Cosmopolitan Citizen and State
Generally, the classical definition of cosmopolitanism can firstly be traced to ancient Greece, where it was defined in the political imagination as “citizens of the universe”, as the word cosmopolitanism in Greek is actually a combination of two words with two-fold meanings:  world (cosmos) and city (polis); it therefore indicates “a man without a fixed abode, or better, a man who is nowhere a stranger” (Diderot and d'Alembert, 1751; cited by Cheah 2006, 477)  

The desire to be a non-stranger of the world, namely being a global citizen, was first systematically theorised by Immanuel Kant, the leading proponent of the Enlightenment movement in the eighteenth century. Generally speaking, cosmopolitanism supports Kant's project of establishing the new modern nation-states in Europe. At his time, the ongoing domestic wars between the fledging nation-states in Europe forced Kant to propose a cosmopolitan state as a solution to address pressing conflicts followed by waves of emigration due to the wars. Kant thus designed the Cosmopolitan Law for nation-states to settle issues of sovereignty, and to clarify rights and obligations. Cosmopolitan Law for Kant was deployed by states to regulate outsiders from other states, such as traders, tourists, or refugees. 
      Therefore, as Robert Fine (2007) notes, although Kant sincerely asserted the notions of world citizen and “coexistence” in his cosmopolitanism blueprint, they are regulated by the state's sovereignty, namely, the Law. In this manner, outsider's rights in “my state” were not unconditional but were governed. For Kant, cosmopolitanism, as a value enacted by the nation-state, was not an anarchic ideal but instead was a tool to maintain and protect the sovereignty of nation-states in Europe. It was a political value of community, as Kant claimed:
“The people of the earth have thus entered into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity.” (Kant [1991]: 107-8; cited by Delanty and Inglis 2011:4)

A cosmopolitan citizen for Kant was described as “someone who knows the world as a spectator of a play but knows his way about the world as a participant” (Kant [1968], cited by Cheah 2006: 487). Meanwhile, once again, the nation-state was appointed by Kant as the major influence to cultivate the modern European citizen (Fine 2007). And cosmopolitan education includes absorbing “universalist humanism”, including hospitality, compassion, and sympathy (Cheah 2006)​[18]​. 
      More critically, the theoretical legacy of Kant's cosmopolitanism has spread into different fields of contemporary cosmopolitan theory. Binnie and Skeggs investigate cosmopolitan knowledge and propose four basic ways to discuss cosmopolitanism, which are: (1) anti-nation, (2) a type of citizenship, (3) a form of consumption, and (4) a form of subjectivity (2004: 40–41). For the authors, the first two definitions relate to the political imagination of state-ness and citizen-ness in our time. The latter two then shift into more individual aspects, asking “what subjects” are chosen to feed into (or to be excluded from) the imaginations of sovereignty and capitalist logic. To fathom these different uses of cosmopolitanism, Derrida (2001) has been the leading thinker to critically redeploy Kant's ideas on cosmopolitanism into today's political regime. Challenging Kant's conditional Cosmopolitan Law but similarly focusing on Europe, Derrida proposes “unconditional hospitality” respond to the pressing human rights crisis’ in Europe, he observes cascading refugee flows from domestic and former colonial states in Africa. This has pressed Europe to retool the “conditionality” of the sovereignty, which lies at the heart of Kant's account of cosmopolitanism. In this vein, Derrida flags “unconditional hospitality” as a new cosmopolitan project for Europe to overcome border troubles. Practically, the city, with its sense of “community”, becomes the ideal “site” for Derrida to practice this unconditional hospitality. The city is viewed by Derrida as a community that not only creates the “inclusive” ethics and justice for its citizens, moreover, it can also go up against the harassment of State violence. Derrida’s idea of cosmopolitanism is fully elaborated in his book On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (2001), where he credits the life experiences of individuals from cities, particularly those from cities in the European Union (EU), as giving individuals hope to form communities that can overcome the nation-state's boundaries and lure of nationalism. This type of city, for Derrida, is a community that unconditionally welcomes and protects those non-citizens and the excluded, such as refugees and the exiles:

“Our experience of cities of refuge then will not only be that which cannot wait, but something which calls for an urgent response [...] I also imagine the experience of cities of refuge as giving rise to a place (lieu) for reflection – for reflection on the questions of asylum and hospitality – and for a new order of law and a democracy to come to be put to the test (experimentation)...a certain idea of cosmopolitanism, and other, has not yet arrived.”(2001: 23)
Shifting this political imagination of cosmopolitanism to subjectivity, Derrida reminds us that his unconditional hospitality is different from Kant’s analysis because his ideal cosmopolitan subject does not request “reciprocity.” In other words, the cosmopolitan self for Derrida should not expect the reciprocal relationship with others, as reciprocity means that the self firstly imagines that there is a subject position of “me”, as a self who is giving, to the others. It is only to legitimise my position, that is, my self, firstly, that thenceforth the others can exist. That is also to mean, that Derrida goes against the conditionality in Kant's Cosmopolitan Law and advises a new unconditional hospitality to collapse this separation between the Self and Others. 
     Yet Derrida himself admits that this philosophical idea is difficult to achieve, thus we realise that his deconstructionist position demonstrates how this untangling of the self and other is, after all, a project for continuous practicing and experiencing (2001: 22). What concerns me from Derrida's challenge to Kant, however, are the ways in which he interrogates the conditionality between the cosmopolitan self and other in terms of citizenship and state-ness from Kant's account. In this vein, by shifting Derrida’s insight onto more debates on cosmopolitanism in contemporary society, it is possible to begin to engage with the second half of the definition of cosmopolitanism in Binnie and Skeggs’s (2004) discussions, which are the cosmopolitan subject and consumerism. For example, in terms of subjectivity, Kwame Antony Appiah (1998) defends cosmopolitanism as a liberalist value to protect people's freedom and identities. He proposes that cosmopolitanism can be the guardian of identity politics through its discourse of respecting “differences.” In this vein, cosmopolitanism for him is the catalyst for self-recognition:
“The fundamental thought of the cosmopolitanism I defend is that the freedom to create oneself – the freedom that liberalism celebrates – requires a range of socially transmitted options from which to invent what we have come to call our identities.”(Appiah 1998: 97)
He continues to argue:
“Our families and schools, our churches and temples[...] provide two essential elements in the tool kit of self-creation: first, they provide ready-made identities-son, lover, husband, doctor, teacher...whose shapes are constituted by norms and expectations, stereotypes and demands, rights and obligations; second, they give us a language in which to think about these identities and with which we may shape new ones.” (1998: 98) 
Following his perspective, cosmopolitanism is used for “the self” to defend his or her identity. Additionally, it concerns an ethics of action suggesting, perhaps, that one ought to speak out if one witnesses when someone’s identity is being deprived or threatened. Appiah is interested in a cosmopolitan subject who can be rooted in his or her local resources, such as identity and culture, but who is also open to the world​[19]​. He yet does not find out the conditionality of being a cosmopolitan subject from his philosophical thinking. Neither does Appiah has concern for the formation of the cosmopolitan subject that might in fact be conditioned by materiality. For instance, in terms of the cosmopolitan subject and its intimacy with consumerism, Binnie and Skeggs critique that what is written on the cosmopolitanism subject in today's neo-liberal doctrine as being about the ways in which culture can become a property consumed and accumulated by someone, “a way of accruing the value to themselves as a cosmopolitan subject” (2004: 41).
      In so doing, the authors instead demonstrate that cosmopolitan knowledge production is in fact operated by a mechanism of making “cosmopolitan winners and losers.” Cosmopolitanism, in Binnie and Skeggs's view, is therefore a competition about the accrual of cultural and social capitals. It is not a fair game because it is highly related to the unequal distribution of materiality and some groups, mainly the upper-middle class, are already given more resources and capital beforehand.
      The empirical study of the modern cosmopolitan subject and consumerism can be found in the work of Tania Lewis (2011), who explains the ways in which in Australia the national desire of the new cosmopolitan subject is now anchored in the assertion that new labourers are willing and able to consume cultural goods and perform their labour in an “aesthetic way”. Through Reality Television programmes, Lewis demonstrates the ways in which the mass media text aims to promote some job types as “stylish”, such as a chef in a high-end restaurant or an interior designer. These programmes attempt to promote this new style of labour to the audience as the solution for solving heated class struggles and pressing labour-market risks in the neo-liberal realm. For example, Lewis found that the TV programme Top Chef tended to encourage people to become entrepreneurs, particularly those who had a taste for culture, and knew how to eat, cook, and work stylishly. Lewis claims this type of reality TV show in Australia was wafting neo-liberal value to those who knew and were willing to “add more value” to their life in order to overcome their economic insecurities.
      In Britain, Binnie and Skeggs (2004) document the urban gentrification of Manchester city, and they argue the ways in which cosmopolitan consumerism is bridled with class and homosexuality. This conflation is evidenced by the local council’s targeting of young or middle-class gay men who have the ability to “consume” and therefore Binnie and Skeggs assert that these gay men are imagined as the role model group for the urban gentrification project and declare, through this new urban project, that those who do not have the ability to accumulate or perform their capital (economically or culturally) are crowded out of the new urban politics:
“The cosmopolitan is produced through consuming difference, but only certain difference. They gay man is frequently positioned as necessary for that consumption as a signifier of difference, but his consumption of difference is only available to those who can (and want to) access different cultures.” (2004: 52) 
In a similar token, in terms of grassroots organisations, Jane Ward (2008) reviews the ways in which Queer activism in today's West-Coast America has internalised the liberalist cosmopolitan value as the primary strategy to get funding from global enterprises. The discourse in those LGBT non-profit organisations (NPOs) that she investigates often followed the neo-liberal ideas that highlight the value of diversity, thus shuffles out the question of (material) inequity. Ward criticises the LGBT activist groups, for producing and promoting “respectable Queer subjects” to squeeze into the front row of diversity politics, many of whom are white-middle-class: 
“Queer activists use diversity rhetoric to compete with nonprofit groups to garner corporate funding and mainstream legitimacy, enhance their public reputation or moral standing, establish their diversity-related competence or expertise, and accrue “liberal capital.” I argue that this instrumentalization of diversity has increased the demand for utilitarian and easily measurable forms of difference -creating the most room for those who embody predictable and fundable kinds of diversity adversity, or transgression.” (2008: 5)

In light of this intimacy between the cosmopolitan subject and materiality, one can witness the way in which materiality defines and conditions the formation of the cosmopolitan subject through the demands of capital possession. People who have resources or more access to the accumulation of cultural capitals are easily included in cosmopolitanism. However, others are easily excluded. In this interplay of the included and excluded, the classed cosmopolitan subject is formulated. As I illustrated above, Derrida (2001) clearly touches upon the interplay between the cosmopolitan Self and Other, but he did not aim to push his argument into an account of materiality. Instead, he placed his concerns in a philosophical account (as Kant had done previously). My argument below intends to shift the discussion to the intertwined relationship between materiality and subjectivity, exploring how the cosmopolitan Self and Others are both under renovation through the demands of capital. This interplay of the cosmopolitan self and others is complicated through the lens of sexuality and the body. 

Revisiting the Cosmopolitan Self and Others
As an original project from the Enlightenment tradition in the eighteenth century, Kant announced that cosmopolitanism should be a part of basic knowledge and that the mentality of hospitality ought to be cultivated in European citizens. The nation-state was an essential unit in sustaining this cultivation project, as Kant stated: 
“We tend to present the human species not as evil, but as a species of rational   beings, striving among obstacles to advance constantly from the evil to good. In this respect our intention in general is good, but achievement is difficult because we cannot expect to reach our goal by the free consent of individuals, but only through progressive organization of the citizens of the earth within and toward the species as a system, which is united by cosmopolitical bonds.”(Kant [1970]; cited by Harvey 2009: 23)

Yet this position is deemed Euro-centric and might be rooted in an imperialist fanaticism. For, as Cheah (2010) and Harvey (2005) comment, in Kant’s agenda on hospitable cosmopolitanism, Kant has termed outsiders as barbarians, and rates their intelligence level according to skin colour, where black is viewed as an imbecilic species and the yellow Chinese as an imbecile the same as the brown of India​[20]​. 
     More interestingly, nevertheless, Kant’s project is still embraced by some Western thinkers today. It is in the United States where Martha Nussbaum (1996) presents her project of cultivating cosmopolitan citizens in order to rebuild a new modern America as an inclusive and hospitable state. Hence, through an attempt to reform critically Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan citizenship from the nation-state, Martha Nussbaum flags the importance of “cosmopolitan education” suggesting that through training in higher education, American citizens can win the opportunity to be free from the cage of state-fundamentalism and patriarchy. Her utopian project then starts from “knowing the difference”:
“To conduct this sort of global dialogue, we need knowledge not only of the geography and ecology of other nations  -something that would already entail much revision in our curricula – but also a great deal about their people, so that in talking with them we may be capable of respecting their traditions and commitments. Cosmopolitan education would supply the background necessary for this type of deliberation.” (1996: 12)

In my view, this western modern project is nevertheless still trapped in the self-centric schema. From Nussbaum’s (1996) added elaboration, one can notice that her idea of the “world-citizen self” is a subject that is enclosed by “concentric circles” – from inner-outer there is a sequence of the family, the nation-state, and then the world. The task of the self in Nussbaum's project is not to integrate into the outer, but by contrast, to “make others as our part of community”, to be a citizen of the world. Nussbaum declares her design of this circling politics:  
“To be a citizen of the world, one does not, the Stoics stress, need to give up local affiliations […] our task as citizens of the world, and as educators who prepare people to be citizens of the world, will be to “draw the circles somehow toward the centre,” making all human beings like our fellow city-dwellers. In other words, we need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether national or ethnic or religious; but we should work to make all human beings part of our community.”(1996: 60; my emphasis) 

What is actually posited here is that this concentric politics is, after all, showing a fixed order of cosmopolitan politics, where the self is inflexibly dependent on the centre. Hence, one then realises that the cosmopolitan can only be legitimated through the actualisation of the centric self.  In a similar vein, through the empirical case study of Law, Kate Nash reveals that the problem of global justice has produced the “cosmopolitanism nationalists” whose attempt is to deliver their own beliefs of universal human rights and justice by a dominant one-way dialogue which actually “takes the moral high ground with regard to the rights of non-citizens” (2009: 188). Nash critiques that the universality of cosmopolitanism is, in fact, facilitated by the legacy of imperialism. That is to say, this imperialist mind is also configured through the promotion of global cosmopolitanism. 
      One example could be applied from Ulf Hannerz (1996), a self-proclaimed “cosmopolitan academic”, who directly admits that if there are no locals then there would not be any cosmopolitans. Thenceforth, the cosmopolitan self always needs the “locals” to make “him” recognise, and legitimate “his” differences, as he demonstrates:
 “For the cosmopolitans, in contrast, there is value in diversity as such, but they are not likely to get it, in anything like the present form, unless other people are allowed to carve out special niches for their cultures, and keep them. Which is to say that there can be no cosmopolitans without locals.” (1996: 111)

This solipsism of cosmopolitanism is also envisioned, as Hannerz continues to underline that for cosmopolitan believers, they do not always have to engage with the other places or cultures, if they do not want. What they are doing is to recognise and to understand the other but “can leave anytime he wants” (1996: 60). However, in this boundary drawing, negative effects occur from the cosmopolitan knowledge production. Since in the Western knowledge system, for example, where Area Studies promotes itself as the global centre, and the other places are doomed to be imagined as either passive victims or as evil. Chow (2006), in this respect, reminds the reader the ways in which nation-state violence can be incited through self-centric knowledge production. Chow emphasises: 
“Knowledge of the other–often coded as native or indigenous knowledge – is now part of the enforcement of self-referentiality in a direct sense. Rather than being a problematic emerging from the ashes of demise of language, to be self-referential is, from the perspective of U.S foreign policy, a straightforward practice of aggression and attack. As was the case with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in the more recent wars on Afghanistan and Iraq this self-referentiality means bombing and eradication – those others who are not like us.”(2006: 15l)

Given this reason, one can see that the most problematic aspect of cosmopolitanism is how it on the one hand, calls for an urgent need of universality in order to rebuild a better world. Nevertheless, on the other, its openness is highly conditioned by the boundary between the Self and the Other. More critically, shifting this seeming critique to the field of sexuality, cosmopolitanism reveals a more complicated story. For instance, for some people it is also about a politics of “betrayal”, argued by Binnie and Skeggs, who critique how being a decent and “sophisticated” cosmopolitan is actually a practice that betrays a certain lack, “a certain lack of confidence in embodying cosmopolitanism, an insecure disposition and attitude toward difference” (2004: 42). Moving this argument into their ethnography in Manchester, by inspecting how cosmopolitanism is now curbed with consumerism, the authors then claim that the working class is actually excluded in the new consumerist project. This case then shows it is not how cosmopolitanism is classed through both the politics of distribution and recognition but how it is through the lens of sexuality that we can thus start to find the gap between the Self and the Other. As Binnie and Skeggs emphasise that the other should not be victimised or appropriated. 
      Therefore, through the lens of sexuality, below I interrogate the deadlock between the Self and the Other, arguing that the other is not outside the self’s construction. But in contrast, they mutually reshape each other. In this light of theoretical reflection, I can thus shift my discussion to the empirical cases in order to prove that a view from sexuality can challenge the scheme of the Self.

Rethinking the Self and the Other
By reviewing global sexual politics, Plummer (2011) delivers a theoretical framework called “sexual cosmopolitanism” in order to propose a new geographic politics of sexuality that can traverse across the different social mores and values. Different sexual citizens (including the heterosexual), in this account can also share the same cosmopolitan value whilst respecting the other’s differences. Plummer’s project, however, can only be achieved by firstly determining the enemies:
“The enemies of sexual cosmopolitanism are those who espouse sexual fundamentalisms. By this I mean those who (a) reject pluralism (b) promote aspects of modernity and usually refer to a time-honoured (often sacred) text which is given a strict and single interpretation […] Of course, living with too much plurality can push lives into chaos, and guides through this labyrinth are needed. But the recognition of pluralities has long seemed to me to be a requirement for living.” (2011: xvii)

In my view, however, Plummer stills recalls the boundary drawing between the Self and the Other here. He tends to search “who are our enemies” (by indicating we first have to know who we are). Thus, in this account, to be a “good cosmopolitan” therefore is to be one who sees him or herself as a part of the universal world, but at the same time evaluates the difference in each other. In short, he maintains that “People everywhere are different and there is much to be learnt from these differences. But at the same time, humankind is one” (2001:  xviii). 
      However, foe me, if one cannot challenge the boundary between the Self and the Other, global-ness and provincialism, then recapturing the ways in which value is active and animated by cosmopolitanism may fail. A critical reflection is also lost on how violence is masked by the promise of cosmopolitanism, as China’s CCTV case unmasks. More critically, one might find that the other, in fact, exist in our inner self. 
     This point is from Julia Kristeva (1991), who illustrates the real problem in this distinction as being “the other”, or the strangers who can never be successfully excluded. She then implies “the other keeps haunting the self and troubles self-identification. What is needed, contends Kristeva, is a new emerging ethical lens to redefine the stranger in our “inner selves”. She explains this relationship between the self and the foreign “Other”:
“The foreigner is within us. And when we flee from or struggle against the foreigner, we are fighting our unconscious that “improper” facet of our impossible’ own and proper.’ Delicately, analytically, Freud does not speak of foreigners: he teachers us how to detect foreignness in ourselves. That is perhaps the only way not to hound it outside of us.” (Kristeva 1991: 191)
      
Nonetheless this psychological performing also reveals its limit. For example, Ziarkek (2003) argues that Kristeva’s analysis lacks an ability to relate to social relationship. She comments that, to some degree, Kristeva has confined herself to the “psychoanalysis cage”, where the subject seems doomed to be confined to the black hole of the unconscious or the uncanny without any possibility to relate to the social. In a similar vein, Fraser (2003) suspects Kristeva’s cosmopolitan subject as being a self that “thereby surrenders its ability to understand intersubjective phenomena, including affiliation…and struggle” (Fraser 2003, cited by Ziarek 2003, 140)
        To make this intimacy between strangers and “us” become more socially relational, I notice that Craig Calhoun’s insight into “embedment” most welcome. By reconsidering the modern cosmopolite movements, Calhoun demonstrates that it would be an illusion for cosmopolitan supporters to imagine a world separated between the Self and Others.  By contrast, he offers a view of “relationship” as the analytical tactic for scrutinising the embedding intimacy between the Self and Other: “Cosmopolitans do not simply fail to see the cultural particularity and social supports of their cosmopolitanism, but cannot fully and accurately recognize these without introducing a tension between themselves and others” (2007: 25).           
     Consequently, this line of “embedment” offers a more practical means for us to pivot the way in which the self and other cannot entirely disavow each other but, in contrast, they are embedded into each other. The later part of this chapter utilises this idea of embedment to situate the cosmopolitan Self and Others in Chinese society. Through case studies and my own research, I maintain to re-scrutinise the boundary between the cosmopolitan self-other. More importantly, I claim “the other” is able to challenge the “strangers politics” through their ability to traverse the sexual identity terrain and class segregation in urban China.


The Necessary Strangers and Their Interruption of the Cosmopolitanism
 
 I came back to Shanghai again. Because I do not believe that I cannot survive here.                                                                                 ( Xiao Lang the Money Boy)

Looking back to the problems of the boundary between the self and other in the account of cosmopolitanism, Ong (1999) implies that there is a “class” issue inside. With a look towards Chinese diasporas, she notices that neo-liberal cosmopolitanism has been adopted by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs (mostly from the USA) to join the new neo-liberal market in China. By utilising different passports, namely citizenship, to negotiate the global financial and citizenship laws and regulations, new Chinese cosmopolitans astutely perform their situated citizenship and cultural and ethnic belonging. 
     In contrast to their Western competitors, Chinese entrepreneurs particularly use “kinship”, such as family values, to secure and extend their financial gains. In short, Ong specifies a new Chinese version of cosmopolitanism that traverses the private arena (the family) and public sphere (the global market). In other words, one can view cosmopolitanism in China now as being embedded in citizenship, for subjects who own resources, and for those that are able to traverse and cross cultural and national borders, they are now recognised as the winners today.  
     Nevertheless, one should not ignore the fact that citizenship is often entangled with intimacy, when the authority, such as the nation-state or public culture, always targets intimacy, the body, and sexuality in order to rewrite citizenship (Boellstorff 2003; Martin 2003; Wilson 2004). I have already stated in Chapter Two, for example, that for those young social reformers in the earlier twentieth century, the project of new Chinese citizenship was related to sex – when they defined and defended how the new citizen-ness should be based on objections to those old-fashioned, eerie, and unnatural sexual and bodily experiences, such as family-arranged marriage, concubine culture, foot-binding, and homosexuality. Henceforth, my attempt here is to rethink this entanglement between sex and citizenship which is particularly obvious in modern Chinese cosmopolitanism. And where it is possible to notice the way in which cosmopolitanism is increasingly inscribed onto sexual citizenship. 
      Cases from sex workers in China (including Hong Kong, China’s territory now governed under Special Law) particularly intensify this intersected relationship because, as is demonstrated below, they expose the hypocrisy and unequal exchange of cosmopolitan citizenship; they then subsequently break down the boundary between the cosmopolitan Self and Other. 
      The issue was firstly elaborated by Cheah (2010), who draws an intricate picture of cosmopolitanism and gender. By looking into female Mainland Chinese prostitutes in Hong Kong, Cheah critiques that today’s neo-liberal market and its urgent need for border-crossing labour unavoidably created “necessary strangers” everywhere. But neo-liberalism also defeats Kant’s plan of hospitable cosmopolitanism because, for Cheah, neo-liberalism linked with global (financial) law, is essentially a self-contained regime that excludes others from sharing the resources and capital. Reviewing the Special Law in Hong Kong, he then denounces the hypocrisy of cosmopolitanism pivoting on its declaration of “welcome the outsiders” but do not make them part of “us”. Cheah reflects on the root of cosmopolitan violence today:
“In the case of the migrant sex-worker, the problem is not only that no hospitality can be offered because she is an illegal migrant. More disturbingly, the path that has been charted for her by global capitalism makes her a permanent stranger who cannot even fully return home...” (2010: 57) 
Cheah continues:
“I have argued that today’s version of this alliance - that between transnational human rights regimes and economic globalization -can lead only to forms of hospitality that remain restricted and conditional for various forms of migrant labor that are necessary to the global capitalist system.” (2010: 57) 

At this point, Cheah (2010) shows us that the formation of strangers, namely, the “Other” is often modelled by a classed position. But in my view, he mainly focuses this discussion on the philosophical debates on cosmopolitan law and citizenship. Cheah argues the failure of cosmopolitan law, for it cannot protect those who are marginal under neo-liberal capitalism, such as the Chinese prostitutes who work in Hong Kong – the Special Law offers no protection to their citizenship. 
      In my view, Cheah is quite right when he points out that stranger politics are driven by the frantic accumulation of global capital. However, he seems to wrongly confine the strangers “outside” of cosmopolitanism, as he refers to them as “permanent strangers.” Hence Cheah seems to “imprison” those strangers in the category of the other, from which they are never able to cross back, thus preventing them from challenging such a boundary. In this vein, I would rather ask, where is the agency of these strangers? Or are they just the permanent strangers as Cheah iterates? 
       Moreover, the body and sex disappears in Cheah’s philosophical critique, as he does not indicate the ways in which the body or the sexuality of the escort who has to have sex with more than a dozen clients each day – becomes the medium of neo-liberal and cosmopolitan violence. How do the body and sex matter? These are questions that Cheah misses. Hence, I thus claim that the problem between the gendered self and other is to ignore the dynamic exchange process of value. Hence we tend to ignore, as Skeggs (2004) demonstrates, the ways in which certain bodies are able to refuse to be exchanged while exchange is always unequal and unevenly given. 
      By the same token, we then realise that “strangers” in Cheah’s framework means those who are living in precarious situation and confined to the category of “permanent strangers”, and their value is not understood beyond the dominant class. But some other scholar works regarding sex workers in China, including my own work, might reveal how subjects are using, performing, or resisting cosmopolitanism. For example, the life of Lotus, an in-process Male-to-Female Money Boy in Shanghai, can offer a case to challenge stranger politics in the Chinese cosmopolitan milieu, and it also rekindles the question of value. 


Rethinking the Cosmopolitan Self and Value

When I met Lotus for the first time in Shanghai, s/he had just finished having a surgery for silicone breast implantation, which was still causing Lotus some pain, so s/he had to massage his/her breasts all of the time to sooth the pain.  Being a street prostitute, Lotus’s life style included going to trendy clubs in Xing Tian Di (‘New World’, Shanghai’s exclusive clubbing and restaurant centre) and five-star hotels to cruise potential clients, particularly those from the West.  As one of our mutual friend Ray teased Lotus: “Gosh, Lotus just cannot stop showing off that s/he can speak English!”  
       Indeed, Lotus is very much into meeting foreign clients, but s/he said the reason was not only about practicing English, but the desire to be in a different place/culture in the future. So Lotus at times reveals strong desire to “leave China and to have a new life” to me. In our interview, she once asked me the question “Could people like me live in the UK?” Lotus also told me that one of some Money Boys friends found western partners and had a complete sex change surgery in Singapore, and this made Lotus want to leave China some day. 
     Lotus witnesses the corruption of her hometown in the far north, and once, during our interviews, Lotus suddenly vents her anger toward the government, saying: “I know very clearly how much black money they earned… I saw what is happening…those bloody bloodsuckers… I hate the Communist Party… I hate all of them.”The sentiment also contributes to Lotus’s desire to leave China. Although Lotus showed me the desires for a better life with a hint of cosmopolitanism, I am under no illusions, however, that for Lotus, an escapee from a poor rural hometown to the bustling metropolis of Shanghai, life is still rough as being a trans-prostitute. Floundering between economic insecurity and social exclusions, Lotus has to tackle discrimination from her rural accent and low, “mannish voice” – Lotus even had his/her Adam’s apple cut out recently.
      Nevertheless I am not claiming that Lotus is simply a victim, or a stranger in Cheah's analysis, who waits to be “exchanged”. In fact, Lotus understands the life is harsher than others. But Lotus keeps negotiating the power that dominates her life, while at the same time, dealing with this through her body. Thus Lotus is not an outsider or victim but one who knows how to wrestle with cosmopolitan desires. During our interviews, I learned that Lotus takes “desires” quite seriously: with a dream of leaving China, living a different and better life abroad, to be seen equally, of her choice to change sex, Lotus knows (after conducting research) which country has the best surgical options and which locations are more open-minded towards individuals like him/her. 
      For instance, Singapore, as a bi-lingual state, seems to be a desirable place for Lotus to pursue her/his first step of living abroad. In short, Lotus is preparing for the future through the imagined possibility of cosmopolitanism. We cannot place Lotus outside the cosmopolitan self, as Lotus defines the cosmopolitan arena by Lotus’s own body and sexual experiences. In this manner, one should not ignore how class is making this cosmopolitan desire more intricate. For example, in her fieldwork in urban Shanghai, Ong (2004) notes how, inside a dramatically competitive environment, female white-collar office workers must arduously “self-adjust” themselves to the criteria of cosmopolitanism by “upgrading” their multiple abilities, such as English-speaking ability, performing gender by dressing in a feminine manner and being as sexy as they can, in order to squeeze into higher positions in the male-dominated enterprise. 
      Nonetheless outside of those corporate buildings, young rural-to-urban escorts, that is xiaojies (literally, “Miss” or “Lady”; often in reference to the female escorts in Hong Kong and Taiwan), are negotiating cosmopolitanism through their bodies too. Some xiaojies told ethnographers that their desires to be “office ladies” one day are rehearsed and practiced by carrying the same fancy bags, and going to the same membership-based gyms as the office workers. One xiaojie even directly expressed her wish to look like a “real urbanite”, as those office ladies’ life styles were for her all about the “endless chain of buying and spending, which makes life meaningful” (Ding and Ho: 2008, 129). Having escaped from a family-arranged marriage and her rural hometown, an interviewee of Ding and Ho, Lan reveals that how she enjoys living in the metropolitan city, feeling empowered by walking into to the telecom office to pay her mobile-phone bills – this gives her a sense of belonging and access to commodities. The other xiaojie then complained to Ding and Ho, two academics in Hong Kong, by saying “You office girls are so lucky, you sit in the office, have air conditioning, face the computer, write and draw and sometimes talk to clients. This is nice!” (2008: 130). 
       In this regard, through my interviews with Money Boys, xiaojies, and those middle class subjects in Shanghai, I found that cosmopolitan value is practiced through different gendered bodies and reformulated through class. It can also be shown that some so-called strangers, or the underclass, are not the passive “objects” in this exchange politics. In contrast, I suggest that keep wrestling with this exchange. Put in another way, if homosexuality in China is now normalised through cosmopolitan practices, then this chapter has suggested that some gendered “others” are stubbornly challenging this normalisation.  
      This last example sums up my argument. When Lotus joined the Shanghai LGBT athletics group, Lotus teamed with a lesbian group even though she had never identified him/herself as a lesbian. The reason Lotus teamed with the lesbian group was out of her/his sisterhood-like friendship instead of a sense of identity belonging. The “friendship” is illustrated when, for instance, some friends lent Lotus money to have Lotus’s surgery and offered emotional supports when she was struggling with depression. 
       In other words, the body and sexuality, for Lotus, are ways of performing value, where the normalised gay and lesbian identities are problematic in Lotus’s case. Lotus performs and practises “her” own belonging through social relationships such as friendship more than through claims for gender recognition. Even in the gay and lesbian athletic competition – an event whose goal is to justify gay and lesbian rights and identity – Lotus’s choice to join the lesbian team and be accepted by Lotu’s group complicated and interrupted this identity politics.  





Yet only the economic in the narrow sense will allow us to get beyond the economic. (Terry Eagleton 2011: 126)

What is value? And why should it be put into the account of cosmopolitanism in China? Who are the players in an account of value and how do they define and utilise value? After proposing how cosmopolitanism is constituted as a value that is used to divide the classed self and others, this section seeks to complete this chapter by a reread of value with an aim to justify my argument of how cosmopolitan desires under neo-liberal doctrine have indeed touched upon the “ethics”, that Massey (2010) has illuminated previously. I then will state that to evaluate cosmopolitan value is, in the end, to imagine and ask what human beings in neo-liberal China are today. Once again, it is necessary to commence my argument from the definition of value. In fact, similarly to identity discourse, theories of “value” are also notoriously varied in different disciplines. Different interests bring different perspectives and debates into the field of value. Given this regard, my discussion of value will focus on its relation to personhood (Skeggs 2011), which also reveals how different imaginations of personas are differently and often unequally, engendered in market-based society.   
     Graeber (2001; 2005; 2009) attempts to bring value into the account of today’s capital. Rereading Karl Marx and other social theorists, he announces that value theory generally can be categorised into two accounts. In his account, the first one is a more concrete idea of “value”, sparked by the capitalist system. Value in this manner is often animated through an exchange relationship where money is the main medium of the exchange system. Graber (2005) nevertheless also emphasises that through this light of value, particularly from Marx's account, it is mistaken to say that value is about ‘prizing’ the commodity or labourship only. In fact, for Marx, value is about importance (Graeber 2005: 24), as it asks why and how things (and their prices) are felt as worthy and treated as important by people. Graeber notes:
“The concept makes much better sense if one bears in mind that Marx’s theory of value was not meant to be a theory of prices. Marx was not particularly interested in coming up with a model that would predict price fluctuations, understand pricing mechanisms,[...] Therefore, he by no means assumed that the price paid for something was an accurate reflection of its worth. It might be better, then, to think of the word ‘value’ as meaning something more like ‘importance.” (2005: 24–25)
 
In this light of social importance, one comprehends that how value in the form of economic calculation is actually implying how people evaluate the importance in an economic system. With this view of importance it is then possible to bring “value” into a more lucid and expanded understanding of value, which is more registered in morality, asking “What matters to people?” (Skeggs 2011: 497). For Graeber, value can be seen when one leaves the place where labour can be sold and bought, one is immediately stepping into the realm of value (2005: 13). Hence, value is not simply about calculating economic gains and losses, it mediates people's moral judgments and actions, asking why and how people are provoked, the acted on, or organised, by certain values, such as patriotism, love for art, and so on. Value, in short, is difficult to put into a neat, static medium. 
      As a result, one understands that the distinction between the abstract, plural “values” and concrete “value” should be challenged. Through a detailed examination of traditional value theory, Graeber criticises that value, from the Marxist tradition, are often misunderstood as merely ‘price fluctuation’ (2006: 450) for use or exchange in the market. Instead, he presents a more rich ‘abstract’ meaning of value that is generated from human labouring:
“Abstract labour, the sort you get in the capitalist workplaces, ends up being materialised in abstract symbols; more concrete forms of labour end up being materialised in more concrete symbols. So housework and childcare, for which one is not paid, becomes a matter of 'family values' and is reflected in tokens of love and respect...But even here, there is usually some sort of material token through which it all becomes real.”(2006: 451)

In light of this “materiality” in generating value, Graeber iterates that the market is the main medium in mediating different kinds of values since capitalism has dominated human life. In a word, Graeber urgently calls for the combination of  “abstract” and “concrete” values in the market:
“We need a market to exist in some immediate concrete form whenever we have to determine the value of our house or art collection, especially if we wish to realize that value be selling it. We need the market to exist, at least at the level of rhetoric, when we wish to represent capitalism as ultimately just.”(Graeber 2006, 432)

Moreover, this combination also shows that value is not a fixed but an active idea. In this vein, Spivak (2008) claims that value can be a yardstick not only in measuring labour but also as a useful tool in probing into how things are “commensurable by other things”.  In other words, value can be compared and can compete with other values. Value is implicated in a relational and intricate system, and therefore value is about the commensurability of human beings. She indicates: 
“The question of value is everywhere. I mean, there is a value theory of everything, not just a value theory of labor, Because value, simple and contentless, is just a form in use when things are made commensurable [...]When Euro-US queer theory is imposed worldwide, this becomes important. In terms of what do you measure sexual preference? Marx thought that the value-thing lost substantiality. How does that figure?” (2008: 253)      

This mutuality of value shows that valuation is not a straightforward process. In fact, as Skeggs suggests attributions of value also tend to be contradicted by each other because she claims that ‘different forms of inscription can work with and against each other’ (2004:14).  Following in this social and material light of value, Haiven (2011) flags the importance of reconsidering how people deploy and practice their “imaginations” to adjust and enact value, or co-create and trade and exchange value with each other. He explains that the reason we need imaginations to deal with value is because “values” are too variable and highly performative, they are thus beyond our capacity to capture all of them, settle them in people life. Thus people need “imaginations” to understand value in order to making “actions”:
 “Indeed, full of awareness of social value is beyond our capacity: there are simply too many variables in social life, too many simultaneous activities and processes, too many other people. For this reason, the imagination is always at the heart of the negotiation of social values: we must project, synthesize, theorize and guess in order to act in a social world fundamentally beyond our comprehension.” (2011: 98)

For Haiven, values, imaginations, and actions comprise a loop in that they reshape and inform each other,​[21]​thus, he proposes this theoretical account of value and imaginations to expose how the core value of neo-liberalism today exclude other radical and creative imaginations of social and economic actions. Financial value, for Haiven, forms a dead-end of imagination by “measuring social possibility quantitatively” (2011: 112). It reveals an act of violence that forces people into imagining and managing value only through capitalist logic. Hence, following Graeber and Haiven, it is urgent to re-scrutinise the ways in which neo-liberalism is reshaping, or exploiting, our imaginations in relation to value, whereby our actions are conditioned as a result of this capital capitalist logic. 
      The theoretical account also resonates with Rose's (1999) argument. He delivers that “freedom”, in the neo-liberal (Western) societies, has become a guiding value, governing the citizens and the State's imaginations of what society should act like. Freedom also demands how citizens should act in response to daily insecurities. Nevertheless, a gap between Rose and my analysis arises. Because Rose does not agree that value (such as the value of finance) are processed from the market. Instead, Rose employs the value of “freedom” as an ethic which is assembled through different power deployments in daily life, that is, not just from the market but from any social relationships (such as intimacy) or institutions which govern our imaginations indirectly, and he calls this “governance at distance.” 
        As a result, from this “distance”, class, race, gender and sexuality seem not to “directly” affect our “actions” in Rose’s view. They can either be important or unimportant for people through people’s daily decisions, and he describes this choice of freedom as the technique of “self-actualisation” (1999: 69). Rose and Foucauldians mentioned above, at some extent do not clarify who are able to perform and utilise values. They do not ask how values are imagined, practiced, and exchanged among different (classed and gendered) bodies either. In other words, they fail to realise that value is registered on the subject, for they are more interested in thinking how subject is discoursed. Thus, I argue, pestered by the apparatus of discourse, Foucauldians hardly can ask questions of “action”, imagining how different selves are making different actions by replaying different values. Neither can they demonstrate the way in which different selves are formulated through value performance. 
      In terms of subjectivity and value, Skeggs (2011) argues that different subjects are differently and unequally located in the liberal and neo-liberal distribution of capital (economic and cultural capitals). Therefore, some people are in a privileged position to accrue and self-perform value, but some are not. Skeggs then accentuates how the inheritance of (class) positions plays a critical role in defining who has “proper” and “improper” personhood. That said, only when one captures the unequal relationship between differently classed personhood can one traverses the politics of value, where value is often lucidly, unequally imagined and then distributed. Skeggs (2011) demonstrates:
“Different imaginaries for understanding personhood are shaped through different spatial and temporal configurations of value: a model of extraction from (surplus value extraction from labor power—time and energy), a model of accruing to (time and energy on self development), whilst the other is based on relationality (time and energy with and for others).”(2011: 509)



















Conclusion: New Chinese Imaginations of the Human Being

“So, well, being a human...I think I have no idea (with an ironic smile)…What does it mean?  Like myself, as a male, I am doing this [the prostitution] and now I will be becoming a woman, I am still doing this job. I do everything no matter who I am [a man or woman]…I really do everything.’ (Xiao Lang ‘Shanghai Blue”, 2010) 

This section seeks to explore the way in which the “new personhood” that is, the new “human” in China is envisioned through class. Here I search for a picture of the human from the precarious human situation in the Chinese past and present. For example, the HIV orphans “phenomenon” in rural China. This is from Anagnost (2006) who identifies the “HIV crisis” in Henan Province China, a rural belt near Beijing, where hundreds of thousands of peasants have become HIV carriers mainly due to poverty. Relaying a story of a young peasant who sold her blood in exchange for a colour TV set for her family, and who then saw many others in the village become HIV positive, Anagnost reflects that this “strange circulation” of blood and economy is in fact an issue of value in today’s China. The rural majority have become the “reservoir” (by State policy), since the 1990s, for the extraction of its value to feed the capital and the newly-emerging-middle class. Hence, in terms of the HIV crisis in Henan, a rural belt just between Beijing and Shanghai, thousands of orphans lost their parents due to HIV and most of them also became carriers, the circulation of blood is not just a physical exchange, but also the circulation of “bio-value.” Anagnost claims:
“The figure of vampiric capital, which Marx used to make visible the hidden abode of production as the source of wealth in societies can also be usefully applied here to draw out the ways in which value is drawn from the countryside through its capacity to absorb the ‘externalized’ costs in the reproduction of a flexible and cheap supply of labour, while also setting up the possibility for the accumulation of new forms of biovalue.” (2006: 510)  

Anagnost points out that in China value is intensified at the cusp of the rural and urban divide, interwoven through the blood trade in Henan. In short, in her account of selling blood, value is circulated, exchanged, and embodied through classed bodies. For the author, what is “mirrored” from this precariousness of human beings is the new birth of middle-class subjects who are formulated as the new model of human beings. In the same fashion, China’s leading feminist critic Dai Jinhua (2012) underlines this formation of the new human in today's China through history. She rereads the anti-human historical tragedy, The Nanjing Massacre, 1937, when the Japanese Army blood-washed Nanjing city and accordingly nearly one hundred thousand citizens were killed in five weeks, including woeful sexual attacks towards women and children were committed (Chang 1997). Rereading the ways in which this historical tragedy and national trauma has been represented, Dai unmasks the ways in which the schematic ideology of the subject in China has shifted, from the socialist style People's’ struggle shifting to the cosmopolitan ‘human beings’ in the post-socialist milieu. 
       By analysing the blockbuster Chinese movie about the Nanjing Massacre, City of Life and Death (2008), which was funded in entirety by the Chinese government, Dai comments how although this was a story about the past, this film has actually promoted a “politics of forgetting.” Dai points out that the image-language from this film is bristling with romantic images that unable to form a space for people to critically review the inhumane history, or bridge the critical self-reflection of wars. She questions that the ideology of this film as requests a non-critical, self-centric cosmopolitan humanism through the discourse of “forgetting”, while the Director Liu Chuang confidently explains that all of his films are ‘not only for Chinese but for the audience all around the world’ (2012: 133). 
     In this light of cosmopolitan confidence, Dai therefore accuses that this film of resonating with global neo-liberalism in order to be profitable in the Western movie markets. It is also spreading middle-class centric cosmopolitan humanism, as the director deploys poetic license and represents a middle-class aesthetic, which she argues leading to the avoidance of asking what and why this tragedy happened. For Dai, this film misrepresents and misrecognises the problem of the subject in China as it replays cosmopolitan universalism to forget the struggle of being a human in the Chinese past and present. Dai concludes:
“When people today attempt to invoke the subject of China, they find that the Chinese self is intrinsically empty and undefined. Thus, the subject position of China becomes a suspension of the subject, a performance of displacement and misrecognition of the self and the other, of home and the diaspora.” (2012: 146;my emphasis)

Yet this is a reason why this film was so successful and welcomed by the middle-class audience, as claimed by Dai, and as this film supported their subject in becoming the mainstream in human discourse. As a state-funded movie, that is a propaganda film, City of Life and Death also embodied the State’s attitude and anxiety for the future, by forgetting past history in order to squeeze into centre of the world “These misrepresentations and misrecognitions seem to be the only way that this film can be successful in the Chinese market yet share the profits of the global market at the same time”, Dai denounced (2012:146). 
















“The psychologisation of subjectivity thus seems to be inescapably bound to the new obligations of living a life of regulated freedom, the obligations of choice at least in consumption, and the demands of competition, entrepreneurship and the maximization of suzhi.” (Rose 2011:255)

 
In the previous chapters I have argued that the Chinese homosexual identity is currently recognised through the value of cosmopolitanism. However, from the lens of value, I also described the shift from homosexuality as a crime of hooliganism during the Maoist past towards a new cosmopolitan subject which is a means of non-recognition. The reason for this is that cosmopolitanism is essentially a self-centric value, where the cosmopolitan self intends to self-acclaim and justify their worthiness through the exclusion of the classed and gendered ‘Others’. Nevertheless I also declared that the cosmopolitan “Others” should not be viewed as merely victims, as I argued that they challenge the boundary between the cosmopolitan Self and Others. 
     In light of this confrontation between the cosmopolitan Self and Others, one then can see how value mediates dynamic tensions between two fronts. For, as Lawrence Grossberg (2010) argues, following Spivak's examination of a Marxist theory of value, the vital aspect of value theory under today's neo-liberal economy is to capture the “commensuration” character of value: 
“Commensuration, moreover, can take many forms; there are many logics/apparatuses of commensuration. It can offer forms of equalization, standardization, reduction, relativism, or it can refuse both relativism and forms of absolutism. It is not a matter of coordination, but the possibility that enables coordination [...] Only through such meditations can value itself become actualized and recognized.” (2010: 162–163)

To engage with the different forms of value commensuration, this chapter seeks to continue and complicate the discussion of value and its intricate relationship with class and sexuality in neo-liberal China, through a specific discourse apparatus. By examining the widely applied suzhi (Quality) discourse, I will examine the ways in which suzhi has become a discourse that is fed into the politics of the self-calibration of value, as a way to add value to the self. I will also discuss how, in China, differently classed gendered selves, such as Money Boys in my case, experience and practice suzhi in very different ways. 
       In order to clarify the different uses of the suzhi discourse from different selves, this chapter will employ Bourdieu’s (1984) analytical concept of “capital” to demonstrate the realisation of how the suzhi discourse is characterised differently through the differences in the deployment of capital. 
      Specifically, this chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, I will critically interrogate the theory of capital from Bourdieu by considering how different forms of capital are distributed and converted with each other. Secondly, with this understanding of the combination of capital, I will then launch into a discussion of the suzhi discourse. By introducing its roots and routes in modern Chinese history, I will show why and how the suzhi discourse has shifted from the Chinese government's propaganda to a daily discourse about human value in contemporary society. In doing so, this section will review the ways in which the suzhi discourse is not only employed as a self-evaluation of subjectivity, for the self to enquire “What do I want to do or Who do I want to be (or not to be)?” This is also a discourse that sheds light on the boundary-making of class. 
      Thirdly, I will complicate the suzhi debates through sexuality by showing how Money Boys are redefining the suzhi discourse. I will present the ways in which my informants are able to remake value through suzhi but in a different way. That is, instead of making social distinctions, this chapter will conclude that the Money Boys' practice of suzhi and capital exchange is aimed at sketching a blueprint for their future. It is a means for creating a better life ahead while their life conditions are more of a struggle than for others.
The Logic of Capital

In the last chapter, I have claimed that through the lens of value, cosmopolitan selfhood is justified by the Chinese state and civil society by the way it aims to exclude “the class others” under the neo-liberal regime. What I have iterated is the way in which value is manifested as a set of contested notions that are applied by different subjects in order to legitimate their social positions and economic securities on the one hand. But on the other hand, value is also about evaluating things, ideas and beliefs that people identify as worthy and important in their life. 
       It is within the politics of the commensurate-ness of value that competitions or frictions between different subjects occur, because some values that are evaluated as valuable to some might be valueless for others. More importantly, I demonstrate that some values, such as cosmopolitanism, can become valuable only when based on one’s exclusion and devaluation from others. In this manner, as Graber implies, employing Bourdieu’s notion of capitals is useful to expose the class violence which may occur in the exchange or trading of value. For Graeber, through capital, one can examine the ways in which values are validated as different forms of capital to be accumulated, used or exchanged. Also, whereas the privileged are those people who usually have more access to the resources of capital, they can play and invest their various capitals in multiple ways. Here Graeber argued that Bourdieu is important to our understanding of the formulations of value and capital in the modern capitalist apparatus:
 “What we are really talking about are jobs that open the way to the (legitimate, professional) pursuit of any forms of value other than the economic. Whether it’s the art world, or charity, or political engagement (as in, say, journalism, or activism) we are speaking of ways that one can dedicate oneself to something other than the pursuit of money – and compensatory consumerism. If one does not possess a certain degree of wealth to start out with, or at the very least the right kind of social networks and cultural capital, one is simply not allowed to break into this world.” (2005: 11)

In this vein, one can see that how the modern economic system, in Bourdieu's account, is not only about how economic capital makes class distinctions in the social world, but how distinctions are also remade by symbolic capital. It is through this convertibility of different forms of capital that the privileged classed self can become mobile in different fields (Bourdieu 1984). Bourdieu deciphers the metaphor of capital, which is aimed at answering why certain selves can be so successful or privileged in the social world, those of which he terms the “misrecognised subject.” Through the deployment and movement of different forms of capital, Bourdieu demonstrates the ways in which this misrecognition is formulating and then strengthening certain selves and who were making this happen. The four types of capital in Bourdieu's account are as follows: economic capital, which is comprised of monetary assets such as income or property. It is the basic form of capital. As mentioned, Cultural capital exists in three forms: firstly in the form of the embodied state of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body. Secondly, in the objectified state, which means in the form of cultural goods such as books, pictures, machines, etc.; and thirdly, in the institutionalised state, a form of objectification which is from educational qualifications (Bourdieu 1984: 243). Moreover, Social capital is generated through social processes and is made up of social networks such as membership in groups and connections with individuals.Last but not least, he took Symbolic capital, which is inspired from Max Weber's notion of charisma. Bourdieu depicts it as being about authority and personal qualities.  It is  important to note that symbolic capital is the one type of capital that the other types capital combined to legitimate. Skeggs declares, legitimacy is vital to covert capital to power, thus, for instance, before having symbolic power, cultural capital has to be legitimated (2004:17). 
       For these forms of capital, Bourdieu particularly emphasised the “convertibility” amongst capital. That is to say, one form of capital can be transformed into another. Calhoun (2002) highlights the importance of convertibility for the movement of capital in Bourdieu’s theory, as it sheds light on how different subjects in different social fields, such as lawyers or authors, are all caught up in the game of capital, with an aim of converting capital in order to ensure their own security or success:
“Yet successful lawyers and successful authors both, for example, seek to convert their own success into improved standards of living and chances for their children. To do so, they must convert the capital specific to their field of endeavor into other forms. In addition to material property (economic capital), families may accumulate networks of connections (social capital) and prestige (cultural capital) by the way in which they raise children and plan their marriage.” (2003, 262)

For my own research, the idea of capital and its converting relationships is quite important to engage with and then to expand upon in the suzhi (quality) discourse. For it can be used to explore capital through how new social distinctions in Chinese society is formatted and then discoursed by suzhi. As Bourdieu proves the ways in which class distinctions are lucidly but powerfully formulated through the movement of capital in France, in today's China, thus, under the dominance of the market-driven government, the upper-middle class families are also at pains to accrue, invest and then perform capital in order to legitimate their identity or privilege. 
     The suzhi discourse for me offers a critical way to examine how status and classed personal bodies are experiencing and making distinctions through capital. This means that not only those privileged, such as the upper-middle class, have the ability to produce and deploy capital. In fact, a great deal of feminist critique has underlined that to dismiss women's abilities to produce and utilise capital has made Bourdieu himself unable to grasp the ways in which different gendered selves' experience the world of capital (McNay 1999; Adkins 2002; Skeggs 2004b; Lawler 2005; Bernstein 2007). 













Suzhi: Roots and Routes


The idea of suzhi, namely “quality”, has gradually achieved influence in Chinese society since the 1980s, and it became a dominant social discourse in the 1990s(Yan 2003; Anagnost 2004; Kipnis 2007; Jacka 2009). Tamara Jacka's (2009) statistical data reveals that in the mass media, for example in People's Daily, China's leading newspaper, suzhi as a keyword was mentioned 102 times in the 1980s and rose to 2486 mentions in the 2000s. In academia, Jacka (2009:583) shows that in academia, according to the China Academic Journal Electronic Database, there were only 14 articles in which suzhi appeared in the title during the whole period of the 1980s, which increased to 2589 titles in the 1990s, and then to 64000 articles in the period between 2000 and 2007.   More significantly, within the political arena, Chinese Communist General Secretary Jiang Zeming, at the 15th Chinese Communist Representatives Annual Conference in 1997, claimed the importance of suzhi, referring to the quality of the labour force, with an aim of establishing a modern Communist Chinese state that would oversee “the cultivation of millions of high quality labourers and human capital to feed the needs of the modernised future” (Yan 2003b). 
       Jiang's call resonated at a critical moment when the PRC moved from the world’s leading factory producers to its leading financial power, when a hundred million peasants moved to the cities to join in the frantic urbanisation which entailed working in export processing factories, the service industry and so on. My goal is to demonstrate that, under such specific political-economic transformations, suzhi can be a signifier of capital which is deeply characterised by class and sexuality. 
       To understand its relationship with capital, it is important to capture suzhi's historical roots. In fact, suzhi is not a new term in modern Chinese history. In fact, it is a historic and political term that first deployed in the 1950s by the Chinese Communist Party Leader Mao Zedong, who announced that one of the key ways for building the new socialist State was to cultivate new and high suzhi workers (Yan 2003b). Under this declaration, the good quality of labour was then coloured with a 'eugenics' discourse, with a particular desire to produce massive amounts of labour forces in rural areas and heavy-industry factories (mostly in far north-eastern China) in order to provide for the needs in urban cities. In other words, during the Maoist period, suzhi was tinted with 'quantity' for labouring (Kipnis 2006; 2007). Nonetheless, recently theorists have rediscovered that in the post-Maoist present, after opening China to the global capital market, the discourse and power of suzhi no longer relies on the demand for the stable masses of the working class labour force only. The discourse has been taken to illustrate the quality of Chinese people from all aspects of Chinese society (Jacka 2009). 
       In this manner, suzhi is not only promoted by the Chinese state but is also practiced by the general public in today's China. What mediates this shifting and why has being ‘high quality’ gradually become desirable? Also, what social effects are occurring? Who are the unqualified and qualified in suzhi politics? The examination of the educational system might be a good starting point to investigate possible answers to these questions. Because, as I will explain below, through the lens of the struggle for educational attainment one can witness the ways in which newly upper-middle class individuals are caught up in a field of capital. The newly urban and rich middle-class parents are, at least in my research, tirelessly accruing cultural and social capital through the education system. This desire and ability to convert different forms of capital is fed into the privileged individuals’ self-claim and performance of 'high quality', which is also based on exclusion of the Other. 

Pedagogy and New Class Subjects in China

In the Chinese Classic Dictionary Sea of Words (Zhi Hai), suzhi refers to a combination of two biological and social meanings. On the one hand, suzhi means “the basic and essential function of human beings”, especially where the nervous system is treated as a vital function of the body, which is necessary to establish the development of mental functions. On the other hand, suzhi refers to “how human beings can obtain cultural cultivations and aesthetic ability.​[22]​” Here “education” is the key for developing this cultural ability. Education, however, has become a particularly crucial topic in that it resonates with the “cultural turn” which began in the 1980s. At that time, Cultural Fever ( 文化熱Wenhua re) as a social phenomenon which was launched by the Chinese cultural elites and middle class urbanity, had on the one hand represented the middle class's “class suffering” during the Cultural Revolution of the past and on the other hand, it drew on a new imagination of Chinese citizens who are fully culturally cultivated (Wang 2006). 
      As Wang Hui (2006) observes, this movement of Cultural Fever has sent the message to the public at large that during the post-Maoist years, for citizens to obtain high quality status it must be done through “quality education” (suzhi jiaoyu), that is, cultivating students’ suzhi through education has functioned as the guiding educational policy (Fong 2007). For example, in 1985, Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping, announced during the Nationwide Education Conference, that Quality Education should be the official guiding educational policy for improving the average quality of Chinese people (Yan 2008). Quality education is required for “the strength of our country and its economic development, which is now coming more and more to rely on the quality of people and the quantity of intellectuals” in Deng’s statement (Wang 2007). In 1986, the year following Deng's announcement, a new compulsory law stated that Chinese education must function as a system to improve the quality of the educated person (Kipnis 2007). Quality education, however, has immediately provoked some questions, that is to say, who is the target of this quality education? Does it have any conditions? If so, who can be easily included into quality education and who cannot? How is quality education motivated and demonstrated?  
    As far as I am concerned, a potential answer can be found in the one-child policy. Since the late 1970s including its strict enforcement in urban China from the 1980s, the one-child policy has become the dominant birth-control strategy of the Chinese government. More importantly, as with suzhi politics, its meaning and purpose is also shifting from population control, that is it pertained to “quantity” in the beginning, to the more anxious demand for high “quality” in the newborn generation. Nevertheless, the Chinese State only strictly employs this policy in urban cities rather than in the countryside (Fong 2007), as the rural areas are expected to produce a high volume labour force but the urban cities are responsible for high quality citizens for the development of the State.   
       Anagnost (2008), for example, criticises that the anxiety towards the height or weight of children’s bodies in China has in fact recalled resentful past-memories from the Cultural Revolution, where hundreds of thousands of people died from famine under Mao's agrarian policy. She explains the ways in which the Chinese parents she interviewed anxiously sent their children to have 'medical scans' in order to have confidence in their children's cognitive and physical growth. In this vein, Anagnost states that children from urban families in neo-liberal China have yet to become a “sign of value” in neo-liberal China. The figure of the child stands at the cusp of the past and future, which also embodies Chinese national desires of growing and developing as she claims:
 “The child, like the national past, represents a place of origin for the adult subject and by extension, for the modern nation-state. In this sense, the child gives the nation a place of new beginning in the overcoming of the national past”. (2008: 44)
 
She thus concludes her arguments:

“A number of urban parents I interviewed originally came from the country side and described a childhood of poverty and famine, the death of a sibling from malnutrition and disease, especially during the three-year period following the disastrous production policies of the Great Leap Forward in 1958...Therefore, greater height demonstrates the bodily register of a flight from rurality, a body that has been radically reshaped by modern regimes of nurture.” (2008: 49; my emphasis)
Bearing in mind this expectation of the new generation, the ‘young only child’ from the upper-middle class family has become the new and main actor of quality education. Vanessa Fong (2007) remarks on her ethnography in north-eastern China that her informants, young high-school students, were expected to become the role models for their family and State. For the students she interviewed, on the one hand, they realised that some economic and cultural capital were necessary 'tools' for them to become “high suzhi” subjects. This is reflected in one student’s response to Fong regarding why Bill Gates is his role model of a high suzhi person: “I heard in the 21st century, everyone would have to know English and computers to have high quality” (2007:95). On the other hand, Fong iterates, through quality education the younger generation learned an obligation to feed back their success to the family and State. This “filial nationalism”, so named by Fong (2004), is in fact a more complicated moral adopting of the Chinese quality education system, where the privileged younger generation is learning how to contribute capital to the State and family in the future. 































Harvard Girl and the Problem of Capital

“That success in the new economy is very much tied to the ability of actors to convert prior forms of cultural and political capital into money capital. Hence the determination of success or failure is anything but a level playing field but is contingent on one’s access to convertible forms of capital.” (Anagnost 2005: i)

Based on the memoir of a middle-class mother who shared her experiences and strategies of parenting and educating, which she believes successfully helped her daughter Liu Yiting gained admission into Harvard University with a full scholarship, The Harvard Girl: A Journey of Suzhi Education (2000), was not only becoming one of the highest selling books in China in 2001, but had become a national phenomenon. Broadly speaking, this book describes a middle class family's endeavour to train their only-child to become a healthy and career-minded girl through physical and cultural training. Physically, during pregnancy, Liu's mother had followed the guidance of a medical eugenics book, eating different kinds of foods and vitamins which were claimed to be good for pregnancy, as well as listening to classical music. When Liu was five years old, her mother began a daily training routine that included pinching her hands with ice-cubes for fifteen minutes in order to train her ability to endure pain (Kipnis 2006). While studying, Liu was often made to work in a noisy environment to learn how to concentrate on reading. What is more interesting for me here is to read about the ways in which Liu learned to perform her morality by meeting other people in Chinese society. For example, invited by her step-father, a middle class business man, the high-school student Liu travelled around China with him, and had opportunities to witness the “dark side” of Chinese society, which sparked her determination to become a successful cosmopolitan person, that is one who will never give up and, more importantly, never be a part of a group of socially poor people. 
         Liu expressed to her parents that, after reading the book entitled “Chinese Social Class Report”, which had been recommended by her mother, she started to understand the logic of playing with capital and felt 'upset' for those homeless and socially poor people on the street. This relates to what Bourdieu called a “feel for the game” (1984), as Liu put it:
“Those 'trash bugs' (beggars) are useless labours from the countryside… they are useless because they do not own any capital to invest themselves.  They do not have any cultural skills to interest potential employers. But their existence also exposes that our society still cannot deal with or help the poor. That is also to mean, before China becomes a real prosperous and strong country, these beggars can only be involved with poverty and crime.” (Liu 2000; cited by Wang 2007)​[23]​.
In terms of sexuality, Liu also offered her complicated feelings towards the bar-strippers she ran into in a club on a business trip with her father. Liu found that she felt bad and embarrassed for the strippers, calling them “cheap” and “shameless” for selling their “bodies and souls” for only for the money. At the same time, however, Liu also showed sympathy toward these women. “Maybe she really needs money so she is selling her body and smiles. Or maybe what is behind her fake smile is invisible bitterness” as Liu put it (Wang 2007). Nevertheless in the end, Liu still concluded that compared to other women working in a factory, these bar girls were less respectable.
      As the bestselling book of the year 2001, The Harvard Girl quickly became a heated cultural phenomenon in Chinese society. It also soon became parenting guidebook for the middle class family (Wang 2007). The book intensively exposed the new Chinese family's anxiety about their children's future. Through high quality education, parents attempt to nurture their only child as a respectable (entrepreneurial) subject and more importantly, this new subject can only achieve through their connection to the global, namely – their desires to become cosmopolitanism. Liu majored in Economics and Mathematics at Harvard, and was then employed as a finance analyst in the United States. However one should realise that the cosmopolitan subject is only achieved through the exclusion, namely the wiping out, of those who cannot qualify. For example, when she applied to the student dormitory at Harvard, Liu informed the school that her ideal roommate shall not be a “smoker, alcohol drinker, drug-user, but should be well cultured, from a different cultural background, and also, not to be a fan of heavy metal.”​[24]​ From Liu's critique of the “low quality” of the homeless people on the street, and Liu's “cheap” and “shameless” condemnation of the female strippers, one can glimpse that the Harvard Girl phenomenon in fact does not simply present the individual's struggle for educational capital, but it also mirrors a new class politics. That is, through Harvard Girl fever, we can tease out how the Chinese middle class family is eager to accumulate capital through education. 
     But capital, as Bourdieu (1984) reminded us, is a social relation and can only become powerful or legitimated through converting. By the same token, for individuals, capital can become influential or profitable only by her or his ability to convert it. With this ability of converting, a subject can more easily transgress across different fields. In this vein, one shall not confine capital to only one specific field, such as education or economy, but instead one should reconsider the ways in which the subject is using capital to attach some value to his or herself in different fields. 
      Before moving ahead, it is imperative to further clarify the character of the convertibility of capital in the suzhi discourse. I would suggest that losing sight of how capital in its various forms is converted might fail to grasp how suzhi is yet obscurely yet deeply embedded in the active relationship of capital. For instance, by looking into the education field, Carolyn Hsu (2007) claims how parents, whom she called “ordinary people” from her fieldwork site in north-eastern China, expressed their interests to make their children successful in higher education. To get a degree at Harvard University means becoming one of the high suzhi people in the parents' eyes. In light of this desire for pursuing educational performance, Hsu accentuates that her informants all acclaimed that being a high suzhi citizen in China is nothing about being rich or a business tycoon. 
      In Hsu's analysis, high suzhi regards “sophisticated” person that has high culture, namely, understanding what is happening in the world, and then contributing their capital to Chinese state. Hsu argues that, in consideration of her interviewees’ ambition to contribute to the nation-state, her understandings of the high suzhi people are those patriotic citizens who go against individualism values or money, which neo-liberalism keeps promoting in China. Hsu thus concludes that suzhi discourse does not embody neo-liberal logic, but in contrast suzhi can be a helpful discourse to challenge the neo-liberalism:

“Neoliberals believe that “welfare queens” live in squalid conditions because they lack morals; suzhi ideology claims that country bumpkins lack morals because they live in squalid conditions […] As such, suzhi discourse offers a language for denouncing unequal structural conditions and demanding institutional change.” (2007: 188)

 For Hsu, the suzhi discourse is indeed about defining what is high quality and what is low quality in relation to personhood, but yet it has nothing to do with neo-liberalism and the game of economic capital. Instead, Hsu identifies suzhi as a form of cultural repertoire, that is, the “Chinese variant of cultural capital” (2007:188) which is invested and actualised by the middle class family. 
      Nevertheless, in my view, what Hsu did not capture is actually how capital (including the human capital that she illustrated as the one gained from education) can only become powerful through the process of conversion (Bourdieu 1986). In his noted book “Distinctions” (1987) Bourdieu documents the ways in which the upper-middle class in French society, through the education system, were able to legitimate their capital from the economically rich to become symbolically powerful. Bourdieu views arts, music, opera and other cultural productions as material that fed into the generation of cultural capital in society. As such the rich have more resources to accumulate cultural capital (they can afford to go to the opera and the theatre, etc), which can in turn be converted, making them symbolically powerful. Through Bourdieu, for example, Diane Reay (2004) stresses this intense relationship between material and symbolic capital:
“For Bourdieu all goods, whether material or symbolic have an economic value if they are in short supply and considered worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation.  Because the upper, and to a lesser extent, the middle classes, have the means of investing their cultural capital in the optimum educational setting, their investments are extremely profitable. From this perspective educational establishments can be viewed as a mechanism for generating social profits.” (2004: 60)

Through this system of converting capital, one can henceforth challenge Hsu's analysis of claiming that suzhi is merely an embodiment of cultural capital and has no importance within the economy. Hsu fails to acknowledge that her economically privileged informants already had enough economic capital to move through social fields. Therefore, in Hsu's account, the middle class parents who identified the importance of educational value are not challenging neo-liberalism. In contrast, they are making social distinctions by converting their economic capital into cultural capital through encouraging their offspring to pursue higher education as Harvard Girl's case has proved. 
      Ching Kwan Lee (2008) points out that the major problem that lies in Hsu's argument is that it fails by realising the ways in which the implantation of selfhood in today's China is unequally produced in market logic; where the drastic resource- distribution differences between the urban and rural gives some selves, such as the urban upper-middle class, more power to accumulate capital. Hence for Lee, the suzhi discourse is not a fair game in the very beginning, as she declares what Hsu fails to capture:
“The list of interviewees includes a fair number of cadres, managers, and professors, many of whom are Communist Party members, but no unemployed worker in a city known for its laid-off population. Do they have similar or different views? [...] as a book aspiring to explore social stratification, the ultimate weakness lies in its complete silence on the most salient hierarchy of inequality in China: the rural–urban divide.”(2008: 1058)

Lee alerts that narratives such as suzhi are themselves “unequal and have uneven political and practical impacts” (2008: 1058), and therefore, it is an error to understand the power of the suzhi narrative without asking who is using it and how? For, recently, in terms of education, a great deal of research has exposed how the inequity between rural and urban in today's China has seriously affected the distribution of educational resources and cultural discrimination against students with rural backgrounds (Woronov 2004; Yan 2006; Kipnis 2007). 
      It is unequal because, first of all, the Chinese government gave far more institutional support to urban families, including pensions for education. But, children in immigrant families from rural areas, their children cannot go to public schools unless their parents pay double or more in tuition fees. Without the urban household registration (hukou), they cannot have welfare benefits such as medical insurance and housing, as I critiqued previously. Under these tight economic conditions, most immigrant families cannot send their children to public school but choose instead private schools specifically for immigrants (Ming Gong Xue Xiao) which they can barely afford. Some of these schools are actually not well organised, with financial problems or even without licenses to operate, which might lead them to be shut down if discovered by the government. 
       As a result, members of the younger generation from immigrant families are in a more fragile situation than the locals, as they are often in jeopardy of dropping out of school if their parents cannot afford to pay their tuition fees. Also, changing from one school to another is very common for these students, particularly if their parents' jobs are unstable and requires relocation or if their school was suddenly closed due to financial problems (Shi 2005). 
     In addition, migrant pupils in cities often experience the negative criticism of being deemed of “low quality” by the urban locals (Shi 2005; Woronov 2004). For instance, as an English teacher at a primary school for immigrants, Woronov (2004) recalls an occasion when she led a group of her students to the city centre for an excursion. And the loud speaking and running around of her young students attracted complaints from local people, who commented that her students must be from rural areas because they “behaved” in such a “low quality manner”. 
     Through this boundary-making between urban and rural and its relationship with suzhi, Anagnost views suzhi discourse as a mechanism of value-extracting which keeps this boundary working. She acclaims that the value of “rurality” is extracted from the urban in order to make the urban subjects mobile. To focus on this movement of value extracting, Anagnost (2006) suggests that to make this extracting happen, the rural subject is forced to be alienated from her or himself. They become merely a labouring unit for the market. She terms this alienation as a politics of ‘unknowingness’:
“The unknowingness of the migrant laborer therefore attains a value that also makes the body of the worker expendable. Once he or she becomes a more savvy negotiator of the terms of labour, she loses her value as a willing body. In this metaphor, the rural becomes the 'spring' from which capital can renew itself. It is the vitality that revivifies the possibility of its own annihilation through a falling rate of.”(2006: 520)

What Anagnost argues above is surely a sort of neo-liberal violence, which operates through extracting value from the rural labourers, reshaping the form of rural subjectivity. But this theoretical argument needs a further empirical account in order to show how it does this extraction work. In other words, how can suzhi be used or challenged by the working class? Moreover, Hairong Yan (2006) comments that through suzhi, we can still see how agency and resistance are however practiced or struggled against by those marginalised. She presents a case from Xiaohong, a Dagonmei (the young female part-timer in cities), who used to work as a housekeeper for a middle class family in Beijing. Yan analyses the ways in which Xiaohong performed or defined suzhi by herself through her class experiences in the urban setting:

“I had a realization: that I should not be like what I was before. I began to have a kind of…self-consciousness, a consciousness that I should change myself. Before this, when I worked for my employer’s families, it was well known among us [domestics] from the same native place that we have to practice embezzlement. For example, I would record 15 cents for vegetables that cost 10 cents...The kind of “suzhi” [quality] that we had didn’t make us feel ashamed about what we did. On the contrary, it made us feel that’s what we should do.” (2006: 227;my emphasis)

In this case, clearly, Xiaohong does not perform suzhi as a way to make her become “morally right”, that is, one who avoids embezzlement. Instead, the exploitative working conditions drove her and other house workers to take suzhi as a discourse/resource of moral defence, when they earned a little bit extra money through embezzlement. I however am not indicating it is a heroic to understand suzhi as a pure resistance to the neo-liberal violence. Instead, for me, one should at least notice the struggling and performing aspects of reactions to suzhi discourse from the lens of marginal. In another case of an ex-dagonmei, Hua Min, Yan (2005) takes another case to present how the marginal rejected inclusion into the suzhi discourse even to become successful, or rich, in the cities. In Hua Min's case, through Yan’s description, after a decade struggling with poverty and enduring mental and physical injuries inflicted in cities, (one of her eyes was damaged while working in south China), Hua Ming told Yan that she refused to be interviewed by the media as they attempted to tell her story as that of the model dagonmei as Hua Min became a successful business woman ultimately. 
        The reason that Hua Min refuses to offer her stories, according to Yan (2005), is that she still witnessed the suffering of her fellow rural immigrants, including her cousin who committed suicide when his money, borrowed from his parents’ life savings, was taken from him by swindlers in city. Therefore, from her personal and other fellow dagonmeis' class and body experiences, Yan (2005) marks that Hua Min opposes sharing or “selling” her story, that is her success, in relation to the narrative of suzhi or development: 
“Hua Min’s sense of migrant rurality grew out of her predicament and hardships. But more than a sense of distress, migrant rurality for Hua Min is also an assertion of an identity with the interest of rural migrant workers and her understanding of troubles, misery, frustration and aspirations of her fellow migrants.” (2005: 12)

Yan concludes that for Hua Min, “to produce her story as a showcase of development would be a betrayal of her critical understanding of her experiences and of the experiences of men and women she has witnessed” (2005:18). In light of this resistance, or unwillingness to betray, one then sees that the experiences of struggles are therefore a source of agency, which drives people such as Xiaohong or Hua Min to challenge, reshape or go against the suzhi discourse. 




Gendering Capital: Suzhi and Money Boys

“The locals perceive that we don't have culture, say, 'good habits' because we like quarreling with people, using violence, or littering and so on...so we will be kicked out from Beijing when the Olympics are coming...but if I heard someone talk this way to me, I would talk back, asking “If we outsiders all leave, who will buy your goods in the shops? Who will clean your streets and, who will rent your houses? How will you make money?[...] Also, think about where is your food from? Without those farms in my hometown, what will you have to eat? How you gonna live? After all, you local urban people are in fact reliant on us—the outsider.” (Miss Z, interview by Shi 2005: 126)

Thus far I have introduced the ways in which the new middle class self in China performs its ability to convert different forms of capitals that are embodied through the use of the suzhi discourse. In other words, suzhi discourse is used by the middle-class to legitimate their privileged positions in new society.
       For me, new China sheds important light on how new formations of inequity and injustice are generated and patterned through boundary-making between the urban and rural by State household policy and cultural reputations. Nevertheless, if suzhi is a discourse that embodies the value of capital, it is not a discourse that is utilised by the middle class only. In contrast, as a language that is fed into notions of value and embodies forms of capital, I aim to emphasise that suzhi is also experienced by the marginal. Indeed, recent studies that focus on the working class's experiences are claiming a new realisation of the marginalised individual’s experiences in the social field. Some ethnographic works, particularly those on working class women's experiences, have claimed that rather than a subject that  “stores” the capital, as Bourdieu claimed, feminist critique however revealed that working class women are able to, or refuse to, use and exchange the capitals they have (Skeggs 1997; Lawler 2000; Evans 2008b; Loveday 2012). In addition, these studies shed light on the power of 'ambivalence', which is an affective power deeply centred on the working class's daily experiences. They illuminate that ambivalence is not simply a feeling of failure or a gesture of “giving up” from class struggling. Instead, they recognise that ambivalence is an affect that crystallises the working class's dynamic and complicated negotiation with inequity and discriminations (Skeggs and Wood 2011; Lawler 2005; Loveday 2012).
       More complex, in terms of sexuality for instance, Marcus Anthony Hunter (2010) investigates how the young black gay men in Chicago in the United States, utilise a space in the urban gay club Spot to search for social support by establishing kin-like friendships or intimacy. Hunter documents how they create emotional capital to negotiate the day-to-day sexual and racial stigmas they encounter from society. In addition to emotional capital, they also reuse the nightclub as a space to search for human resources and broaden networks (social capital), which is helpful for them in their work lives (economic capital) and in “getting by” during hard times from daily lives (2010: 178). In my own research, however, Money Boys understands that suzhi is not employed by them to perform class differences with others, but as a sort of tactic to negotiate the violence and difficulties inherent to cities. 
      With this regard, what I aim to argue is an expansion of Bourdieu’s account of capital to include a better understanding of how the middle-class’s performance of suzhi, allowing for a better understanding of how my informants are elaborating and performing suzhi in their daily body or class experiences. I do not intend to proclaim that all of my informants are practicing suzhi in the same way, nor do I seek to romanticise my informants as heros/heroines in class antagonism. In contrast, I will decipher how suzhi is registered in my informants’ lives, through their bodies, sexuality and familiar relationships.     

Chen Ma and his Daughter

One example is Chen Ma (Madame Chen in Mandarin), a Money Boy who is also the owner of a brothel. Chen Ma has a ten-year-old daughter Pingping, whose mother is from Chen Ma’s primary marriage in his countryside hometown. Chen Ma was not happy to discuss his past marriage in his rural hometown and simply told me that his daughter is not seeing the mother anymore since divorce. As a Money Boy, Chen Ma seems to be quite sensitive of his age as a man in his mid-thirties and in regard to his body in the sex industry, so he goes to the gym every weekday morning after sending Pingping to school. Nevertheless, this is not all for “marketing” reasons, as with most of his Money Boys in the brothel; Chen Ma enjoys “styling” himself, as he also has a small business selling fashionable men’s underwear online to his clients. 
       At this point, Chen Ma is doing pretty well financially: promoting and styling himself, adding some value in the sex industry but also trading goods to earn some extra money. At the same time, as a pimp, he also helps out Money Boys in his brothel to expand their network of clients. Thus, Chen Ma usually has to introduce his regular clients to new Money Boys in his brothel, as his income is mainly from the “commission” from his Money Boys in the brothel. Chen Ma nevertheless told me that he also has to be cautious of not giving access to all of his social networks to his “employees”, which would result in an overall loss of capital.
       I witnessed how Chen Ma skilfully used his resources to sustain his life, through body training, styling and deploying his social capital. Chen Ma, however, never expressed to me an ambition of being a high suzhi person or told me what and who is a so-called low suzhi person. At our interview in the brothel, he showed no intentions of distancing himself through cultural distinction from others. I understand this more through Chen Ma’s expectations of his daughter’s future. Living with Money Boys in a small apartment, under more difficult circumstances of economic capital than Harvard Girl, what Pingping showed me during my fieldwork was that she was articulate, chatty and adroit with people in the brothel, regardless of whether they were new-coming Money Boys, clients, NGO activists or a stranger like me. I chatted with Pingping a couple of times, as her father liked me to check her homework, including her English vocabulary. Pingping was doing outstandingly in school, of which Chen Ma was quite proud. Nevertheless, when asked what he expected Pingping to become in the future, Chen Ma did not insist his young daughter should become a Harvard Girl, banker or any other “successful” type now promoted in China’s media. Instead, he feels “Okay” if Pingping becomes a model or actress in the future is, as he said she was really into “that kind of life.” 
      What I am interpreting here is that from Chen Ma’s expectation of Pingping, one can see he is really a caring single-father. Like Harvard Girl’s or other middle-class parents in Shanghai, Chen Ma absolutely cares about his child’ s performance in school but he is not demanding that his daughter become a self who looks down at the poor’s bare life from the pinnacle of her success. In the brothel, I found Chen Ma was keen to perform the ways in which he educated Pingping to be a “mature”, sociable and listening child. For instance, several times he asked Pingping to tidy up the house after finishing her school work, and Pingping knew what she had to do without many complaints; she quickly wrapped up the garbage bags, took them to the lift alone, walked to the garbage gathering site downstairs and then soon came back to the flat to enjoy her cartoons on the TV. Chen Ma also once seriously asked Pingping to express gratitude to me when I brought a Pudding cake to her, which according to the father, was about “the rule of being a good kid.” 
      It was a sort of moral performance that Chen Ma wanted to show me from his small family, where “mutuality” was what Pingping had to cultivate instead of being a girl who builds up Harvard University as her primary goal in the life. Ray, the NGO activist friend of mine, who has known Chen Ma for years, once told me that at Pingping’s ninth birthday party in 2009, he was so shocked at how “mature” Pingping was. Even as a kid, she toasted her glass of juice to the people who joined her party, including Money Boys and her father’s friends, saying,” Thank you all for my birthday party, I wish your dreams will all come true.” Having witnessed Pingping’s charisma, Ray and other Money Boys came to tease her, saying that after 20 years, she will become the “queen” of nightlife in Shanghai and after that, they all will rely on her to take care of old friends. 
      Why I present Chen Ma’s stories here is to understand how Money Boys are able to reframe their lives from the limited capitals and social resources they own, and that how they negotiate with suzhi discourse, is very different in comparison to middle class families. Let me specify the difference here. As the previous chapter showed, the meaning of proper personhood in China is nailed in the cosmopolitan identification. But in this chapter I document that for Money Boys, they are actually offering a different picture, because for Money Boys, they are not stuck in the game of self-identification and recognition of “who am I” (or who I am not). By contrast, they take their limited capitals to reflect and thenceforth plan about what life can be or become by virtue of their own efforts.  That said, even at some points, their marginal positions and daily struggles are imagined as people who live in the precarious and “inhuman” situations (Bauman 2004). Yet, I want to emphasise that Money Boys are not and do not want to be in limbo or to be imagined as “wasted humans” named by Bauman (2004). Rather, they are able to carve a space for a better life and negotiate the daily violence they encounter, making them substantive rather than wasted. 




For Lotus, a FtM transgender Money Boy, what was really important to him/her was to find a better place (that is, another country) to survive. As a transgender escort, Lotus's decision to change sex, to practice English or to meet potential “high suzhi” clients from the West in the high-end hotels of Shanghai, and to buy nice clothes and eye-catching bags and accessories – all such actions touched upon during our conversations were never considered in relation to the discourse of boundary-making. In other words, Lotus never expresses the personal’s desire to add value that was about making distinctions. Lotus deploys suzhi to accumulate the capital “she” could earn from clients, and that capital was then fed into the future that was planning: “Although this future is difficult to achieve”, Lotus sometimes said to me.  
      Another case was Robert, whose dream of the future was not clear, but he always revealed a positive attitude towards life in our conversations even when he had a bit of struggle with his income. When I met Robert, with other Money Boys, he lived on and off in Chen Ma's brothel. Living with Chen Ma, he saved a lot of money because instead of struggling to pay the considerable rent to have his own room in Shanghai, Robert only had to pay a little rent to Chen Ma. The tradeoffs for this money savings included participation in the 'Cooking Rota', which meant that everyone cooks for people in the house by turn. In addition to saving expenses on food and accommodation, living in the brothel also helps extending the Money Boys’ network of clients, as they would introduce reliable clients to each other. Sometimes, they would do a threesome or have group sex. Also, living in a brothel gave Robert access to more resources to generate social and economic capital but, similar to Lotus's case, Robert was not interested in making capital or claiming quality to legitimate his position in society. In contrast, Robert's interest was in how to make a better life, with more income and a “handsome” boy friend in the future. Being a handsome young man, Robert’s relationship with some of his young rich clients was sometimes ambiguous as their relationship was to some extent like that of a couple who were dating. 
      When I met Robert at a gay bar, his client kept calling and tracking what Robert was doing and with whom he was meeting. Robert had to deal with jealousy from his clients at times, but it was crucial to maintain this in-between intimacy with his clients in order to make the client stay with him over the long term, paying him a steady, stable income. And when we were gradually getting to know each other, Robert asked me if I know how to help him find more clients or make other gay friends. I then suggest that he set up a profile on a dating website where he could meet more people and where he could also list as a preference his desire to meet foreigners in Shanghai. Though Robert was not familiar with the online world such as using the E-mail system, he was willing to learn and to find any opportunity to “make a move.” Besides, as is the case for a lot of other young people in Shanghai city, Robert also went to the hair salon, shopped for clothes, and had a manicure a few times a month. Indeed, Robert was performing his body similarly to how the middle class, but the difference between them and Robert was that these endeavours on the body were tactics that struggle with class exclusion in urban Shanghai in my point of view. 
      Like I have elucidated above, without the urban household policy, the immigrants in urban cities struggle more under the economic insecurities and social welfare of new China. In Robert's case, he reused the added value of his body (by the use of clothes or style) to benefit his job as an escort. At the same time, he is also trained as an insurance salesman, for he noted that there is potential for a huge insurance market in China. In this vein, Robert’s use of suzhi discourse shall be understood as a struggle or performance, which is limited by the capitals. For me, from Chen Ma’s life of being a single-father pimp, to Lotus's re-setting of gender and body, to Robert's performance of his body and style, these empirical examples all show the ways in which the working class in today’s China are able to re-deploy their resources in order to negotiate a better life when their resources and access to capital are institutionally limited. 
       In other words, if the suzhi discourse is now taken up by different subjects in China to redefine what is the proper, “high quality self” and what is not. Thenceforth, this chapter argues that through Money Boys one could notice that this imagination of a good self is problematic. Because, as mentioned, the new Chinese “good self“, added to the value of cosmopolitanism, is clearly produced through class violence derived from state policies (such as hukou system) and exclusion based on cultural discrimination.  As a result, this quality self is also challenged by the marginalised as they redefine and practice suzhi politics.  
       The differences in the ways to experience suzhi that I stress here between my informants and the Chinese upper-middle class is that the former does not claim suzhi discourse as a way of self-performing as a cultural and/or cultivated subject. What I am explaining here is that they perform suzhi as a language of independence or moral defence in order to estimate what resources they have already. What they need more in order to bargain for a better life for themselves, even with institutionalised limitations of their opportunities in society. What I highlighted above was that my informants are neither the holders of capital nor its victims. Lotus’s decisions to change sex, Robert’s choices of adding value to his body and attending the training course of insurance sales – all of these actions express alternative ways of negotiating neo-liberal violence. Through suzhi discourse, the interplay of inclusion and exclusion is following the new rural and urban distinction, and the ways in which Money Boys struggle to survive in this new social distinction, defending their future by the capitals they have. Suzhi, as a discourse to envision this rural and urban boundary is thenceforth reshaped by Money Boys’ daily experiences, which offers a new understanding from the lens of the marginal. 


                                   Conclusion










Rereading and Replaying Filial Values

“In traditional China filial piety was the fundamental principle of society.” (Margery Wolf 1985:205)


“…filial piety is not simply a matter of respecting one's biological or cultural elders but also an age-old moral apparatus for interpellating individuals into the hierarchy-conscious conduct of identifying with –and submitting to–whatever preexists them–from the ancestral family to the ancestral land, the province, the country, and the ethnic community in a foreign nation–as authoritative and thus beyond challenge.”(Chow 2007: 11)


In the last chapter I argued that Money Boys were able to challenge the discourse of suzhi – a new way of valuing “human quality” in contemporary China – when they reset suzhi as a means of for envisioning their future rather than making class distinctions in the same way as the middle class. I also looked into their practices of value, demonstrating how my informants were struggling or performing capitals in order to carve out a space in the middle-class centric society. 
       In so doing, this chapter brings issues of filial value (孝 xiao) to the centre of the discussion in order to explore how Money Boys explain and perform filial piety and also reshape the meaning of filial piety – one of the most important value in Chinese society. The reason I look into filial piety was because during my fieldwork many interviewees indicate the importance of filial piety, insisting that their obligations to the family and this attachment to their parents and families cannot be easily jettisoned. Hence, this chapter intends to enquire why do Money Boys take filial piety as a serious matter? More specifically, as “rebelling sons” that stand outside of heterosexual kinship relationships, why do they still carry a sense of filial obligations?





Chinese Families, Filial Value and Kinship


Shih Ji-ching, the pioneering Taiwanese feminist activist whose personal experience of being from a deprived family where her mother was mentally unstable and collapsed after her military officer husband abandoned the family in the 1950s. Shih criticises “xiao” that is, filial piety, in Chinese-speaking societies as allowing letting the nation-state to avoid its responsibility for social welfare - while family members, (particularly wives) tend to each other’s needs or any difficulties related to finance, intimacy or health (Shih 1993). Shih views filial piety as an emotional force or even a form of violence concealed in a narrative romantic love, and marriage, which allows the State to avoid responsibility for the poor (particularly poor families). She argues:

“Chinese societies do not have a real social welfare system, but we have filial piety. Actually, filial piety is the Chinese version of social welfare. In a country that does not offers reliable social welfare benefits to its citizens, family is therefore a place that bears overloaded obligations. Indeed, if a Chinese family happens to have a long-term-ill patient, handicapped, or a mentally ill child – the whole family will absolutely be in the state of Ji Fei Gou Tiao! (雞飛狗跳; Chickens fly and dogs jump; a Chinese slang that refers to a chaotic situation) – no one cannot escape from it and none can have a peaceful life. In this situation, let the State to waft filial value or romantic love to the common people or the poor is way too cruel”. (1993: 193; my translation and emphasis)

Considering this critique, what interests me is why filial piety is important and how was it practiced and performed by ethnic Chinese. Does everyone perform filial value in the same way, or not? Before answering these questions, it is crucial to know where the filial value is accommodated into the family, in line with Grossberg’s (2010) theory that by exploring where value operates, we can comprehend how and why value can or cannot be in some specific space of exchange with others’ value. Given this reason, thus, here I will investigate what constitutes “family” in Chinese society, and then examine the ways in which it has become the key place to produce and process filial piety. 
       My first goal in this chapter is not to exhaust the whole debate spectrum of filial piety within Chinese culture, but rather to tease out how it serves as bedrock in cultivating the Chinese collective persona, through the daily practices and education within the family and kinship system.  


Family and Filial Piety

In the history chapter (Chapter Two), I introduced, how for the May Fourth Movement reformers, the call for reform was in response to the ways in which traditional Chinese intimacies, including non-monogamous, concubine culture and family-arranged marriage, not only signified the dark, dated nature of Chinese culture which went against the individual’s right to choose, but also substantiated why China could not become a modern State similar to many Western countries at the time. As a revolutionary generation that challenged traditional ethos and customs, the May Fourth reformers declaimed that individuals should be released from having a big family and submitting to family-arranged marriage. Nevertheless, for those reformers, to attack family-arranged marriage was not to attack the family itself. In contrast, for the May Fourth reformers, their primary aim was not questioning the legitimacy of family but rather to propose what kind of family they and the new modern Chinese society needed. In this manner, male reformers proposed that the nuclear family was an ideal type, where the couple, and specifically the adult males, would have more power to control their own sexuality, intimacy, and property instead of being dominated by their fathers or male seniors within the extended family. 
        This continuous attachment to the family (Jia) can be realised through the writings of Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005), of the May Fourth movement, and who was trained by Bronisław Malinowski in England, returning to Asia to become the founder of Sociology as a discipline in socialist China. Fei’s entire academic career was anchored in theorising the Chinese kinship system and exploring the ways in which the family was the most important institution to shape the Chinese persona. Through his ethnography on the Hans family in rural China, as seen through the lens of structuralism, Fei (1981) claimed that the Chinese kinship system differed from the West as the latter works through the deployment of romance/love/sex leading to marriage and family-establishment, and finally to “child nurturing”. The logic of kinship in traditional Chinese society is based on the obligation to nurture infants, namely to prevent the newborn from starving and to bring them up. 
      Consider Fei’s ethnographic research: he reasoned that the Chinese family or marriage exists or functions to precisely secure the continuation of the next generation instead of legitimating the Western value of romance, love, or marriage (Fei 1984). Fei underlined that the Western family is usually secured in, and then expanded from, the relationship between the father and mother. However, in Chinese culture, the family is expanded between seniors and juniors, particularly father and son, in order to continue and expand the blood-related family. Hence, in light of the blood-related family, he demonstrated that the Chinese-style kinship operates through its “reciprocity expectation”, as the seniors’ devotion to the next generation is also based on an understanding and expectation of the junior’s prosperity, when the latter will “feedback” the fruits of their prosperity in the senior’s later years.​[25]​In doing so, generally, the Chinese family cannot be viewed as “completed” if there are no children; this was highlighted by Mencius (B.C 372-279), the primary interpreter of Confucius, who expressed that the first obligation for Chinese people was reproduction. As Mencius famously acclaimed “There are three things which are “unfilial” and the greatest of them is to have no posterity” (Mencius, cited by Evans 2008b:172). Elisabeth Croll (2006) for instance, reviews the ways in which this filial value is embedded and performed by Chinese people nowadays: 	
“Regardless of the different levels of familial wealth, spending on children in both spending in both poor and rich families is frequently rationalised as both an expression of affection and sign of devotion and a strategic nurturing of gratitude and interest.” (2006: 235)
Croll exemplifies her argument with a case: 

One professional urban mother sets out to purchase a piano not only in order that her 5-year-old daughter might learn to play but also to show her that they were saving money in order specifically please her and that her gratitude and debt to her parents should be repaid in late life.” (2006: 235)
  
As a result, given the common understanding of Chinese family as focused on the obligation of posterity, Evans considers that this sort of desire for having posterity 'is so well known that is has acquired an almost canonical status in the legend of China's “culture specificity”(2008b: 172). It is thus necessary to understand what exactly is the value that unites the Chinese family to work together for the family and how? 
      Here I regard filial piety as a key to exploring the Chinese family. From my fieldwork I have noticed that filial piety seems still to be recognised as imperative by my informants –who cannot build up a family and whose sexual practices were outside the norms of heterosexual kinship. Money Boys usually express that what they have done to the family will be evaluated through the lens of filial piety. Given these assumptions, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the term filial piety, and then prove the ways in which filial value can be so powerful as to affect people outside of heterosexual norms. 





              

                       Filial Piety in Chinese Culture

Symbolically, as Charlotte Ikels explains, the core value of Xiao (孝) can be seen from its character. Xiao in Mandarin is a word that is composed from two other characters, which are lao (老; old), the top half of the character, and zi (子; son) the bottom half of the character. Ikels acknowledges” When combined to constitute Xiao, the element derived from lao rests on top of the character “zi,” that is, the elder is on top of the son” (2004: 3). 
      Indeed, traditionally, the children's “debt” to their parents was “naturally” inherited, because the Chinese cultural view is that the parents gave life to the children, and thus, unavoidably, children have this priceless debt to the parents until the latter dies (Chan and Tan 2004). More radically, to some extent, children in this web of kinship are recognised as the (symbolic) property of the parents. Confucius explained this in the text of The Classic of Family Reverence (Xiaojin B.C. 221) –the canonical book that elaborated filial royalty from Confucius's account –where he demonstrated that the basic rule of being filial is to “take care of your body”. Confucius asserted:
“Your physical person with its hair and skin are received from your parents. Vigilance in not allowing anything to do injury to your persona is where family reverence begins; distinguishing yourself and walking in proper way (dao) in the world; raising your name high for posterity and thereby bringing esteem to your father and mother-it is in these things that family reverence finds its consummation.”
(Confucius B.C. 221; Translated and cited by Rosemont and Ames 2009: 105)

In this manner, one can get a glimpse of how this emphasis on the blood connection between generations constitutes the backbone of the Chinese kinship system. Yet, on the other hand, the blood connection to family is also culturally written. Chris Berry (2001), for instance, reveals how, regardless of whether one is in the mainland of China or in other Chinese-speaking areas, the blood relation to family is the key to understand the meanings of being a Chinese subject and his or her obligation to the family. Thus, xiao can be a value that mediates the formation of the Chinese persona by evaluating whether he or she can be qualified as a human being. As Confucius (551-579 B.C.) announced that even “animals” know to feedback to their parents, so a human being should value filial piety:
“The filial piety of nowadays means the support of one’s parent. But dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of support;– without reverence, what is there to distinguish the one support given from the other?” (Confucius 551 B.C.; Translated and cited by Ikels 2004: 3)

More complicatedly, filial piety as a value is not only operates through family or kinship, but it also acts as a guiding value woven into the government and society (Stafford 1995). According to Confucianism, the nation-state to some extent is actually the embodiment of the family, where the leader should learn how to govern his territory and people, as a father treats his children, and the children will adopt Xiao as the primary value to perform repeatedly throughout life. Therefore, the harmonious relationship between individuals, the family and the State is generated through the practice of filial value. From this perspective, Rosemont and Ames (2009) indicate that filial piety is the most fundamental value in Confucianism, for it enshrines how the human bond between parents and children is understood and practiced as a practical ethos that extends from the family to the society, from the personal to the collective. The authors reason that Xiao is a powerful ethics centred in Confucianism:
“In fact, for Confucius, there is no individual—no ”self” or “soul” – that remains once the layers of social relations are peeled away [...] The goal of living, then, is to achieve harmony and enjoyment for oneself and for others through acting most appropriately in those roles and relationships that make us uniquely who we are.”(2009:11; my emphasis)

The authors continue to extend this ethic to the relationship between the State and the individual:

“In the tradition that Confucius so thoroughly influenced, all Chinese people are the children of the Yellow Emperor. As such, China as a country is a “country-family” (guojia), and all human beings are a “human family” (renjia).” (2009 : 11)


Put another way, xiao becomes a dovetail to evaluate the qualifications of Chinese personhood to see if one is doing well in managing his or her social relationships. Hwang Kwang-Kuo argues that in Chinese society, to be a successful and respectable human being is about one’s capacity to manage his or her relationships, from family to social relationship, instead of being “the one who has strong character or individuality” (2001: 23). The Chinese subject who can be in charge of his or her relationships (guanxi) will be respected normally as having “face” in front of other members of society.  
      Guanxi is a sort of technique that every Chinese subject has to learn in order to manage his or her relationships, in order to avoid the risk of potentially injuring his or her family’s interests. Hwang emphasises that the so-called “respectable subject” is the one who can maintain his or her relationships in society well, and then knows to feedback the benefits from those relationships to the family and then the State. In light of guangxi, I want to complicate the concept of filial piety as also being about capital accumulation. In the kinship system, as we saw, filial piety is an intergenerational ethos which solidifies children and parents in a fixed and rigid system of heterosexual kinship. 
     To secure this relationship, however, there needs to be material and emotional investment. For example, ethnographic literature has recently described the ways in which filial sons and daughters skilfully utilise capitals they have accrued in order to perform their filial value in contemporary China (Jacka 1997; Lee 1998;Whyte 2004; Evans 2010; Fang 2012). Yan Yunxiang’s (2003) research particularly draws on how parent’s offerings of gifts and money for their children’s wedding has become a reciprocal strategy. In Yan’s analysis, the more offerings parents give, the more parents can expect the groom and bride will be willing to shoulder the responsibility of supporting their parents in their later years. Money and gifts at the wedding mediate the relationship between the senior family members and the younger couples, as it helps to actualise a new intimacy in the family, while also demanding further obligations in the future. 
      Shifting this intergenerational reciprocity to focus on gender identity, Evans (2008b; 2010) explores the role of new mother and daughter identity in China and how they demonstrate that filial piety in society have been applied by the State and experts to inform those well educated, professional middle-class families as to the importance of “mutual-communication” (Go Tong). In the game of Go Ton. daughters are expected to be the willing-to-listen, considerate female self, while mothers are encouraged and then naturalised as the one who is caring and listening. Evans alerts us that “communicative intimacy” within the middle-class family is different than for those from a rural background as the latter emphasises material reciprocity more than emotional communication. In a likely fashion, Kong (2011) critiques the intimacy between filial obligations and gay identities in Hong Kong by noticing that filial piety is a form of violence that demands “reproduction obligations”– moral obligations that force sons and daughters into (heterosexual) marriage. Kong also argues that the real problem of “gay sons” in the Chinese family is not about homosexual  “sex”, but the fact that gay identity interferes with one’s willingness to perform traditional roles in kinship, and this is judged as “non-filial” (Bu Xiao) for society. Similarly, Chris Berry announces that real confrontations in Chinese families seem not to occur between homosexuality and heterosexuality, but between “those who are willing and able to play traditional family roles and those who are not” (2001: 219).  That said, for Kong or Berry, filial violence is not only about the moral pressure to exercise the heterosexual familial values, thereby oppress homosexuals but also presses on one’s economic security. 
      Kong’s point is expanded from Ong (1999), whose account of Chinese entrepreneurship illustrates the ways in which Chinese families emphasise the well being and healthy children as the foundation of the family and are at pains to cultivate and practice this ethical belief by extending this ethics to imagine the family’s “economic well-being.” Ong notes this ethical practicing as “Chinese family biopolitics” and viewed filial piety as also lubricating the relationship between individuals and the family body​[26]​. Kong (2011) rereads Ong's Chinese family biopolitics as having the potential to show how Chinese homosexuals are disciplined by the family’s economic demands. In his account, most Chinese gays and lesbians understand that to leave the family means putting their economic security or future at risk when income, networks and career are closely connected to family interests and networks in Chinese societies. As Kong accentuates, only those “who are wealthy enough” and able to afford another house in the notorious real estate market in Hong Kong can create a private space in which to protect and cultivate personal identities.
       Through these criticisms of the intimacy between material needs and filial piety, therefore, we can clearly tease out that intimacy is twisted between sexuality and materiality. In my account, it is important to re-fathom filial piety, when it has become a new form of value in contemporary China, particularly as some people are able to accrue and exchange filial piety while some people cannot. In other words, I suggest that the reciprocal game of filial piety in today’s China has also become an unfair game, as it is also conditioned by material structure now. For instance, Yan (2003) analyses the ways in which filial value in today’s China today is being challenged. He observes that gradually, young Chinese couples take control of the money (benefits) or material needs (food) in order to become the leading figures in the domestic sphere, the young generations, in Yan’s investigation have learnt to utilise material needs to bargain for their rights in the family, by countering the filial duty which for them is no longer a “natural” given. Added to more “modern” expressions of individualism, he notices that new Chinese generations will be willing to feedback to parents only when they have more authority to make choices about their own lives. 
       In doing so, one realises that how filial piety is now also conditioned by money (capital) for younger generations who have more material resources with which to negotiate their filial obligations and to bargain for their owns rights and needs in the domestic sphere. Therefore, in this light of conditional filial value, the subsequent part of this chapter continues to examine the ways in which Money Boys struggle to obtain filial value. I reveal how they consider and express filial obligations as important, but also struggle to redeem filial piety as a personal value. 








Linda’s Gold Necklaces and Rings 

It was a lovely afternoon in the early summer in Shanghai city when I went to Linda's place which is located in Hongko, a district of Shanghai which is still brimming with “old” buildings and traditional markets rather than skyscrapers and luxurious boutiques. I knew Linda through his boyfriend Joy, who was one of my interviewees. I was interested to speak with Linda about her decision to have surgical breast implants. When I arrived mid-morning, about 11am, I immediately felt bad about deciding on that time for an interview, as it was earlier than normal for Linda to be up, after an entire night out on the street. Linda came out from the bedroom, wearing quite short pyjamas, which barely covered the body, and was in an unpleasant mood from having woken up so early. I worked very hard to placate her temper, by trying to place our conversation on the right track. In the beginning, Linda was answering but not very engaged with some questions. But in fact, Linda is familiar with meeting a stranger and knows very well how to tell them what s/he thinks and wants. 
       However, it was this difficulty that ultimately made me feel that doing this interview was actually a positive experience for me as a researcher, allowing me to meet respondents that were not really performing too much respects (or politeness) towards their interviewer (due to the bad timing I chose for the interview). As such, Linda was able to filter topics she felt interested in or not to respond. Through Linda’s choices, I thus reconsider why some questions mattered to Linda and why some were to be avoided. Indeed, it was when our interview shifted its focus to the “family” that our conversation suddenly became more vivid. We opened up our conversation regarding family issues by discussing a quarrel that Linda was recently involved in. It stemmed from the wife of one of her/his clients who had discovered the affair between her husband and Linda, and came to Linda’s place to argue. 
      Linda told me, in a furious tone, that the angry wife almost used physical violence, not to mention lethal words. Nevertheless Linda fought back, with similarly toxic words, saying: “Did I force your husband to mess up with me? Was it my fault? Go look in the mirror, if you are pretty enough to let your husband mess up with you, how dare you come here to blame me?” Linda was particularly ferocious while relating memories of this drama, which had just happened the previous week. However, when we started to talk about her family, Linda’s anger curbed. To justify him/herself as not a “bad person” despite the fact that Linda might have caused injury to the clients’ families, Linda went on to tell me the ways in which she is the one to take care of the family, by starting sharing some of his/her life story.
      Linda came to Shanghai with nothing, as a son from a poor family in a north-eastern village. Linda had to leave home for the cities, much like other young people in the village who did not want to be stuck in their hometown doing agricultural labour for their whole life- though most of them were drawn by the desire to make more money, which added to the feeling of adventure in the city. During the millennium year, Linda made a great leap towards the “Rich South”, and started a new life in Shanghai city. It is in Shanghai that Linda met a boyfriend, who also came from a rural town, and then, after a period of fretful, on-and-off dagong (part-time work) in the city, they decided to become Money Boys. 
      In the beginning, both of them did “drag” on the street, but for no other reason than to earn more money in the bigger market of the heterosexual sex industry, Linda and some of her Money Boys peers decided to change their sex. S/he had surgery in 2008, in a hospital in Northern China, which charged far less than in Shanghai or other big cities and). The couple sometimes meet clients from online chat rooms, cruising men who had a sexual preference for MtF or threesome sex. Though sex work is their job 24 hours a day, they have gradually earned more and more money, which sparks hopes for the future. Boy friend Joy explains that when Linda finally “becomes a woman”, that is, when Linda finishes the whole-process of surgery or when they earned enough money, he wants them both to quit prostitution, leave tiresome Shanghai, get a small house, and start a small business. Nonetheless before this dream can become real, Linda has to spend a lot of money on her parents. Alongside sending money back home, Linda was also very proud to tell me about how generously s/he treated her mother when his/her mother came, for the first time, to visit Shanghai. Linda told me in a stern, but jaunty and proud tone:
“I remember when my mom came to Shanghai, I brought her to Nangjing Xi Road (a landmark, prosperous district in downtown Shanghai), I bought her clothes, gold rings and gold necklaces…etc. You know, I spent more than thousands (RMB), almost my life savings.  My mother has never been to Shanghai, she never left our town, but she was very happy; I think I really gave her a lot, as much as I could.”(Linda interview 11th July 2010)

Through expressing the intimate nature of the relationship with his/her mother, Linda's temper gradually cooled and our interview shifted to money, as Linda started to reveal how practical Linda was in terms of managing her income. Linda even criticised the interviewee fee I provided as being “not enough”, and reminded me that I would definitely have trouble finding interviewees at that rate, remarking that: “Well, since you want to know something from us, then you need to give good money here for exchange.”  Nevertheless at the same time Linda contended that the “donation” here made towards Linda’s mother is not only a sacrifice but instead is “something that has to be done!” 
       In my view, the claim that “something that had to be done” is actually quite complex; the “something” here is related to filial value but also relates to her personhood. That is to say, for Linda, to give money is on the one hand a way to sooth the anguish that Linda has to deal with as being a street escort, including the dramas with unpleasant clients or angry wives. On the other hand, it is also a way to give material support to the family that actually demonstrates that Linda can proudly claim that s/he can do more than other people who do not help their family enough. It also means that Linda is not a “cold-hearted” prostitute, who measures everything in terms of money, but rather somebody who experiences and practices values that are twisted with personal morality and money.
      My interview with Linda inspires me to rethink the ways in which the filial piety of intergenerational reciprocity and this gift-exchange is actually “conditioned” by material conditions. I argue that the “gift” here is more than one-way giving but is a component of an active reciprocity within the family. The givers, in this case, are Money Boys who buy gifts for their parents, but this “gift-giving” also returns back to the givers, appeases the Money Boys’ anxieties about being escorts, which opens up a space to claim the respectability of being a filial person. Actually, what I emphasise here is the ways in which sending money or gifts back home becomes mutual performance of reciprocity. The givers – Money Boys in my case – are not only “giving” gifts to his/her parents but the money and gift-giving is also a way to mediate the limited understanding and acceptance from their parents. This understanding also enables Money Boys to sooth the potential anxiety experienced by their families.  In this respect, in the end, they become the receivers of gifts (such as increased self and familial esteem) after performing their filial value. 
      This chapter demonstrates that this gift-exchange is not a one-way road of gift-giving, but rather is a way of reciprocal gift-giving between the seniors and juniors. I also maintain the ways in which Money Boys deal with distortions of self-dignity which is also about their “social faces” in Confucius society (Hwang 2006)​[27]​. Being a prostitute, or more precisely, a “same-sex” escort—these two highly stigmatised behaviours in Chinese society which seriously distort their “social faces.” Money Boys take this material donation to their families to “restore their faces back.” This is the ways in which this complex reciprocity operates, which is also deeply tied up from the “face culture.” In so doing, below I aim to continue to argue that the ways that Money Boys explain, about the importance of filial piety, is actually a gesture of struggling. In other words, filial piety, even as the most distinguished ethics that fabricates Chinese personae, is no longer symmetrically and equally operated. 
        Taking this cue to expand my argument, I will explain that what Money Boys can do, is to express and emphasise the obligation as a sort of moral defence. To assert the importance of family royalty is not simply a gesture of nostalgia, immovably embracing the old- fashioned moral ethics, but shows a reaction to the material struggling. Another interviewee, Kai, can further exemplify this argument.

Kai’s house at large

Kai is from Fujian, a province in south eastern China that is noted as an area that features one of the highest instances of Chinese citizens legally or illegally immigrating to other countries due to poverty (Chu 2010). Kai has worked on the streets since he came to Shanghai around 2005, in his early twenties.  With long hair, he drags up to meet clients who are supposedly unaware of his “real gender.” He even told me that he was “alright” with getting paid a low amount from each client and that he aspired to have as many clients as he could. Even for fifty RMD (about five British Pounds) he is “fine” to give a “quick blow job” to his clients –though he asks me whether it was utterly “safe”, in terms of HIV, to have oral sex without using condoms. 
        Though Kai was certainly struggling with money he always gave me a smile, with a touch of bitterness, saying, “What can I do? This is life so we all have to suck if off, right?” However, similar to Linda, our interview became more engaging when Kai started to talk about his family. Many Fujian people who are domestic or overseas immigrants sending money back home to help out their parents, perhaps to refurbish or rebuild a house which is a major way of ensuring their parents will have a better life in the future. 
        Having a new or refurbished house also allows let the senior members of the family to feel proud in the local village, as it demonstrates their children’s success in making money and practices filial piety at the same time. To allow his parents to have “face” in their hometown, given this ambition of family-pride, Kai distinguishes himself from “those young kids” who are selling sex to obtain luxurious gifts for themselves. Instead he was a Money Boy to support his family. “I really care about my family” he replied to me tersely but firmly. Plus, he emphasised:  “I don't care what other people do but I am different, I still contribute what I have to my parents,” Kai declaims. 
         Once again, what I suggest are the ways in which Kai and Linda’s stories can promote a more critical and close exploration mechanism or filial value. Indeed, for Money Boys, value is not only performed through material exchange but it also offers us another way to rethink how the traditional moral ethics, such as filial piety are also shifting in contemporary China, where the more resourceful subjects are able to perform filial piety for self-fulfilment. On the one hand, for the marginal, that is, Money Boys in my research, they defend the traditional filial obligation to sooth moral struggles.
       This chapter also proposes that Money Boys’ claims to traditional filial ethics are not only about the personal moral struggle but have a more public and political meaning. That is, this reclaiming of filial piety is actually a way of reacting to the inequality in China nowadays. And, as such, this also exposes the difficulties of living in a marginal and fragile social position, so that deep claim of filial duty becomes a sort of moral defence. The marginal citizens’ access to filial value through exchanging and accumulating emotional (such as performing “communicative” skills with parents as Evans notes) and social capitals (using family networks to earn enough money for parents) are significantly limited compared to the urban rich. To reiterate, I do not claim that essentially, filial piety is equally important to each person in Chinese society. This chapter has endeavoured to highlight how, in line with the kinship system, filial piety has been evaluated as a basic moral capacity in Chinese society, by discovering how my respondents interpreted and performed filial piety. To put it another way, I will argue that Money Boys are not that involved in attending the “new” filial value game. 
      As Evans (2008b) states, the new filial performance in China is enacted in parents and children employing or performing emotional communication with each other.  By self-reflecting and evaluating how to behave as a filial son or daughter, through the endowment of emotional capitals, their selfhood or gender identity is thus legitimated, Evans claims. This is however not for those who have very limited accesses to accrue emotional capitals such as for Money Boys, even though they reclaim the value of filial piety and justify this as a moral defence. To unpack my argument here, Xiao Lang’s story is important for letting us understand the power of bitterness.
 
Xiao Lang’s Homesickness 

Similarly to those young rural immigrant workers who are from a poor family background, at sixteen Xiao Lang, a Muslim son of a mining family, decided to move to the city and find a job in order to support his family. After years of moving back and forth in China, Xiao Lang finally stayed in Shanghai. “I did everything in my life, it is rare that people can do as much as I did”. Xiao Lang often reflected. The “everything” that Xiao Lang implies here does not refer to the hundreds of different kinds of part-time jobs that many rural immigrants do in urban cities, but rather to Lang’s decision to start selling sex a few years ago. When I met him, Xiao Lang was preparing for a sex change, when had already and had breast-implant surgery and plus. Xiao Lang interpreted the life trajectory as seeming to always be about crossing boundaries. Xiao Lang said: “As a man I am a hooker, now, as I am becoming a woman, I am also a hooker, who else can do that much I could” However, Xiao Lang's capacity for crossing the boundaries of gender, and his/her ability to blur the boundary between money and sex, relates to what Rofel (2007) illuminates as the “normalised desires” that are now exercised through the new neo-liberal regime alongside crossing boundaries. Xiao Lang kept telling me of the importance of being happy; that is, not to argue with people, not to ask for more if you already had enough, and to be practical and positive. Nevertheless, I contend that this sort of happiness is conditioned by or mirrored by bitterness. Let me elaborate this point in Xiao Lang’s journey. 
      As the youngest son from a small but closed Muslim family in the far west of China, Xiao Lang's father passed away in a car accident after working at the mining site. Xiao Lang was also in the car and had a serious head-injury from the accident. Shortly after recovering from the car accident, Xiao Lang decided to leave home to help the family's financial position on the one hand, and on the other “to breathe the air from the big cities.” But Xiao Lang soon had to face the difficulties of finding a proper job in the city. This also opened a door to experiencing the same-sex sex which was seen as a taboo in the Muslim religion Xiao Lang holds. In a homosexual cruising park, Xiao Lang experienced his first sexual contact with men; he then stepped into the homosexual world and due to economic struggles s/he eventually started to provide sexual services in the park. 
      To be a Money Boy on the street for years was an unrelenting struggling for Xiao Lang, particularly in dealing with the guilt of rebelling against his religion which is strongly against prostitution and same-sex eroticism. Additionally, at times Xiao Lang has had to face a lot “dramas” while engaging with abusive clients. One new difficulty is the pain Xiao Lang must contend with after the breast-implant operation. In terms of these daily challenges, Xiao Lang stated that he is quite used to dealing with these hardships, as her description of these unhappy experiences is “they are just snags in daily life which can be sorted soon.” But the resentment and homesickness towards his/her mother is, however unsolvable. 






What I am arguing throughout this chapter is that these likely claims of filial obligations, the expression of bitterness and their material feedback should all be realised as a struggle for value. Richard Sennett (2004) claims that the meaning of “gift-exchange” is getting more and more difficult to explain. Inspired by Marcel Mauss’s noted theory of gift- giving and his defence of the social welfare state, Sennett understands that what matters in the former’s account of gift-giving and receiving is the mutual exchange of emotion, particularly how “respectability” is a key affective force that binds people together. Thus, there are no “losers” between the receivers and givers in Mauss’s analysis as both are respected by each other. Sennett comments that today’s capitalist system and its attacks on welfare benefits has conditioned and devalued this exchange ethics. He argues that the neo-liberalism states treats those who have little resources to “give”, as a burden and as valueless. 
     Thus, the less privileged is given no respect –for the neo-liberal states identify themselves as the self-evident ‘giver’. In doing so, forms of gift-exchange are now evaluated and altered by the economy and State, and I assert that values are also shaped and redelivered by the latter. What I have endeavoured to achieve throughout this chapter was to use the concept of filial piety to probe into this shifting of ethics and the new inequality. 
      However, as the introductory chapter highlighted, some have declared that the new ethics of Chinese society is moving away from the ways of self-sacrifice or the speaking of bitterness towards the new performance of self-fulfilment, namely, to experiencing and “valuing the value” of life (Kleinman et al. 2011). This chapter has responded to this point but shifted to a more critical reconsideration by showing the ways in which different classed and gendered selves are actually given different quantities of resources to pursue and perform their ‘qualities.’ The market logic has shaped PRC as a nation-state polarised between the rural and the urban, lined with the newly middle class rich and migrant poor, therefore, the filial self –the moral model of Chinese society –is also reshaped and reconfigured through the material generations nowadays. 










(Photo 8 Cafe in Beijing. A cafe called “Hong Kong MRT” ( 港鐵 Gangtieh), serves the famous Cantonese milk-tea. The owner is a young lady in her 20s. She is a professional tourist of Hong Kong, where is the island she places her dreams, desires and love of modernity. Even people now consider her city is the star of global. Colleges students adore her small shop, for it provides high-end fashion and 




Queer Value and Queer China






As I acknowledged in Chapter two, female prostitutes and same-sex eroticism (as shown in concubine culture) were not new but familiar subjects in Chinese history. However, they gradually became seen as old-fashioned and regarded as filthy subculture. Concubines were attacked by social reformers from the 1920s onwards, during the May Fourth Movement, and were denounced as one imperative reason why the Chinese State could not improve and become a strong nation-state on the global scene, but instead continued to be bullied by imperialist Western countries and Japan. Additionally, as previously discussed, the anxiety of China being seen as late and lack in the context of global modernity and competition finally kindled a May Fourth Movement, led by the young elites who flagged cosmopolitanism as a key value for rebuilding a new Chinese State. 




The Queer Marxism Turn In China?


“The queer will therefore require an account of China, even if that account can only be exploratory, insecure, and always standing in an uneasy relation to other cultural knowledge’s and claims. As such, Chen’s text is an invitation to a radical theory of sexuality that is ultimately incompatible with the one developed by Foucault, and our critical task in the coming years is to transform the signifier of “China” into a useful set of queer tools. The Foucauldians have taught us much about the sexual history of China. The point, as Marx said, is to change it.” (Liu 2010: 316)


By rethinking the PRC’s rising power in altering the shape of the global economic and political milieus, theorists who are writing on China’s sexualities are nailing their discussions to the practices of desires (Rofel 2007), and how this sort of psychological impulsiveness from Chinese citizens is applied by the latter to the connection and communication of the global (Liu and Rofel 2010; Eng 2010), or to cosmopolitan practice. Petrus Liu and Lisa Rofel, for example, in their article “Beyond the Strai(gh)ts: Transnationalism and Queer Chinese Politics” (2010), declare that the timing of this is critical in seeing how this relatedness between China and the global can make certain kinds of sexual desires or politics manifest. They explain their idea of transnationalism as follows:

“The advantage of using “transnationalism” as a point of departure for our inquiry is that it allows us to produce a more historically rigorous account of a new kind of queer thinking that imagines one’s world, identity, and politics as either challenging or moving beyond the contours of nation-state politics. Some do so with a reinvigorated sense of political agency and cosmopolitan justice, while others feel compelled by their needs of survival, patterns of consumption, fear, or frustration. In either case, transnational connections are particularly important to consider with regard to queer Chinese politics”. (2010: 283; my emphasis)

Although Liu and Rofel (2010) are aware that transnationalism is not linear or equally applied by each Chinese individual, they still insist that transnationalism (stemming from the promise of cosmopolitanism) can be an important idea for us to understand how Chinese queer citizens are coming into existence. This is because the authors contend that Chinese queers today are actually at the site of “intersections” where global values and local ideas intersect to cultivate their selfhood. Thus, Rofel and Liu identify this intersection between the global and the local, but view it as naturally dynamic and unstable, and therefore the new Chinese queer citizens, characterised from these dynamics, cannot be normalised easily either. In this perspective, Liu and Rofel are not only convinced that transnationalism decides the style of Chinese queerness, but also maintain that the latter is able to deploy transnationalism or cosmopolitanism to shape identities of a radical and self-reflective queer self, and to thereby create a new radical politics. 
       This project is then recounted by Rofel (2012) and theorised as “Chinese Queer Marxism.” Generally, Rofel interprets that neo-liberalism has fabricated the material grounds for the privileged to emerge in Chinese society, but at the same time, new myriad desires have emerged too. From this perspective, she launches the idea of Queer Marxism to interrogate neo-liberalism. She contends that queer desires can be a means of interrupting neo-liberalism, which is facilitated through the trade or exchange of capital, and thus queer desires are able to disorder this exchanging system. Rofel puts it:

“Thus Queer Marxism leads us to address the question of value head-on, in refusing to subordinate erotic practices and desires to a secondary set of social relationships and in refusing to respect boundaries of identity as they have taken root and the been uprooted. Queer Marxism addresses questions that lie at the heart of both queer and Marxist politics: how do we develop a politics in the gap of what Petrus Liu has so eloquently stated as the “incommensurability between the value of a human being and its formal exchange-ability” under capitalism?” (2012: 186; my emphasis)

To be more careful in empirically reconsidering this theoretical account, however, it is difficult for me to be convinced of how much Marxism, being such a radical theory, can achieve. For example, by demonstrating that desires have emerged through neo-liberalism in today’s China, Rofel’s (2007) empirical research on Beijing’s homosexual lives was used to validate Chinese Queer Marxism. She presents that the new desires, generated from neo-liberalism as “gayness”, were also tied up with global human rights values. In my view, however, this is actually more about cosmopolitanism but not about what is claimed by her informants to be material struggle. Precisely, in Rofel’s case, gayness should be respected as human nature as her informants commented that gay rights are now justified as global universal values. And this recognition of desire in my view recalls the “cosmopolitan justice” that Rofel declares. 
      I assert, yet this statement of new gayness cannot promise the radical materialist view here. For example, as Rofel herself maintains, the young, Chinese gay men normally claim their sexual desires as superior or as being of a “better quality” to those of Money Boys. The denouncement of Money Boys by urban middle-class gay men is not only about the Money Boys selling sex for money but also about their inscription of value as rural, working-class backgrounds (Rofel 2010; 2012). In this vein, I question for what reasons can we situate Chinese gay men as radical materialist queers when they condemn the rural background of Money Boys? As Rofel herself states, those who can claim “rights” from the law in today’s China are always those who are materially resourceful and are able to translate their property into “rights”: “China currently has the formal rule of law, but only those involved with property, commerce and consumption can claim something called “rights” (2012: 189). Henceforth Rofel continues to expand her ideas, stating that Money Boys can also exemplify her argument of Queer Marxism, as their labour actually blurs the boundary between romantic love, sex and money. I also suspect Money Boys can be defined by Rofel as radical actors interested in global network participation to justify their desires while at the same time challenging neo-liberalism. 
       At least in the case of Money Boys, which I will prove later, what they are doing is actually engaging in the struggle for material needs instead of self-identifying as cosmopolitan players or neo-liberal interrupters. Even so I should give emphasis to that I do not tend to devalue that Queer Marxism fails to depict the terrain of new Chinese sexual politics, for the theory is certainly imperative for me to engage with in regards to the twist of “sexuality and materiality” which this thesis aims to capture. What this chapters claims is that the class-centric idea still haunts the Queer Theorists’ framework. For example, as Petrus Liu (2010), who employs the Foucauldian view of exhuming sexual ideas or experiences that enveloped China’s past, the crucial task now is to retool Marxism in order to “change” that past. However, this chapter has not witnessed enough proof to identify that material struggle or injustice is being addressed by Chinese Queer Marxist theory. Instead, what really convinces Rofel or Liu is more about the probing of how desires are produced and attached to certain normative (middle-class) selves. 
     That said, I now turn to Ara Wilson who argues that, “just as factory work (or wage work) produces the proletariat, global markets produce new identities and relationships in a number of ways” (2004: 190). For me, this actually subtends the emphasis of Queer Marxism showed above. For theorists mainly focus on how desires are spawning from transnational or cosmopolitan practices, but they do not think about the social cost within this – which is, who can be and who cannot be desired by capitalist market. Binnie (2004) raises questions about “whose bodies and desires can be consumed and whose cannot, and this is always crucial when aiming to relate cosmopolitan or transnational labour practices to sexuality. Therefore, lacking a view to explore inequality or exclusions through the making of desire comes from the inability to reconsider the issue of “labour” – which lies at the heart of Marxism – in relation to sexuality. I nonetheless insist that it is more urgent to see what kind of labour is evaluated as valuable and what kind is not, where we can thus explore how cosmopolitan desires are evaluated then practised by new Chinese citizens. Value, once again, is employed to shed light on the actions or labour force that are measured as exchange symbolically, and thus we can keep inquiring into why people are (forced to) react in different ways, due to the different resources to which they have access. 







Queer Value:  Exchange and Beyond


“Queer value addresses what Gayatri Spivak has identified as the “necessary complicity” between the cultural and the economic that allows the feminist critic to register the effects of her investments in seemingly benign value-systems within uneven global distribution of resources and division of labor. It is, to use the comparison Spivak offers, to see within the schemes of evaluation the domination of some values over others, the workings of exploitation.” (Wesling 2012: 107)


Following from the “commensurable” dynamics in the value system proposed by Spivak, who brings about complicity between culture and the economy, queer theory critic Meg Wesling (2012) proposes her idea of  “queer value” in order to bring Marxism back into accounts of sexuality for a reconsideration of the material grounds of desire. Wesling reasons that existing queerness is being formatted by capitalism’s investment, and is gradually characterised in terms of identity politics, which she criticises as limited and exclusive politics. To reverse this queer identity and to go beyond identity politics, she offers her reasons for retooling value in Marxism to reread sexuality:

“As I hope to have shown, the question of value reminds us of the imbricatedness of sexual desire and gender identity with material practices of production, accumulation, and exploitation, and helps us resist the temptation to see queerness as necessarily resistant to or outside such practices. On the contrary, it is by wishing to make queer desire do the work of extricating us from capital’s exploitative capacity that we miss the opportunity to explore such possibilities as they arise.” (2012: 123; my emphasis)
 
In doing so, queerness in Wesling’s view thus needs to be critically re-evaluated through investigating the hierarchy that lies within value production where some values are considered as beneficial but some are not. Wesling initiates bringing queer value into labour performance, in order to realise how it is ratified from materiality. For this goal, she flags “exchange” as the key method for carrying out the ways in which queer value is ratified. Below I detail how she fabricates her idea of exchange, but I continue to challenge this point by pinpointing the limits of exchange, which cannot include all types of queer labouring and performance. 
      Wesling’s argument of exchange is based on an examination of the drag performance in a documentary (Butterflies on the Scaffold, 1996) that charts queer culture and performance in La Guinera, a town in the suburbs of Havana, Cuba. She first delineates the ways in which drag performance in the local club actually exemplified an anti-alienated labour performance and yet-normalised gender identity. Wesling notices, under the tight economic situations, which performers could not or were unwilling to put on “make up”, “shining sequins and fabrics”, or those “raw materials of gender” for their performance. 
      This refusal, for Wesling envisions an alternative style of dragging – which exposed the material struggle rather than the “performing spectacle queerness” to embody gay identity. More importantly, she comprehends how dragging was actually a creative and radical labour performance, which she called the “self-conscious production of human work “(2012: 120), which sustains a politics of anti-identity. For the drag queens examined by Wesling, what they explained that they were doing was less about inciting recognition of the homosexual identity but instead, for local Cuban citizens, drag performers were bringing about and showing a new message of gender culture to Cuba’s local society from their queer performing/labouring. More precisely, Wesling agrees that performers were communicating with post-revolutionary Cuba, asking the latter to self-reflect its legitimacy through the lens of gender. Particularly in the early 1990s, when the documentary was recorded, Cuba was in an economic crisis after losing political and economic support from the Socialist bloc of the Post-War Europe, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and added to by the United States’ diplomatic enforcement of trade sanctions. Through this documentary text, she credits drag performance, showing how it skirts from the idea of individualism in self-identification, but with a more social, community-engaged labour style, with the function of communicating with society:

“Such a reading of value—queer value, as it were—comes through in numerous scenes, not only from the performers themselves in their discussions of the “important cultural work” they perform but also in interviews with other members of the community. As a local congressman puts it, “They are what they are, but they’re giving people something that others who aren’t like them, don’t give.” Later, one construction worker reiterates: “They’re the people who are giving this neighborhood a new level, a new character.” There are scenes that elaborate on drag as social utility, as a form of productive work.” (2012: 118; my emphasis)


Wesling argues how “desire” is making value through the intimate exchange between sexuality and the nation-state. She also extends this queer exchange to the broader and transnational field. For, she reviews the ways in which the drag queens’ labour performance is also estimated through relationships between nation-states. Where she additionally emphasises the ways in which performers self-reflect, making fun of themselves as they claim a higher value in U.S. Dollars when tipped, rather than in local Cuban currency and select American pop songs in their performances –all of these choices, for Wesling, are about transnational exchange as she claims:

“Such moments place La Guinera within the global economy and the particular history of US-Cuba relations. This interconnectedness is nowhere more evident than in the transformation of American pop hits by Celine Dion and Bonnie Tyler into catchy Spanish ballads to accompany these drag performances, highlighting again how seemingly natural categories of gender are imbricated in the global circulation of commodities and engendered through networks of cultural exchange and appropriation that reach far beyond La Guinera’s borders.” (2012: 117: my emphasis)

In light of this transnational exchange, Wesling’s argument of queer value is generated by multiple styles of exchange. However, while I want to argue that this claim of exchange actually resonates with the cosmopolitan desires that Queer Chinese theorists are promoting, I will argue that this is limited to a middle-class self-centric account. It does not consider exchange more critically but instead generates exchange as the self-evident and common labour for making queer value. Nevertheless, I challenge this point by arguing that queer value is not necessarily always generated by exchange, let alone by being the general way of labouring for value. In fact, theorists have illuminated that a more important way to clarify who can facilitate exchange and who cannot is by looking at the cultural, such as religious beliefs (Taussig [1980] 2010) or materiality (Strathern 1992), instead of directly placing value-exchange as a self-evident movement. Strathern (1992) for example, interprets how the key question in value-exchange is actually a need to define the ways in which the different bodies that own different objects or things (and values) are differently (or even unequally) evaluated and inscribed before they enter the exchange game. In other words, Strathern illuminates the process by which different people are given different values before they are exchanged. She underlines that it is the “relationship” between individuals which patterns this exchange process, as she exemplifies “women” as being the gender subjects who are evaluated through their biological productive capacity first, “before” the exchange comes later: 

“Since the things exchanged are often identical, then what must be measured are the relative value of persons for one another. In the case of exchange of women, a whole generation of anthropological theory has processed on the premise that women are identical in their reproductive capacities, so that what must be measured in marriage transactions is the respective pulling power of wife-givers and wife-takers.”  (1992: 172)

In this regard of placing personal relationships (with others, objects or themselves) in the centre of the exchange procedure, Skeggs (2004) enlarges this view into a more critical account by highlighting the conflicts inside exchange formation. In her account, through the view of personal relationships within exchange, one can additionally comprehend the ways in which tensions or conflicts might keep occurring amongst each other. That is to mean, exchange is hardly a game of fairness. In other words, exchange is rather formatted in terms of struggle and contest as for some resourceful individuals tend to win more through exchange (Brennan 2003). Yet, for those who have less, exchange for them might be exhausting and untenable for consummation as they are aware that they are usually doomed to lose in the unequal game of exchange. In this perspective, Skeggs (2004) demonstrates that it is imperative to realise that not everyone is willing or is able to do exchange, and the priority is to question whose perspectives are considered as an authority to make exchange happen. That is to ask, who has the power to consider something as exchangeable. In short, exchange is usually about the competitions of resources and authority. Skeggs iterates this point:

“By shifting attention away from the object/asset being exchanged to the relationships and power that make the exchange possible in the first place, we focus instead on whose perspectives make something valuable, hence exchangeable. This allows us then to explore the power that exists between groups that enables some to elicit/extract and appropriate dispositions and objects from others.” (2004: 11)

Through these theoretical reflections and debates of exchange, I aim to modify “Queer Value” with a more “grounded” angle in order to challenge the “transnational exchange” that Wesling illustrates above or the “cosmopolitan queer desire” that Rofel and Liu (2010) deploy. Throughout my own case study of Money Boys, I claim that “transnational exchange” is not the way that they utilise to perform and legitimate their queerness and value. My argument is to reflect how their experiences are not about claiming a desire to be connected to the global or to exchange, but as material struggle. Similarly, as exchange and global interconnectedness are not prioritised in my research, my interviewees were able to offer instead a labour performance, which is socially meaningful, paralleling Wesling’s case in Cuba. Yet for Money Boys, labouring queerness is not based in social solidarity, as with the Cuban queers.  
      By contrast, I aim to stress that what they inform us of is material struggle, as being rural immigrants, and having limited resources from citizenship benefits and networks, they have been pushed to work hard to survive. Their bodily experiences and performances shed important light on this struggle at the same time. This challenges the cosmopolitan desire in the generation of queer value. Lastly, before presenting my cases, I have to accentuate that I am not claiming that “struggle” here is actually to illuminate the “hopelessness” from my respondents. In contrast, I claim that value can be teased out through immigrants’ daily experiences or struggles, when living away from their rural hometowns. Therefore, the chapter starts to inspect how queer value is saturated and represented through Money Boys’ labour experiences and simultaneously, the ways in which through materiality (struggle), they expose the contradictions and contingencies at the heart of the cosmopolitan identity. 


                              Struggling for Value


“But recognizing the ideological means through which categorization and oppression operate does not negate the material foundations of their development. The ideological realm cannot be changed unless the energetic as well as the economic basis for its generation is challenged and defeated.”(Max Kirsch 2000: 110)

It was a rainy afternoon in early summer in Shanghai when I went to meet my friend Ray in a big local restaurant where Xiao Xue was going to perform. Yet, as Chapter Three addressed, Ray and I found out Xiao Xue was not only a performer, but was a Money Boy as well. What became evident was that Xiao Xue’s lived experiences offered a more significant and complex opportunity to critically think about the material reasons that shapes the possibilities for becoming a gendered self. 
      When I arrived at the big boisterous restaurant, surprisingly I found nearly a hundred people were there, enjoying the show and food. It was an annual local community gathering where the children and parents were from the neighbourhood yet all of the performers were middle-aged males who dragged as women. A gentleman who wore a beautiful red qipao, the traditional Chinese lady’s gown, was singing (dubbing) a pop Cantonese song from the 1980s – yet I wondered who in the audience could actually speak Cantonese or happened to know this old-fashioned Cantonese song. Later, a slightly younger man dressed as Cat Woman from the Hollywood movie Bat Man performed. Then another man performed some Chinese Opera as the female character (dan), gracefully sang a song winning the audience’s applause. My friend Xiao Xue gave the audience one of his new performances: the Bollywood India Dance. The audience seemed to enjoy it, though some men were wearing slightly withdrawn smiles towards the drag performers; but they were not the most important audience after all. In fact, the women in the audience were the particular key to coordinate this drag show. As Ray told me, there were two ladies there who were the most engaged and were basically the key persons in the local community (danwei). They were the ones who decided who could perform, and which restaurants they were going to choose for this big gathering in the community. Performers thus had to be very keen to socialise and at times flirt with those powerful ladies. I saw a lady feeding food to one of the main performers, whom Xiao Xue was competing to take attention away from. In this situation, Xiao Xue refused to sit at the same table with that performer. In fact, they shuffled tables, tossing back drinks and socialised with their fans separately. When Xiao Xue came to sit by Ray and myself, he finally could not help but complain about his opponent:  “I just don’t like him at all!” Xiao Xue muttered. 
      I then had a chance to go to the backstage area to speak to the performers. All of them were freelance performers. The one who performed the Chinese Opera routine was in his forties, and told me that he was sent to the theatre to be trained as a professional Chinese Opera performer during the Maoist years. Nonetheless in the theatre, he could not perform a female character until now, when there were changes in society, and he now found stages that belonged to him. For Xiao Xue, I asked where he found the Bollywood songs for his performance and he told me he conducted research on YouTube, where he taught himself the style, the lyrics, and the emotional expressions that Bollywood dance demands. While I mentioned that some Money Boys I met were spending fortunes buying luxuries or paying fees for a gym-membership, Xiao Xue was suddenly silent for a few seconds (at that time he had not yet implied to me he was also selling sex) and then with a tepid smile on his face, he said:

“Well, you know, life is all about gain and loss (De Yu Shi). When you are too desperately searching for something, at the same time, you are losing another. You never know, but this is life isn’t it? Always about to get or to lose!” (Xiao Xue Interview 15th June 2010)

Xiao Xue’s response inspired me to rethink the issues of personhood for Money Boys through a more intricate angle. For me, Xiao Xue was not simply deploring those Money Boys who spend money on luxurious things, who were in fact “losing something” such as dignity. However, in my view, he was implying that endeavours for measuring life’s costs have become vital for everyone including himself. More specifically, living in a more marginal position in society, or in the sex industry, since he is in his middle age, without a charming face or a fit body physique, Xiao Xue actually is quite well aware of those difficulties for him to “get something”, that is, “money!” 

In so doing, Xiao Xue had to measure what could bring him more “gains” and actively seek who and what could help him to secure his position, which meant that at least he could have basic material goods such as a room and food. So he learnt the new Bollywood dance from the Internet, to fawn on the power ladies in the community. In terms of networking, that is, struggle to get social capital, I notified the ways in which he tried to befriend Ray or me, whom he thinks may know or has contacts with managers of restaurants, gay bars and NGOs that may offer him the potential to perform or compete with other performers that are also preferred by audiences and the power ladies.  
      All of this, in my view, is not only about manipulation but it shed an important light on the ways in which the socially marginal in the new Chinese society have to learn how to maximise their capacities in order to have their basic material needs met. Yet, as Ray used to tell me, Xiao Xue is “a real queer”, in reference to the latter’s different kinds of gender positions— of being a drag performer, a Money Boy, and a partner of an on-off girl friend. In this manner it seems that Xiao Xue’s sexual position is mobile or nomadic, for he does not rigidly give himself any gender identity. Nonetheless, for me, with the movement of his gender positions in accordance with daily situations, Xiao Xue, once again, indicated that the experiences are all conditioned through material struggling, such as the possibilities of valuation or devaluation. 
      This is why I do not propose queer value can be understood from the perspective of transnational exchange as the theorists above have proposed. Indeed, Xiao Xue spotted global trends such as Bollywood from the Internet and then digested and replayed them in his performance. But Xiao Xue’s labour performance here is not about regenerating social value, that is to say affecting the community, which makes the latter more acceptable to their gender identity as exemplified in Wesling’s Cuban case. Indeed, one may notice that recent research on drag queens’ performances view queer performances as a catalyst to incite communication and debates within residents of the local community (Taylor and Culp. 2003), or contemplate drag queens are “Global Divas” (Manalansan 2003) for their capacities to generate local and global values regarding their diasporic background, which enabled them to challenge the mainstream gender or race norms. For example, a drag queen in Taylor and Rupp’s American case announces that “We’re not just lip-synching up here, we’re changing lives by showing people what we’re all about” (2003: 189). Or, in the authors’ case, one performer creatively related the “drag” to when gay men were “dragged out” by the police in the Stonewall event in 1969, where gay men in a New York gay bar decided to “fight back” against the relentless harassment from police at that time, and finally Stonewall became a remarkable historical event for global LGBT rights activism. This creative reflection on “drag” then is gleaned by Rupp and Taylor to reclaim how “dragging” is always a political performing even if it comes from the performers’ “entertainment value.”  





In thinking about the “mobile culture” stemming from the fast-paced digital technology development in East Asia, Chris Berry et, al. (2003) depict the ways in which digital queer identities are produced then reconfigured through the on-line arena. The authors welcome the coming of the digital age and they view opportunities for Asian Queers to create and reshape their identities on-line, through their countless, rapid and transnational encounters with other queer subjects on the Internet. They call it a process of “identity synthesizing” in East Asian content as they demonstrate:

“Technology from hardware to terminals and memory bytes, plays an important role as a link, a network and a practice for mediating the divergence and convergence of queer ‘n’ Asian displacement […] From sexual politics to cultural policies, the same browsers with different clicks drags icons to reveal the junctions and disjunctions where meanings crack, collide, and collude. In spite of and alongside the commercialization of sex from Net-order brides to online Asian gay and lesbian pornography, new media have become a crucial site for constituting new Asian sexual identities and communities.” (2003: 13)

As such, Berry and Martin retool this idea then advance it, illustrating the ways in which South Korean and Taiwanese gay and lesbian groups have created an on-line space in the BBS (Bulletin Board System) or other CMC (computer-mediated-communication) virtual spaces where their identities can be exchanged and switched on- or off-line (Berry and Martin 2003: 88). The authors reject the homogenised idea of “global gayness” but instead propose that the communication between the local queer and homosexuals and global cultural powers is a way of synthesising (2003: 106), so that on-line queer identities are also generated through this process. 
      This theoretical account is quite similar to the recent queer theories that have been applied in Taiwan and Chinese-speaking areas, which propose a strategy of being nomadic or shadow-like for the queer self in order to challenge the binary between the queer self and others, subjects and objects, or global and local (Liu et al. 2007; Huang 2011) since these are all “synthesised” instead of being separated in theorists’ accounts. However, I intend to rethink this idea more critically for the reason that this synthesised politics of identity, which is animated by transnational desires, is for me actually echoed in my critique of transnational exchange above. These assume that identity or value exchange is highly digital and geographically wide, that is, global. 





Xiao Ping, the youngest interviewee of mine, was from the rural province of An-Hui, and began to evaluate his selfhood, or “worthiness” of life, when he was nineteen. As a rural boy who came to Shanghai three years ago, Xiao Ping has tried different kinds of Da-gone (part-time work) which barely offered enough salary to meet his living costs. After leaving a job as a waiter in a nightclub, Xiao Ping joined Chen Ma’s brothel, starting his Money Boy career. When I met him in a brothel, Xiao Ping was the most engaging interviewee I had encountered. At the same time, he was keen to know how to go to the “right” websites, such as the popular match websites, to meet his future boyfriend, who he would like to be “a mature and reliable person” he said. Thus, I helped him to register on some hip gay dating websites (one is “Fridae” the most popular LGBT dating website in Chinese-speaking areas). 
       Once, during our interview, Xiao Ping told me that he totally realise that being a MB has made his material life more comfortable, as he could afford to buy some clothes quite often from H&M or Uniqlo in the central city, and in particular he could go to the hair salon to have a treatment or just a blow-dry immediately after meeting clients. But when we set up his profile on a match website, filling in sections of the profile asking “What kind of man is he looking for”, Xiao Ping unexpectedly curbed his excitement for making a profile on the dating website, and told me in a down and low tone that “no one will want to be the boyfriend of the one who is doing this kind of work [escort] for their job...”
      At that moment, I also felt upset and had a moment of self-blame in thinking that perhaps my advice to him to join the dating website caused some sadness that was my fault, an act of arrogance on the part of the researcher. However, after I left China, the website has become a place that I could regularly contact Xiao Ping, getting updates on his life in Shanghai. Xiao Ping is the one who is more engaged in Fridae than any of the other Money Boys I met in the brothel. I noticed that the reason they go on the Internet usually was to cruise clients in adult chat rooms, instead of making friends or for personal networks. I knew this since most of them are not even bothered about using email, as this is far too complicated and unnecessary for them in their daily lives. However, Xiao Ping is unique in that he is quite interested in joining a dating website. 
      As described above, he is always hankering for a romantic relationship and this made him act on joining Fridae. But I do not comprehend Xiao Ping’s move to join the virtual world as being about identity synthesisation or exchange. Most of the time, Xiao Ping shared with me concerns about his ongoing struggle with financial difficulties in Shanghai. In 2012, he finally decided to leave Shanghai for the reason that there was “nothing interesting to keep me staying here” (沒意思;mei yi si means non-sense and meaningless), and decided to go home. As with Xiao Xue, I do not comprehend Xiao Ping’s labour, or their struggle for value as a type of cosmopolitan performance or identity recognition. By contrast, queer value here, through their labour performing, is more embodied in struggles for the material security. 
      This does not mean that I am suggesting the economic capital is the only way to probe into (queer) value, as this runs the danger to dismiss the ways in which culture is also rooted in the value formation. I maintain that before employing this twist between economy and culture, it is necessary to clarify how different bodies (and their labour performing) are conditioned. This means that different people have different accesses to resources before they are involved in entering process of value (Skeggs 2011; Skeggs and Loveday 2012). 
      To emphasise, Money Boys in my case informed us that one should realise that everyone’s desires are not equally valued. The more practical way to justify queer value should specify that “labour” itself





This chapter has discussed that the theorists who have suggested a new Queer politics in China have missed an imperative point because they failed to notice that queer value is actually riveted in materiality. By taking cosmopolitanism or transnationalism as value which feed into the construction of a Marxist idea of queerness, I questioned a perspective that cannot respond to the violence that lies in the new material distributions that Money Boys are experiencing. 
















Cosmopolitan value, rethinking materiality


“In other words, the post-modernity that accompanied colonisation – or semi-colonisation of China – has certainly accelerated in the last 25 years. Dislocations, cultural self-consciousness, nostalgia, eclectic agglomerations of style, and commoditisation have gathered pace. Without doubt their connections and references cross national borders. But they occur under the governance is necessarily territorial.” (Feuchtwang 2004: 17)





To reconsider this research of value, a critical moment would be helpful here to reiterate the many faces of value practices written in this thesis. My fieldwork notes from the 3rd June of 2010 were noted down as follows:

“Went to have a reflexology “therapy” and felt totally surprised by my own stupidity for today’s fieldwork afterwards! From the beginning I assumed that this kind of place is served by a female masseur. “Who the hell would know or believe that there is a male-male masseur salon open on a noisy high street in a city in PRC?” But soon I knew I was totally wrong whilst confused about where the female masseurs were, the two teenage boys had already started to do their job. I couldn’t stop noticing how up on the wall there was a statement from the Shanghai mayor’s council, proclaiming the rules of “Nos” in this place, namely, any sexual interactions between masseurs and clients. Neither could I stop looking out at another salon located on the opposite side the street, a dozen middle-aged local gentlemen were also enjoying reflexology from young boys. My local friend told me that that was the most famous salon in this neighbourhood, and that men normally bring boys to the back-room for private sex services after the reflexology service.”  
     It was a day in June, and Ray, a friend of mine who helped me network with Money Boys in China, was provocatively asking boys, have you ever noticed “June 4th?”(Tiananmen Turmoil). Our masseurs, two 18-year-old boys who came from rural Sichuan, south-western China, gave us confusing but tepid smiles, and then shake their heads. After reflexology, we walked through the street markets, where female prostitutes stood in front of erotic masseur salons to search for clients, and then we headed to a big ballroom dancing club located in an old building nearby. 
    I was overwhelmed by nearly a hundred middle-age local men coupled up on the stage, dancing Waltz and Cha-Cha and indulging in the live music from a small band. Most of them wore lovely smiles while dancing and most of the men were married, according to my local friends. As in their time - the time of socialist revolution - marriage was personal and political, as it fit into the “collectiveness” of communist value.  The other people were sitting on the sofa around the big stage, smoking and drinking; Money Boys stood in the “hot corner”, near the entrance, waiting for potential clients. Not one woman was here. After the ballroom dancing club closed, some of them walked to a small park nearby, where people were cruising for sex or clients. Xiao Xue came to say hi to me and left to probably approach potential clients. At the same time, my friend Ray began a small quarrel with a local gay friend there, by complaining that western “foreigners” (Wai Guo Ren外國人) are annoying, (as they tend to involve themselves in China too much today). But his friend, talked back, saying, “What's the problem of you? I don’t see any problems with them? Without foreigners, homosexual people would be sent to jail in China!” (Fieldwork note 3rd June 2010) 
                                     Why Value?

This is part of my journey in Shanghai, where as a researcher of new China, I was at pains - but at the same time felt excited - to meet different people, when I gradually immersed myself into the world of values, gleaning and then interpreting which values my informants felt were important and thus struggled for. It also resounds with what this research posited initially, that theorists have now noticed how value is a term that is notoriously difficult to define, as it is not rooted in economy but twisted into moral imaginations and accountability (Sayer 2011). David Stark (2009) implies that “worth” is a keyword in understanding value by bridging “value” and “values”, that is, the economy or moral reasons that prompt people to react. He claims that “worth” is a moral reaction to how people evaluate things, persons, social relationships or even life itself as being worthy or not:
“The key concept in this fusion is the notion of worth. The polysemic character of the term—worth—signals concern with fundamental problems of value while recognizing that all economies have a moral component. Rather than the static fixtures of value and values, it focuses instead on ongoing process of valuation—whether in assessing the value of firms under competing metrics of performance, or in studying the incommensurable assessments made in daily life.” (2009: 8)

Braided together with materiality and morality, Stark is arguing how the ethos of “worth” has become one moral force that drives “value-evaluation” work within capitalist economic institutions. However, in my view, the “worth” in Stark’s account, as a mediator of moral ethos is still way too self-evident, whereas we hardly can tease out the contesting dynamics inside the value processing. In other words, I argue that “worth” is actually not enough for us to understand value when it merely functions as a moral idea about (economic) production as Stark demonstrates, which ignores the struggle within. For instance, Andrew Sayer (2011) declares that when one thinks of values as the ways in which they matter to and are practiced by people, it is particularly essential to grab the “middle evaluation” between the binary of “is” and “ought.” Sayer suggests that what is behind people's actions in daily life is a process of unremitting evaluating between those values that people identify “are” or “ought to be” important, good or bad, and the tensions between the two fronts. He demonstrates that people live in this ongoing process of valuing as “evaluative beings” (2011:142) and considers the ethics practiced by them is the ability to relate to others/differences:
“We can live only as social being, and our social being is always developed in particular cultures [...] Our ability to treat each other well or badly depends on how we relate both to what we have in common and what we have that differs.” (2011:142)

Sayer's argument, for me, offers a more dialectic and thus practical account to probe into worth and its relationship to value. Indeed, value is not about self-morality evaluations of worth only, under the name of making profits. It is rather as a mutual evaluative process, as our decisions or practices are actually related to other’s struggles. This view is presented within this research, where the previous chapters have investigated the ways in which value is experienced then practiced through Money Boys. Also at the same time, how value is produced then distributed unevenly and unequally through capitalist markets in China. I have noted in particular the ways in which value is not merely about “production”, but also tends to relate to struggles and performance, patterned by different people who own different culture and economic capitals. I have shown the ways in which people who have more resources and therefore “access” can be more privileged within the game of value production. The reason for this is usually that the capitalist market characterises and dominates value production in order to respond to the privileged desires or imaginations, as the latter have more capitals to make profits, thenceforth process their value in advance. In this perspective, this thesis thus insisted on and pointed out that it is not enough to merely focus on the production of value, as this would merely unveil how the privileged becomes privileged, which therefore ignores those who are devalued through neo-liberalism, at least in my case study of Chinese society. I also have therefore focused on reading value from the marginal — or Money Boys in my case — exploring the ways in which they experience value, and how these practices can only be captured through bodies. Taken as a whole, the research evidenced the ways in which value is practiced through Money Boys' classed and sexual experiences. Let me refer here back to the previous chapters in order to show how they have substantiated my argument throughout.

Real Class, Real Value

“A new Chinese working class is struggling to be born at the moment when the language of class is curtailed and becomes inarticulate. The new working class is this spectral other, gazing at itself but expecting no one else to see it.” (Pun 2005: 28)

I unveiled my research assumption from a critique of the new Chinese self in the introduction, where I interrogated recent theories that depict a new emerging Chinese selfhood in the neo-liberal milieu that has been named as a “value turn”. Nonetheless, this claim is limited in my opinion as when theorists argue that there is a “value turn” altering Chinese society today, value in this sense is seen as a self-evident term, only available to certain (resourceful) people (Solinger 2012). Precisely, from the view of the “value turn”, one witnessed how theorists applied Foucault's ideas of “self-discipline” to inspect the ways in which Chinese citizens started to cultivate the quality life that they expected. Under the Chinese state's discipline, citizens are evaluating what they want and what they measure as worthy and valuable, but at the same time, how the new self learns to be self-responsible for their choices.  
      In this respect, for example, this research noticed that there is a great deal of scholarship that has noted down the ways in which modern Chinese citizens are practicing value through their pursuits of intimacy. Also, it is always to do with how neo-liberal logic has grounded the market, so that people are able to start to purchase and perform their intimate relationships (Zelizer 2005; Berlant 2011). In the Chinese case, since the 1980s when the state's leader Deng commenced the “economic reforms” project, the capitalist market for native citizens to purchase intimacy has also been created and refashioned. The reopening of clubs and bars in urban cities became a phenomenon, providing the venues for a young generation to express their sexual desires and perform their urban and gendered bodies (Farrer 2002; Scroll 2006). In light of intimate citizenship, sex education, for example, gradually emphasised and applied by the Chinese government (Evans 2008b) and LGBT’s rights activism has yet become visible in the public media and on-line communities. Last, perhaps more radically relating to the performance of sex is China's virtual fields, where recently porn websites, amateur DIY (Do-It-Yourself) sex tapes, adult chat rooms and blogs are rapidly proliferating on the Internet, challenging China's notorious information surveillance culture (Jacobs 2012). Katrien Jacobs (2012) recognises that porn materials cultivate the new on-line sexual identities for “Chinese young adults” but there exists an interplay between  “sexual citizens” and the state's governance, that amplifies through her Foucauldian critique:
“Sex and pornography have become central forces in China's twenty-first-century politics, in its technology and cultural policies and in its blueprints for Internet governance [...] The Chinese Communist Party aspires to control activism and political movements, yet it also promotes a specific type of netizen activity through commodity fetishism and/or consumerism.” (2012: 13)

Taken as a whole, the value turn here explains the ways in which bodies or sex are now associated with value, when styles of intimacies are allowed (by the nation-state) to become more versatile, following the opening up of certain intimate spaces (such as bars, clubs and the Internet). From Chapter One however, I began to state that the value turn is partial and middle class-centric, as it clearly specifies how value can attach to the body and self. My critique followed Anagnost (2005), who demonstrates that in the contemporary Republic of China, the opportunities to become a “self-fulfilling” or “responsible” citizen is however conditioned by materiality. She argues that the “successful” cases from China's economic achievement are exposing how capitals are unequally given to very few people. And it allows them to become the ones who are able to join the game of self-discipline or responsibility, anointing them as the role model of new Chinese citizens. Yet for most Chinese, particularly those immigrants who are now the majority population in China's urban belts, the ability to self-claim as a new governed self is highly contingent. Given this, in my account, the value turn is more about struggling and excluding, rather than self-evident. In this vein, by reviewing the stories of life experiences from the immigrant poor in urban China, Anagnost rejects the Foucauldian view to understand the questions of self or value, but through the lens of material struggle she declares​[28]​:
“China’s economic reforms of the last quarter century are revealed to be a much more contingent process in which the twists and turns of policy have afforded unparalleled opportunities for wealth accumulation for a few, while dispossessing a vase majority of others. These stories repeatedly demonstrate the importance of social connections, timing and prior formations of political and cultural capital as critical factors in determining one’s success or failure.” (2005:i)

Following this view, my research started its journey by challenging the idea of the “value turn”, asking for what reasons only certain bodies or sexual experiences, in certain places, are evaluated, while some are excluded in this discourse. In other words, I have insisted on rethinking this value turn from the perspective of materiality. By deploying Bourdieu's theory of “capital”, I reinvestigated the contingencies of value practice. I initiated to survey how Money Boys' rural background and class experiences can bring us into the world of value, by enquiring how they are able or unable to acquire capitals, in what ways they are deploying them and for what reasons. I have sought to discover through their sexual labours or their performance of gender (such as changing sex from male to female) how value is deeply embedded in their bodies. Below I shall be clarifying what I have found from this intersection of sexuality and class through the value lens and how it is impacted in my research on Money Boys.
          









                         Findings: Cosmopolitanism

I started my journey into value, and how it is embedded in class and the body from modern Chinese history. In other words, to fulfil my goal to understand how male-male sex has been imagined and then legitimated as identity, Chapter Two took a detailed and critical review of modern Chinese history and acknowledged how same-sex experiences are starting to be valued, or devalued. Following several theoretical endeavours (Berry 2001; Sang 2003; Lim 2006; Chiang 2010; Kong 2011), the chapter highlighted how questions of homosexuality in Chinese history also shape the ways in which same-sex sex is understood as a sort of behaviour or action, an experience more than a claim of identity in the past. Following this theoretical implication, Chapter Two traced how homosexual eroticism, particularly when practised in concubine culture, is evaluated in history. From historical texts, literature and legal cases, I stresses that the ways in which same-sex sex is entangled in cosmopolitanism. 
     As a result, the chapter considered the ways in which historically, since the 20th century, cosmopolitanism has been repeatedly employed by the social reformers to depict the fate of the Chinese state, such as when the latter was seriously invaded by Western and Japanese imperial power. Taking this anxiety to resist colonial imperialism, the leading reformers, through the May Fourth movement years in the 1920s to the Chinese communist revolution and finally, to the post-Maoist era, cosmopolitanism as an ethos has unremittingly mobilised China's desire to move to the global centre (Rofel 2007). 
     Within these cosmopolitan desires, the chapter sought out how same-sex sex, along with prostitution, was increasingly attacked by reformers as the shame of an old-fashioned Chinese concubine culture, which symbolised China's late arrival to modernity in global political competitions. 
        Later, the research also noted the ways in which during the Maoist years, same-sex sex was further imagined or categorised as hooliganism crime, an umbrella term that the Chinese Communist Party borrowed from the Communist Soviet in order to discipline political rebels. As I also highlighted, since the 1980s the market logic of post-Maoist China has witnessed cosmopolitanism not only being recalled by the nation-state. Cosmopolitanism was also gradually registered into the account of identity, as well as affected by the opening-up of social activism, such as the mushrooming of local NGOs groups. For instance, in Chapter Two I thus explained how, in 1995, China's one noted legal case of homosexuality as defamation to personal identity and reputation has referred trickily to - and then legitimated - homosexuality as a sort of identity or gender belonging.    
      The historical review endeavoured in this thesis is imperative for it provided a ground on which to examine how cosmopolitanism, as a key value for the nation-state, has been gradually modulated as an account of identity. Through this historical search one can witness how cosmopolitanism has been gradually employed to shift same-sex eroticism from the hooligan (one who misbehaves) to the homosexual individual (one who owns identity). More importantly, the research went on to retool value in order to critique this new cosmopolitan identification in China, by asking how it has privileged certain people as potential cosmopolitan subjects but at the same time, conditioned others within its (classed and gendered) regulation. In Chapter Three, for example, the methodology explained why identity theory cannot capture Money Boys' experiences, as I discovered the ways in which the latter's sexual and class practices are not treading a path towards an identity belonging, that is, to self-identification as a gay man. Money Boys’ “doings”, that is, body performances and class experiences are significantly patterned by their daily material struggles, which are also altered by the State’s policy such as hukou policy, which limits their search for citizenship benefits and job opportunities as stressed through this thesis.  In this vein, and by going against identity theory, the thesis detailed the ways in which Money Boys are wrestling with cosmopolitanism when it acts to legitimate gender and (middle) class identity. Hence, in Chapters Four and Five, I detailed the ways in which value highlights a dynamic and contesting processing of the deployment of capitals, through Bourdieu's thinking. These two chapters specified value as a process of struggle for capitals and resources more than as a self-evident “fair” game of governmentality. Cosmopolitanism therefore was emphasised here as a dominating social force that mediated the politics of capitals from the State to individuals' self- legitimating. 
     Chapter Four examined theories of cosmopolitanism and challenged the idea that cosmopolitanism as a ground of universal humanism can be used to cultivate the cosmopolitan self, since this is highly limited by class. My contention is that in today's China, where neo-liberal logic is more aggressively endowed, the conversion of cosmopolitan ethos and identity politics actually resonates with the neo-liberal logic, for neo-liberalism and understands people who are able to pursue capital investment and accumulation as having personal identities which are entitled by the property that they own. In this vein, however, I was reminded by my interviewees of their ability to challenge cosmopolitan logic by showing the ways in which their bodies (and gender performances) negotiate cosmopolitan identity. In Chapter Five, for example, I showed that when cosmopolitanism is related to pedagogy, privileged to the only-child in middle-class families, the ways to define the “high or low quality” (Suzhi) of a person is anchored in one's in/ability to be transnational. My respondents, however, reversed and reused suzhi discourse in order to envision desires for a better future, instead of taking suzhi to draw social distinction between Self and Others. That is to say, Money Boys do not accrue or attribute capitals for themselves in order to evaluate or exchange with others, or for self-legitimation. 
     Nevertheless, this rejection of dominant value politics is no easy labour for Money Boys. In Chapter Six, I uncovered my informants’ struggles for family values. Filial piety, as the most privileged and traditional ethics or Chinese heterosexual kinship, is being refined and reemployed by the neo-liberal State as a new filial value. The new filial value is based on the mutual exchange of emotional capitals between generations, which is a communicative skill generated through cultural capital (Evans 2008b; 2010). Nonetheless, I found, Money Boys are struggling in this new game of filial value. Lacking the capital to become the new filial son, marked with the stigma of being sex workers, my interviewees indicated that they are hardly able to attach new filial value to themselves. Instead, their reaction to filial piety was a more traditional way of dedicating their money, or economic capitals to their parents in order to defend themselves are  filial sons. The dedication of money was also considered as a way to appease moral anxiety within their families for being sex workers.
       In this respect, once again, Money Boys revealed the ways in which value is always characterised through capitals. It is about how much or how little they have, and thus the ways they can or cannot produce value. Value is about competition, impinged on by the interplay of inclusion and exclusion. Through this research, Money Boys demonstrated the ways in which value is indeed patterned by material struggles (class) but how it is also complicated through bodies. Bearing this in mind, I concluded my research with a reconsideration of Queer Theory in Chapter Seven. By reviewing recent scholarship on Chinese queers’ lives or the labouring of value, I announced that existing theories have not noticed how “queerness” should be generated through “labour” first instead by identification. I however suspected that reflections on queer transnationalism have yet over-determined cosmopolitanism as transnational exchange is a major way of promoting queer value and global capitalism, which I would suggest fails into the middle-class solipsism trap. Once again, through my case study, the chapter demonstrated the ways in which Money Boys' labour or queer performance is not characterised through or rooted in transnational exchange, but in material struggles.
      Lastly, the research reiterated value as an analytical tool to understand my interviewees' lived experiences, deciphering what they are doing rather than defining who they are. Thus, value is not merely about the making of the self. In this research value is about how the marginal reacted to China's intense social transformation, which has stimulated the rapidly polarisation of urban rich and immigrant poor.              This thesis has found that the inequity of distribution of materiality is embodied in cosmopolitan desires (Ho 2009), which have been used by the Chinese State (consider CCTV's statement in Chapter Four), middle-class families (the Harvard Girl), LGBT activists and even radical Queer Theory promoters. Money Boys, as the ones who live in the marginal area of their class and gender background, are experiencing this new form of inequality in their own ways. 
     Taken as a whole, the research is however aware that it seems unfair to condemn homosexual identity or cosmopolitanism as being purely negative. As I exemplified in the beginning of this chapter, through a small quarrel between my friend and his gay friend, cosmopolitanism has given gay men a reason to feel or sense their identity as a sort of “rights.” This is why I disagree with Dirlik's (2001) caution regarding protecting identity in China today. Dirlik argues that to attack identity means to support capitalism as the latter in China today demands individuality through the market mechanism thus devaluing collective identities, such as working-class identity. Nonetheless, Pun (2005) claims that working-class identity has never been really legitimated by the workers themselves in modern Chinese history. She demonstrates that during the socialist past, working-class consciousness was hijacked by communist revolutionary discourse and now it is middle-class identity, which is promoted by neo-liberalism and the nation-state:
“Maoism serves as the best example to illustrate how the politics of articulation forcefully “announce” and then shaped the Chinese proletariat in the socialist period. In Maoist China, class was formed without its corresponding subjects; the interpellating power was taken over by the party machine in order to create class actors.” (2005:26)





Conclusion: Bodies in Liminality 

In 1975, living in the diaspora in the United State, the legendary novelist Eileen Chang (1920-1995), who is considered to be as the most important Chinese female writer of the twentieth Century (Wang 2004), tersely noted down her life journey which was twisted by China's fate:
“To many others communist rule is also more palatable for being a reversion to the old order, only replacing the family with the larger blood kin, the state, incorporating nationalism, the undisputed religion of our time. What concerns me most is the few decades in between, the years of dilapidation and last furies, chaos and uneasy individualism, pitifully short between the past millenniums on the one hand and possibly centuries to come. But any changes in the future are likely to have germinated from the brief taste of freedom, as China is isolated by more factors than the U.S. containment policy.” (1975: 298; my emphasis)

Chang continued on to confess that she could not have understood the common experiences of personal negotiation and struggle with family values and nationalism at that time which were rooted deeply in her writing until she decided to leave China, due to the Communist Revolution, and encountered various difficulties as being a foreign writer in the United States. In other words, Chang revealed how she started to evaluate herself, her works’ value, which is riveted in the individual’s pursuits for freedom and its entanglement with the traditional family values. That friction is elaborated as the primary theme that preoccupied the Chinese “new” writing at that time:

“I myself am more influenced by our old novels and have never realized how much of the new literature is in my psychological background until I am forced to theorize and explain, having encountered barriers as definite as the language barrier.” (1975: 295)

That said, only when Chang came across the contingencies of “uneasy individualism” after experiencing cosmopolitanism, and was forced to theorise and re-evaluate her own works, could she have initiated the self-evaluation of her life and of being a writer. As a result, I want to conclude this thesis through Chang’s encounter with self-evaluation and her views of China’s future, which are shaped through the difficulties of being a transnational or cosmopolitan subject. Chang’s statement seemed to foresee that the cosmopolitan desire, for her fellow Chinese people uphold, will only keep facing barriers rather than envisioned as a self-evident performance. Value is therefore a critical analytical tool for unveiling these numerous and intricate contingencies within cosmopolitanism, styled by the accumulation of capitals rather than comprehending value as a self-evident attribution. Through the Money Boys, and their day-to-day struggles, my research reiterates that cosmopolitan identity is uncaring of marginal experiences and it thus needs to be rethought and challenged through the bodies of the marginal. This thesis here thus claims there are more issues can be expanded and extended through my own research, such as the “liminality” that the young rural-to-urban generation is experiencing, which I shall be shortly expressing below. Let me unpack my thoughts with two cases study.

Lives in Liminality: The Young Generation and Chinese Future


In China after three decades of economic reform, while the sense of
social embeddedness that was once the core of the moral economy is partially eclipsed by an individualistic and materialistic determinism, it continues to shape the way self and living are structured in postsocialist times. This assemblage of self- formation techniques and class possibilities draws from multiple cultural and political sources (such as socialist, neoliberal, and Confucian ethics). It is innovative yet unstable, distinct yet heterogeneous. (Zhang 2012:664)


In her ethnography in Fujian, the most noted immigrants-export province of China, Julie Chu (2011) asked her informants why so they are willing to spend almost their whole life savings paying to smuggling snakeheads and then hiding in the storage room with a dozen of people in the bottom of the boat for many months, in order to migrate to the United States. Those “ready-to-go” immigrants all expressed to Chu that their motivation was the “bigger value” of American dollars. “One American dollar equals five RMB” today, the latter is being more valuable according to Chu’s interviewees. 
     “Bigger and better”, manifested in American dollars, mirrors the better values of a better life and brighter future expected that will be achieved in the U.S.A for the immigrants. The immigrants’ evaluation of American dollars has called “cosmology of capital” by Chu. In many ways, this thesis aims at prying out how the cosmology of value is embodied by Money Boys, through their daily experiences, their uses of suzhi and cosmopolitanism and practises of filial piety. Here I will conclude this thesis by expressing a need to rethink the lives of the new Chinese rural-to- urban generation. Issues can be extended from this research, that is, to reread the condition of “liminality” that contemporary Chinese youth is experiencing; How can we begin to understand the youth politics, which is quite different from the Maoist past, but very important for us to understand the new Chinese society? (Hoffaman 2010; Anagnost 2013). How their self-making become possible in that critical moment in the city? In terms of “youth politics”, we witness that, during the Maoist time, especially for the Cultural Revolution, “the Red Youth” was the most frantic group that recalled by Mao to stand on the front of the Revolution (Wang 2003), launching the incisive attacks to Chinese traditionalism, Confucianism and bourgeoisies. In other words, the young individuals had privileged stages to perform.  For today’s Chinese young generation, however, they are facing the drastic transition of society which is altered by the dramatic market privatisation, rapid urbanisation and deeply urban and rural division, which are all joint with State’s authority and deeply alter the young people’s future (Anagnost 2013). Ong and Zhang (2008) term this movement as “socialism afar” by emphasising how values of Chinese socialism are still powerfully affecting the movement of new Chinese society. The labour force of the young generation is more imperative in evaluating this new grouping of the socialist past and the marketism present.   
      I want to explain that, the performance of value, for most Chinese young generation, that is- the “post-80s”, is situated in the condition of “liminality.” Generally speaking, liminality is a concept that refers to the recapturing of the anthropological idea of “rite of passage”, considered a “dynamic” and challenging process of self-making for young individuals. By learning to acquiring and practising skills, the young people have to overcome the various challenges and difficulties in this critical period, to prove they so can become a proper adult in their community or society (Pun 2005; Yan 2008; Fang 2012; Liu 2011; Anagnost 2013). In this account, researchers above reapply the idea to remap how the modern individuals are actually forced to rethink and reflect upon themselves; their choices and their performance of skills, and this practice can also reflect the movement of their societies. It is from Victor Turner’s (1967; 1969) notable definition of liminality, where he suggests us to take the liminality from the aboriginal societies to rethink the modern societies and communities. In this account, following Turner, Liu Shao-hua suggests we can be retooled to reframe the new power structure of today’s society:

“Anthropologists usually employ these concepts to describe formal or institutional transitional rituals in traditional, preindustrial societies; however, (Turner 1969) argued that, because the formation of communitas and its changing relations to a society’s power structure are universal, rite of passage can be found in all types of societies.” (Liu 2011:52; my emphasis)

Liu’s use of liminality is to document and ask why the young aboriginal men (Nousu ethnic) she met in south-western China, a place that becomes a group have a disproportionately large number of HIV positive individuals compared to others in China. Liu claims that for her informants, those young HIV positive men, becoming heroin addicts and carriers of HIV, are the prices to pay for taking the decision to leave their hometowns, in order to taste the exciting urban life, earning money in order to prove themselves as a grown-up. Liu sees their decision to leave their hometown is a action of  “passage to manhood”, a very common and necessary immigration, for young Nousou men have to prove themselves can become an independent mature men and meanwhile take care of the economy of their families at home. Using and trading Heroin or opiates becomes common and symbolic practices among young Nousou men in cities, showing that their masculinity and individuality can be matured. In short, lacking education and ability to speak Mandarin in the Hans-dominated cities, drugs trading, thefts and other illicit activities are continued practiced by Nousou men in cities in order to make money, and this has interpreted as “fun and adventurous” by the young people (2011: 72). All in all, the migratory patterns of Nuosu youth is understood as a rite of passage by Liu, carried with the young people’s yearnings for a better life.
      To expand the thinking of liminality for Chinese young generation from the rural, there is a more radical research that showcases the precariousness of living in the liminality. It is the suicide scandal in Foxconn factories 2010. Owned by Taiwanese company Hong Hai, Foxconn is noted to manufacture Apple’s products such as I- Phones and I-Pads and it employs one million workers, most are migrant workers born from the 1980s onwards (Pun and Chan 2013). In 2010, however, there was a “wave of suicide” in its factory, dubbed the “Foxconn suicide express” by Chinese citizens which become a global-noted scandal (Litzinger 2013); Foxconn’s low payment, long working hours, heavy workload and its militarily-style management style is blamed for the fact that so many young workers, one after one, cannot bear the pressure then decided to end up their own lives. Foxconn reacted by hiring numerous psychotherapists, and decreasing the workload that ultimately helped a little in improving the situation (Pun and Chan 2013).




For, this research has presented, through the “skill” that Money Boys are performing, through the discourse (such as suzhi and cosmopolitanism), and retooling and thus through the values they are making, we could be more accurate and critically to capture the less privilege’s lives in contemporary China, at least in my own case study, is rooted in the daily struggles instead of performing self-identification.  I do actually aware that this thesis hitherto had put more efforts in illustrating “struggles”, rather than “happiness” that Money Boys are experiencing. However, here I argue that my intention is to challenge those research outcomes that misunderstanding the “self-making” as a natural and self-given game in today’s China. Hence I countered this thinking by inspecting Money Boys’ lives, stressing that the self-making should be better situated in the context of liminality, where one has to perform and practice various skills in order to survive through the “rite of passage.” Thus, revisiting the politics of “bitterness-speaking” (Su Ku), which I interpreted in the methodology chapter, might be a new way that one can take to pivot around the young generation’s live in the future. The reasons are as follows. First of all, with a more historical sense, as I have suggested, “bitterness speaking” had been deployed as a political weapon by the State, given to the subaltern (most were peasants) to vent off their anger and to attack their employers and landlords during the Communism Revolution period. It was through the bitterness speaking, the class, or more precisely speaking, that the “working class” was gradually discoursed and formulated in Chinese history for the first time. 
      In other words, Su Ku is a discourse that was used to recall then which worked to “fabricate” Chinese working class. But for today’s China, I contend Su Ku can be reused.  As a political speech-act, Su Ku can be retooled as a method of capturing the language that the young Chinese generation is speaking and acting. Particularly for those less privileged, as cases presented above and my own research here, the bitterness they are able, or unable to speak out can help us to document the experiences that young individuals are performing. Secondly, as the Money Boys’ case had implied, the experiences are always related to the body. More critically, for neo-liberal politics is asking the huge need for labour force in China, the young people’s bodies, particularly of the immigrant youth, is the main group demanded by this labour chain (Fang 2011; Anagnost 2013). In this case, the pains or the enjoyments that migrant bodies experience in their daily labour life shed a light on how global capitalism is such deeply “embodied” in the young individuals’ lives.       
      However, as my research had argued, Money Boys for example, are not merely passive victims. For example, when one interviewee of mine, Xiao Lang was at pains deciding on whether or not to undergo gender “reassignment” by implanting the plastic breasts, she is aware that it will cause body pains but the new body will help for her business, giving her better living conditions in Shanghai. At the same time, the new gendered body however gives her pleasure and new sensation from new bodies, in performing gender and femininity, which she has always been interested in. But Xiao Lang, after a year of shifting gender, decided to remove her breasts, due to bodily pains and her Muslim religious faith. Therefore, the key here is to capture how individuals react to their own choices, and the ways in which we realise these reflections of their life, which are also considerably affected by outer social forces (such as economic security and religious faith in Xiao Lang’s case). How will they interpret their life?  Su Ku here is a creative way I offer to engage in. 





	Age (2010)	MB Experience Period (year)	Rural/Urban background and hometown	Gender/sex
1. Joy	25	3	Xian (Northwest, rural)	MSM (in a relationship with a girl friend)
2. Stone	24	0.5	(Northeast)	Gay
3.Linda	27	6	(Jilin, Northeast)	(Male-to-female)
  4.Xiao Lang	26	10	Gansu (Northwest, rural)	On-Off Male-to-Female
    5.Hank	27	5	Anhui (rural)	MSM
    6.Lotus	25	4	Shandong (rural)	In-process Male-to-Female
    7.Kai	27	on/off 7	Fujian (rural)	MSM (Drag while working)
   8.Xiao Ping	20	0.5	Anhui (rural)	Gay
9.Robert	26	2 (part-time)	Chongmin Island (rural Shanghai)	Bisexual





                                Brief Biographical  Notes

Joe
From Xian, Joe is the most confident interviewee we met. He came to Shanghai as a Money Boy when he was 22 years old, through a friend’s network. Joe is tall, outgoing, tanned and handsome with a boyish smile. He goes to the gym, pubs, to karaoke and the shopping mall, and is full of the energy of a young urban person. Joe is quite popular in this industry and his friends told me later that he has a girlfriend. Joe can easily get more than 15 clients in a week according to him, and he always told me “everything is fine” of his life, no one is mean to him, he enjoys the moment.”
Stone
Stone comes from northeastern China. He had only been a Money Boy for a few months when I interviewed him. He told me that he came to Shanghai because he was always thinking about urban life. He is a good friend of Joe. He follows in Joe’s footsteps to try to earn quick money. Stone is handsome but with a more macho and masculine body than Joe. He could be called a “bear” in the gay community’s language, which makes him popular in the sex industry. He could have more than a dozen clients a week. Stone told me that he actually went to another big city in the north-east, where he was a doorman for a hotel. It was an OK job for him, but boring. But it was there that he met some businessmen from Taiwan, particularly those who worked in the entertainment industry coming to work for a concert for a Taiwanese pop star. These people opened a door to Stone to glimpse modern, urban life. These people befriended him and finally pushed Stone to move south, to Shanghai, to see a new world.
Linda 
Linda is from northeast China, like her boyfriend Junjun, who is a son of a poor peasant family. Linda decided to change gender (by implanting plastic breasts) in order to get more clients. Being a Money Boy for Linda is only about making money, not a very interesting but a necessary job she has to work. She stresses how much of her earnings are given to her mother, for the importance of the filial piety. She is very proud of this. She has a strong personality and is sharp and clever. Linda complains the interview fees are not much enough. At times, she has quarrels with her clients’ wives, and those rows almost become physical. She works on the streets most of time. She wants to quit the business as soon as possible; right after she has enough savings she will leave Shanghai and set up a small business with her partner Junjun, who is also a Money Boy.
Xiao Lang
Xiao Lang is the only Muslim Money Boy I interviewed in Shanghai. She comes from the far west, from a very poor and very small farming village. Xiao Lang has lived in Shanghai on and off for ten years. His father was a miner, and died in a car accident where Xiao Lang was in the same car. Xiao Lang had a serious brain damage took a long while to recover. As a Money Boy Xiao Lang mostly worked on the streets, and as an MtF, Xiao Lang always has to deal with anxious clients who are eager to know her true “gender” in the bedroom. She had implanted plastic breasts and her face and skin are pale, and her acts and gentle manner demonstrate her femininity.  Xiao Lang often has to deal with feuds that happen when the angry clients refuse to pay after discovering Xiao Lang is not a “real woman”. She then insists that “Time is Money” and telling these clients that she is not afraid of the police, as she knows the clients would not want to “mess around” with police in China. Except this, Xiao Lang is actually a soft-hearted person, she is gentle and kind while doing interviews and always warm to people she has met. She is also struggling with the plastic surgery on her breasts due to her faith, and in the end, in 2011, Xiao Lang had her plastic breasts removed.   
Hank 




Lotus is from a small village in the far northeast of China. She is very tall and slim with wide shoulders. She still has a strong northern rural accent, which she said that the local people could easily spot and mark her as an outsider. In addition, by changing gender, her in-between (she is also an MtF) body also disturbs the gender “order” of Shanghai. I remembered once we took a lift together, and a middle-aged man could not stop checking Lotus’s body, from head to toe - when Lotus kept massaging her breasts, saying that they “really bloody hurt”. Lotus holds a desire to find a boyfriend is leaving China for good. She is also quite rarely among Money Boys, and is involved in NGO and other LGBT rights activity, following Ray, the NGO worker’s, and Lotus’s housemate’s encouragement. 
      Lotus is keen to practice her English, and she is doing very well, as she quite likes foreign clients as she thinks they are “easy going”. Lotus is outspoken and chatty though she is always on the edge of being financially broke. Nevertheless, as her friend told me, she is never stingy with her care for people she likes.
Junjun
Junjun is Linda’s boyfriend. He comes from the same hometown as Linda but compared to Linda he is very sociable, although careful to observe peoples’ intentions. He mentioned that he could introduce Linda to me if I was willing to pay the interview fees. He sometimes drags on the street with Linda and other Money Boy friends. He is also close to Xiao Lang, and they love to go to Karaoke together. Junjun has been in the industry for five years, and he recently “came out” to his mother that he is earning money in a “bad way” on the phone. His mother kept crying but told Junjun that there was nothing she could do to help, as the poor family needs money. Junjun wants to have a small business with his partner near his hometown after he quits Money Boys. It is a way to start a new life, he says. 
Kai 
Kai is from Fu Jen, a southern province of China. He has long black hair and a skinny figure. He smokes a lot. He came to Shanghai when he was 19 and has been a Money Boy on and off for nearly seven years. He drags and works on the street mainly for oral sex, which he thinks, can be quick and easier. He charges a little for sexual services (50 RMB) sometimes. Like Linda, he kept stating the importance of filial piety during the interview. “I am not like others, I am very filial” he said. He wants to earn enough money to help his family build a new house in his hometown, which could allow his family to be proud in the neighbourhood. 
Xiao Ping
Xiao Ping is a 19 year-old Anhui boy who came to Shanghai for two years after high school. He went to a technician-training course before but disliked it. He thus decided to go to city to have a look of “new world.” He likes Japanese manga culture and dresses himself as the “Bishonen” (Mei Xao Zien; meaning Pretty Boy). He likes going to hair salons and shops for pretty clothes. Xiao Ping is soft, pale and slim, and longs to meet his “true love” from a dating website. He told me that Shanghai people dislike Anhui people the most, as they are bad neighbours who come to Shanghai to do bad things. “A lot Anhui gangsters in Shanghai so they hate us” he said. I helped Xiao Ping to set up a new profile on dating website, and he told me it has to emphasise that he only needs a mature and reliable man, and that the “look” is not important. After two years I left the fieldwork site, and Xiao Ping decided to go back to his hometown for a while; he said that Shanghai life is boring for him. But he will think about the next step soon. 
Chen Ma
Chen Ma is the owner of the brothel, where Xiao Jun, Robert, Xiao Pin and his daughter Pingping live together. In his thirties, Chen Ma is divorced and told me he never let his former wife meet his daughter for certain reasons. He seems nice to his Money Boys in the brothel, though he is keen to ask and track where they are going and who they are meeting outside the brothel largely due to the commission he can get from the deals of his Money Boys. He told me he is a nice “boss” for sometimes his Money Boys stole his stuffs then left but he never seeks to track or punish them. He also has his own clients who he does not share with his Money Boys. He goes to the gym every afternoon, then picks up his daughter from school afterwards. He is a strict father, quite bossy while asking Pingping to do a lot of housekeeping. Sharing the same bed, Pingping has to move to another room when her father has a client coming. Chen Ma also sells male underwear through a small business online.  He also tries to make friends online and has his own dating website profile where he describes himself as a lonely man living in the past, but sincerely trying to find true love in the future.

Robert
Robert works in Chen Ma’s brothel. He is a sociable and handsome guy in his mid-20s. He used to study textiles in Japan so he speakes Japanese fluently. He is from an island near Shanghai. When he needed more money and perhaps needed male-male sex, Robert started as a Money Boy, though he still has a girlfriend. He is very popular in the industry and his clients kept calling him when we were doing interviews. He showed me around the centre of Shanghai, the gay bar he goes to, the street he walks around, the shops he likes. He is not keen on using the Internet as he prefers to meet people face-to-face and he is not shy to talk to strangers. He met a white British man on the tube, and was given the name” Robert” from that English teacher. He wishes he could save money enough to leave prostitution, though he knows he spends too much money on clothes. But he wants to have his own clothes shop in the future, as he really loves fashion. He has also joined an insurance sales training course, a new skill he contends is useful for his future.
Xiao Jung
Xiao Jung is a Money Boy in Chen Ma’s brothel. From Anhui Xiao, Jung has worked as a Money Boy for two years now, though he is thinking of leaving soon. He reasoned that after two years in Shanghai “it’s about time” to go home. Xiao Jung is very easy going, and rejected me paying him interview fees as he thinks our meeting was the start of a new friendship. We had dinner with other Money Boys and Chen Ma once in the brothel, but he had to leave soon as a client called him to join a threesome with his former roommate, who was another Money Boy. He told Chen Ma that he was taking his laptop to be fixed; it was true that his laptop was broken but he would do his secret business behind Chen Ma’s back first.  
Xiao Xue
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^1	  Xiaowei Zang (2011) declares that China has surpassed Japan as the 2nd biggest economic body in the world, 90 times bigger since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping started his reforms. Plus, according to the research from Goldman Sachs, China might overtake the Unites States as the world’s largest economy in 2020.
^2	  Empirically, for example, one can easily witness the profound shifts based on intense changes in the politics of distribution, where the People’s Republic of China was arguably the leading “income-flat” State in 1978 but now is the most extreme example of income and resource polarization (OECD, cited by Otis 2012:1).
^3	  Felski contends that Nietzsche’s account of history is, after all, that we cannot avoid facing the burden of historical consciousness and in doing so we might have a space to engage the fissures of history. Felski then states that “Nietzsche’s untimely mediations have themselves become timely in an era that is marked by the questioning of History but also by a proliferation of histories. History may no longer stand as an absolute guarantor of metaphysical truths (did it ever really do so?), but magisterial proclamations of its imminent demise coexists, often on the same bookshelf, with a tumultuous array of references to history, tradition, and the past across a variety of cultural forms and genres” (Felski 1995: 208).
^4	  What is of primary interests to Dutton is the materiality of time in China. He addresses: “The dustbin of history, then, always has its rag-picker and recyclers. They will forage through these debris, searching for the eternal, lifting out those things that can be “turned”, transformed and reconfigured” (Dutton 2008:140).
^5	  Dan is the male actor in Chinese Opera.
^6	 Wan Yanhai “Homosexuality and the Law in China”. From http://www.utopia-asia.com/chinlaw.htm; visited on 11th May, 2011.
^7	 See Wan Yanhai “Homosexuality and the Law in China”. From http://www.utopia-asia.com/chinlaw.htm; visited on 10th May, 2011.
^8	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/15/mr-gay-china-shut-dow; ;visited on 29th January 2010
^9	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/15/mr-gay-china-shut-down; visited on 29th January 2010
^10	  Http://chinaplayer.blogspot.co.uk; visited on 22nd August 2009
^11	   See how this controversy was kindled from Weibo to the Entertainment Industry in China and Taiwan.  http://stars.udn.com/newstars/collect/CollectPage.do?cid=7793;  visited on 11th November 2011
^12	  See http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/www.yn.xinhuanet.com/ent/2011-06/30/content_23130846.htm; visited on 11th November 2011
^13	 See http://blog.caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151194-33615.shtml; visited on 28th August 2011
^14	  See http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/local/2011-07/10/c_121645484.htm
^15	  http://ent.163.com/11/0705/09/786JE5KA00031H2L.html
^16	  See  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UMFPwJu58tU
^17	  See http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 ; visited on 18th April 2011
^18	  It is the belief of Kant that human beings should be differentiated from animals as he proclaimed: “The universal feeling of sympathy, and the ability to engage universally in very intimate communication. When these two qualities are combined, they constitute the sociability [Geselligkeit] that benefits humanity and distinguishes it from the limitation of animals.” (Kant [1968]; cited by Cheah 2006: 488.
^19	  Appiah (2009) later reminds his readers that the responsibility of the cosmopolitan today is “we have to figure out how to live in a world in which our responsibilities are, not to just a hundred people with whom we can interact with and see. But to six or seven billion people whom we cannot see and whom we can affect only in indirect ways...But you cannot abandon your local group either, because that would take you too far away from your humanity.”(Appiah 2009: 113)
^20	  Kant reviewed his “human archive” as that “its greatest perfection with White race. The yellow Indians have somewhat less talent. The Negroes are much inferior and some of the people of the Americas are well below them.” (cited by Harvey 2009:22)
^21	 Haiven notes, “In the circuit of imagination, social action, and social value, cultural and institutional mediation occurs at every state” (2011: 98).
^22	  See http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E7%B4%A0%E8%B4%A8; visited on 1st March 2010.
^23	  See http://csat.org.tw/csa/journal/73/park_73.htm ; visited on 20th May 2010
^24	 http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/book/2004-03/23/content_1378535.html; Visited on 4th May 2010 	
^25	  Fei argued that the Chinese kinship system works as a  “relay” of reciprocity for each generation; a married man in his adult years has to take care of his children and his parents at the same time until either his children get married or his parents passed away. Fei explained this relationship as follows:  F1F2F3Fn. Here the 26 (continued) “F” refers to the family, the number (N.) means different generation; the arrow indicates the way of nurturing. Shortly, for Fei, each generation in this kinship system all shoulder the responsibility for each other. But for the Western society, the kinship system in Fei’s view however remains one way: F1 F2F3Fn. (Fei 1984:86)
^26	  Ong’s case study of overseas Chinese families who establish transnational enterprises revealed the ways in which filial piety as a sort of governed force that bounds family members together for the common good and interests, for example, economic profit. In short, new Chinese wealthy families are economic units tied up with moral/filial ethics; Chinese family biopolitics indicates that the family’s business is the extension of family household, when filial ethics are transformed into economic value, by converting moral obligations into capital accumulations.
^27	  Hwang (2006) elaborates that in the Western societies, “face” embodies the situated identities presented in different situations as Goffman’s famous theory of front and back stage playing. But in Chinese culture, for Hwang, face is highly about the construction of selfhood, which is also tied up by society’s expectations to you being a relational and respectable individual. 
^28	  Anagnost claimes“ After all, one of the premises of China’s economic reforms is that the unleashing of market forces will produce a new type of subject, a risk bearing individual “responsible for his/her own profits and losses” whose productive energies can be developed through the pursuit of economic self-interests in a free market.” (2005:i)
